PULL-OUT SECTION:
TORIAL HISTORY OF THE PALESTINE TRAGEDY

SPECIAL DOUBLE ISSUE

# INQUIRY

Vol. 3 No. 9 Spring 1994/1414H $6.95

## THE HANDQUAKE:

## Peace or Surrender?

# Orphan Sponsorship Project in Palestine

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# About this issue

This issue exclusively covers many aspects of the PLO-Israeli accord-political, economic, security, legal, human, etc. It shows the many weaknesses of this accord supported by strong arguments and documents. The writers come from diverse backgrounds—Muslims, Christians and Jews, religious and secular, academics and activists, supporters and non-supporters of the PLO. This coverage shows that the latest agreement is a mirage and will not work unless it is substantially modified or imposed on the Palestinian people by the threat of force and not by the strength of persuasion or conviction.

## From the desk of the editor

Dear Reader/Supporter/Brother/Sister:

It has been almost two years since the first issue of Inquiry came onto the scene. Our objective was to bring to the Muslim and non-Muslim communities of the US coverage of major events that are central to the Muslim world. We have also provided news analysis with a perspective that we believe is hardly given a chance in the "official media" whether it is that of the US or the Islamic countries.

It is our firm belief that a fair and unbiased look at the events and developments in the Muslim world is not just simply an educational and enlightening experience, but also a necessity for the following reasons: First, to counter the bias against Muslims that overwhelms the mainstream media, especially that of the US; second, to create better understanding of the Muslim people amongst Muslims and non-Muslims in the US; and third, to create awareness amongst Muslims and non-Muslims of the important changes taking place in the Muslim world and the effects these changes have on the state of the Muslims worldwide.

Clearly, this task is difficult but we here at Inquiry are determined to pursue it despite the very little resources at our disposal. Inquiry's funding comes primarily from subscriptions and individual contributions. However, these two sources are not able to maintain Inquiry in its present costly form. Therefore, we are forced to make changes with regard to the frequency of the magazine and its number of pages. We found that this was the only alternative if we are to keep Inquiry alive while maintaining its non-partisan approach and independence.

We expect that the restructuring of Inquiry will take some time and we ask for your support and patience. Because of the delay in publication, we will extend the subscription period to cover the number of issues that would otherwise be mailed within the regular subscription period (i.e., six issues per one year, etc.)

Again, we appreciate your support and patience, especially in these difficult times.

Sincerely yours,

*The Editor*

**INQUIRY**
**An Intellectual View to the Muslim and an Islamic Perspective to the Intellect**

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The ***INQUIRY*** is published periodically by the Islamic Committee for Palestine (I.C.P.), an affiliate of Islamic Concern Project, Inc., a non-profit organization, P.O. Box 82009 Tampa, Florida 33682.

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This publication is brought to you by a voice whose purpose is to encourage study and analysis of the social, political and economic spheres underlying the conflict areas of the Muslim Ummah; with a view to educating the general public to an awareness and appreciation of these issues. The views expressed in this magazine are not necessarily those of the Islamic Committee for Palestine or its members.

Annual subscriptions are $15 in the U.S. $20 in Canada and $30 abroad. For institutions: $28 in the U.S., and $45 abroad. For advertisements and information contact:

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# The handquake: Peace or surrender?

In the words of an Israeli Zionist activist, the September 13 signing ceremony represented the second biggest victory of the Zionist movement. The modern political Zionist movement was launched by (the secular) Theodore Hertzel when its first conference was convened in Switzerland in 1897. Its ultimate victory was fulfilled with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. This objective was achieved at the expense of the wholesale robbery of Palestinian land and rights. For over seven decades the Palestinians have been subjected to a continuous state of displacement, terror, repression, occupation and denial of their rights - human, political and religious.

**The nature of the conflict**

Since the 1940's the Palestinians have rejected any settlement that legitimized the existence of a Zionist political entity in the land. On the other hand, the Zionist doctrine was to impose facts on the ground, absorb lands and then move to the next target until more land is occupied. The wars of 1956 and 1967 were launched by the Zionist state precisely to acquire more land and impose its will on its enemies. The 1973 war was initiated by Egypt and Syria in order to force a political settlement in accordance with UN resolution 242. The end result politically was to remove the biggest Arab power from the conflict—Egypt—through what was commonly referred to as the Camp David Accords in 1978. Once Egypt was taken out of the war formula, Israel launched its biggest campaign against an Arab country in its invasion of Lebanon and siege of Beirut in 1982.

3 months later, the Palestinians were forced into a third exodus after 1948 and 1967. Under a terrific campaign of Islamic resistance, the IDF was forced for the first time to withdraw under military pressure in order to cut its painful losses in the south of Lebanon. Israel retained however a strip in south Lebanon for political bargaining, water resources and what it termed also "security reasons" in defiance of UN resolution 425. With the protection of the political and diplomatic shield of the US Israel defied the international community by blocking all peace initiatives advanced by scores of governments including the former Soviet Union, the European Community, the Arab regimes and the PLO. The objective of Israel continued to be to absorb the land and to try to make life so difficult and miserable for the Palestinians in the occupied territories they would eventually either leave or adapt to life under occupation.

**The breakout of the Intifada and international realities**

The intifada ignited and showed the Israelis that the Palestinian people would accept nothing short of total independence and end of occupation. With all the brutality, repression and Nazi-like tactics used by the Israeli army the intifada was sustained for over six years against all odds.

With the collapse of the Communist system, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the rise of a uni-polar superpower, a new global political system emerged. Coupled with the total destruction of Iraq and the break-up of the Arab regional system, Israel was now more secure than ever with the potential of absorbing many Jews in the Eastern bloc countries.

The Arab nationalist-secularist regimes have reached the end of the road. The objective of establishing democracy, social justice, human rights, development, modernism, reform, the end of imperialism and the liberation of Palestine have become the mirage and a symbol of the failure of the secular nation-state system in the Arab World and to a lesser extent, the Islamic World.

**The resurgence of Islam**

The loss of Palestine, the heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds, represented a feeling of total failure, frustration, despair and anger in many Islamic countries. The 1967 defeat sparked the re-emergence of the Islamic movements in much of the Islamic World. The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran; the Jihad in Afghanistan; the Islamic resistance in south Lebanon; the rise of Islamic Jihad and Hamas in the intifada in Palestine; the emergence of an Islamic state in Sudan, the electoral victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria; the Continuous challenge of the Islamic move-

ments to the regimes in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan; the strong showing of the Islamists in the Yemeni elections are all examples. Add to that a strong resurgence of Islamic trends in Kashmir, Malaysia, Turkey, Pakistan, the Central Asian States and even among Muslim Communities in Europe and North America. Islamic resurgence has become a world-wide phenomena. The new cold war has been redefined by many in the West as a one between North-South with Islam representing the ideological threat in the South. Islam was seen as a threat simply because of its real and potential ability to resist subjugation, hegemony, exploitation, manipulation and adaptation of secular-humanist values which in many respects deny or ignore God's revelations.

Hence, the battle for supremacy of Islamic traditional values, the re-assertion of Islam in public life, and the movement towards liberation and independence from the new global secular West with Israel as its spearhead became more acute. The secular and westernized elites in the Arab and Islamic Worlds have become natural allies to the external forces whether willingly or unwillingly. The governing elites in the Arab World including the PLO belong to this latter category. It became apparent that despite the popular call in the Islamic world for the restoration of Palestinian rights, the liberation of Jerusalem, and the tremendous resources at the disposal of the governing elites, their political initiatives were totally directed towards accommodating the will of the West and Israel. The "updated and revised" statements—demanded by the US—of the chairman of the PLO to recognize the legitimacy of Israel since 1988 are only one episode of this road.

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**Israel first accord**

The Gaza-Jericho first agreement came at a time when the PLO leadership was more isolated than ever especially in the aftermath of the second Gulf War. The shunning of the PLO was not because of so-called terrorism but because it symbolized the Palestinian tragedy in all its aspects. The Madrid formula and the subsequent Israel-PLO recognition and agreement insured that the parts that address the core of the Palestinian problem were removed—namely, Jerusalem, the Palestinians in the Diaspora, the issues of sovereignty and independence, Palestinians in 1948 occupied land, the settlements, the land and water, etc.

What is interesting to note is that the PLO, including its present leadership, totally rejected the Camp David accords which was a step-up to the current agreement. What is given now to Gaza and Jericho was given to the whole West Bank and Gaza in Camp David.

The accord was signed after an exchange of letters between the Israeli Prime Minister and the chairman of the PLO. In his letter to the Israeli Prime Minister, Arafat recognized the Zionist entity to live within secure borders and consequently the right of any Jew in the world to live in Palestine while denying this right to the overwhelming majority of Palestinians. Moreover, he, in effect, denounced the right to fight occupation by any means available and tainted the struggle of the Palestinian people throughout this century against occupation and repression and he even promised to stop the intifada which is the popular revolt and uprising against the occupation. He furthermore acted on his own authoritarian rule (typical of all Arab regimes) to disband the Palestinian National Charter—the covenant of the Palestinian people. With all these humiliating concessions, Rabin as a Prime Minister recognized the PLO as a representative (not the sole legitimate representative as the PLO insisted) of the Palestinian people as long as it abided by the many preconditions stated earlier.

It meant the abdication of responsibility on the part of the PLO towards the millions of displaced Palestinians who yearn to return to their towns and villages in Palestine, the giving up of self-determination and independence, the continuous engagement with the hegemonizing Zionist regime, and more importantly closing the door on future generations which could be better equipped to liberate the land, restore the rights and establish real peace and security to the people.

On the other hand, the Zionist regime did not give up its dream of establishing "Greater Israel" and left the door wide open to any eventuality. Not a single word in the Declaration of Principles document refers to the Israelis' military rule in the occupied territories as occupation. In fact, the spirit of the whole document confirms the fears of the Palestinian negotiating team in Washington that the

Israelis are negotiating over "disputed" territories and not "occupied" territories as the Madrid formula and its accompanied assurance letters indicate. In this accord the Israelis are simply the leading partners to the Palestinians in almost all relevant matters—security, economic, political, resources, etc.

**Dangers of the accord**

The dangers of the accord are so pervasive that they render any gains of limited recognition or simple economic relief to the population meaningless. The following is a summary to these dangers.

1. The aim of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, the document states, is to establish a limited interim self-rule in the major population centers in the occupied territories, particularly in the Gaza Strip. The objective of the Zionist regime has been to get rid of Gaza which has no strategic value and has a population of almost a million in a very condensed area. In the words of Rabin in 1988, "I wish I would wake up and find out that Gaza had drowned in the sea".

In these arrangements there is no guarantee to return any lands back to the Palestinians' sovereignty, hence no self-determination or independence is achieved that all Palestinians demand and international resolutions support. It transforms the nature of the conflict from a struggle against occupation, racism, displacement, economic exploitation and the future of a national liberation movement with regional and international implications, to a mere internal problem of self-rule to a "foreign" population with all political, economical and military cards in the hands of the Israelis. The Israelis' long sought elusive goal of localizing the Palestinian problem and de-internationalizing it, has now been accomplished, at least as long as this accord is in effect.

2. The powers given to the administrative council are limited to six service-type areas. This fact only exacerbates the fears in the mind of many Palestinians that the aim of this agreement is simply to relieve the Israeli army from ruling over the Palestinians with all the political, moral and security concerns associated with them without giving up the claims over the land, water and ultimate sovereignty over the territories. The final outcome may not look very different from the black townships called "Bandustans" in South Africa under the Apartheid regime. In other words, the end result is the establishment of local Palestinian administrative councils ruling over the major population centers in the West Bank and Gaza with very limited jurisdiction. All the Israeli conditions in the previous two years of negotiations in Washington have virtually been incorporated in the document, especially with the total refusal of establishing any legislative body in the territories which might symbolize a collective national will and sovereignty.

3. The biggest deception in this agreement by its proponents is the claim that Israel would withdraw from the territories. The truth of the matter is that the title of that article in the accord is called: "Re-deployment of Israeli Forces." Moreover, when that article (Article XIII) states the word withdrawal, it then refers the issue to Article XIV as follows: "a re-deployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV." When one then goes to Article XIV, it again ignores any specifics and refers the reader to Annex II as follows: "Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II." Annex II simply postpones this issue and leaves it to a future agreement between the two sides through a joint committee. In other words, the major achievement of this agreement by its proponents has not even been spelled out but left to future negotiations.

The vagueness of the nature of this withdrawal however has been clarified in the last paragraph of the agreement in Annex II under the heading: "Specific Understandings and Agreement." It simply destroys any notion of withdrawal and confirms the Israeli interpretation of simple re-deployment by stating the following: "Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area." That is any Israeli or future Israeli (in uniform or civilian) has the right of access to these "withdrawn from" areas.

While the gains to the Palestinians are vague and unclear, the "rights" of the Israelis are quite clear and cannot be negotiated. It is a farce that completely negates any claims of gains.

4. The land area under consideration in Gaza and Jericho is about 360 square kilometers in Gaza and 40-70 square kilometers for Jericho (which was left unspecified). Excluding the Gaza settlements and the military installations which will stay in Israeli hands, the total area the Israeli military forces would withdraw from (but could always go back to) is less that 300 square kilometers. In other words, the struggle of the Palestinian people over seven decades has been eclipsed to the possible withdrawal (or re-deployment) of less than 1.5% of Palestine! The rest of the West

Bank which is more than 20% of historical Palestine was deliberately left for an unspecified fate.

5. The Palestinian demand of halting the construction of settlements or at least stopping further settlement of Zionists in the occupied territories has been completely ignored. Not only is there no guarantee of halting future construction of settlements in the areas, but even the continuous growth of current settlements is guaranteed. There are currently over 120,000 settlers in the West Bank, 150,000 in Jerusalem area and about 17,000 in the Gaza Strip. This number could double into more than a half-million while the Palestinians are negotiating the nature of their limited self-rule while guaranteeing the security and safety of these settlers who are armed and enjoy the protection of the Israeli army. The settlements in the West Bank have been constructed in such a way as to disconnect the Palestinian population centers and to connect these settlements through a sophisticated system to Israel.

In the past two decades over $10 Billion have been spent on these settlements. Last year alone, the US State Department estimated that the Israeli government had spent more that $400 million on these settlements—even after the US loan guarantees had been approved.

**The Palestinian people have rejected in the past any settlement that ignored the plight of the displaced as unjust and unfair. While Israel prepares to absorb as much as two million Russian Jews and American settlers, it contiues to deprive the true owners of the land, the Palestinians from living there.**

6. Jerusalem, this sacred city to Muslims and Christians, has been totally left out of this agreement with the intent to negotiate its status later. This fact ignores the continuous Israeli position of non recognition to any Muslim, Christian or even international jurisdiction over the holy places. What leverage does the Palestinian negotiator have to force the Israeli government to give concessions over this issue? The Zionists have achieved at last their objective of legitimizing their occupation of their victims. What else would the Palestinians possibly give the Israelis for them to give up part of Jerusalem?

7. The documents totally fails to address the fate of over four million Palestinians living in the Diaspora as refugees or homeless people. Many are still living in squalid conditions especially in the camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan or at the Egyptian-Palestinian border.

Why the international euphoria over this agreement when these people have given up their right to return and live in their beloved country? This accord is against UN resolutions which recognize the right of all Palestinians to return to Palestine and the compensation of those who do not wish to return. Have these people living in the Diaspora for over four decades been asked whether they would like to return or be compensated?

Therefore, this accord, at best, does not have the support of two-thirds of the six million Palestinians whose rights have totally been ignored in this agreement. The Palestinian people have rejected in the past any settlement that ignored the plight of the displaced as unjust and unfair. While Israel prepares to absorb as much as two million Russian Jews and American Jewish settlers, it continues to deprive the true owners of the land, the Palestinians, from living there.

The failure of this accord to address this issue means that the crux of the tragedy of the Palestinian people has been ignored. Hence, this issue will loom large over the horizons and this aspect of the Palestinian tragedy will never go away and no peace can be achieved without addressing it.

8. The PLO negotiating team has totally ignored the fate of over 13,000 prisoners and detainees in Israeli jails. There is no guarantee of freedom to these prisoners where the overwhelming majority of them are prisoners of war since they were imprisoned for activities relating to their resistance against the occupation. This issue may be used by Israel as a potential bargaining chip to extract more Palestinian concessions.

9. The accord totally ignores the status of over one million Palestinians living in the 1948 occupied lands who would still be under Israeli law and control. These people have been incorporated in the Israeli society against their will. They live as undesirables in their own land simply because they are not Jews. They should not be left to the designs of Zionism. Their silent suffering should not be an excuse to separate them from their Palestinian brethren, and their right of self-determination and liberation must be addressed and respected.

10. The accord represents a grave security risk for all

Palestinians. There are no constitutional, political or human rights given to them. While the Israeli army and armed settlers are always over the horizons ready to move at a moment's notice, there is a real fear that Arafat's police force's task is to tame Palestinian resistance, halt the intifada and safeguard Israeli interests and settlers at the expense of the Palestinian populace.

The threat to national unity and the nightmare of bloody civil war are distinct possibilities. In fact, Arafat's security forces have already assassinated, in less than a month after the accord was signed, three Fateh leaders who were supportive of the agreement but represented indigenous leadership. The popularity of the Islamic movements represents a real challenge to Arafat's leadership and the fear is that the PLO security apparatus will deal with any opposition - as several observers believe - with brutal and repressive measures. That would only spread into a possible civil war with a heavy price to be paid by the Palestinians in the territories.

In fact, Israel, with hundreds of collaborators in the West Bank and Gaza, is in a position to spark a wave of assassinations and violence that could end up in a bloody civil strife at any time. The promise by Arafat to end the intifada, which is a legitimate form to end the occupation, is another sticking point since occupation itself has not ended, and since there is a great opposition to the accord inside the territories—especially within the Islamic ranks. The accord leaves the Palestinian communities in a very fragile security state and at the mercy of armed settlers and the Israeli army who are given the right to intimidate and display their power anywhere in the occupied territories including Gaza and Jericho.

The borders, external security, foreign relations, and overall responsibility and other spheres not mentioned in the accord are all part of Israel's stated rights. In that the Israelis will be in a position to control all borders' crossings—which Palestinian is allowed to come and go—the nature of the relationship between the Palestinian people in the territories and any "foreign" power including all Arab and Islamic States. It is a complete betrayal on the part of the Palestinian negotiator to abdicate the safety and security of Palestinians in many aspects of their lives.

11. Almost one third of the accord was devoted to future economic cooperation and coordination between both sides. Although political matters were left vague, unclear and subject to multiple interpretations, the economic sphere was detailed and expanded. It is interesting to note that the Israeli economy is 60 times the fragile Palestinian economy which is likely to dominate. The objective of these joint ventures and projects is multifaceted: The domination and control of Palestinian economic development, the continuation of Palestinian cheap labor, the expansion of Palestinian consumers and the inclusion of a much larger market in the Arab World through a small segment of Palestinians to act as agents and middlemen for Israeli products are examples. Also an example, the accord calls in Annex III (7) for joint ventures in products such as textiles, computers, electronics, diamonds, etc. which are leading exports of Israeli goods. Israel is the manufacturer of 95% of diamonds in the world (produced by South Africa's Jewish companies and transferred to Israel). Hence, the Palestinian's future role is for example to expand this market to the entire Arab market. Israel wants to penetrate the regional economic system, end the economic boycott and dominate the region with the Palestinian side playing the role of the bridge for Israel to cross over to the huge Arab market.

This possibility is shared by many in the Arab World especially since the accord calls for immediate cooperation in economic spheres while the political settlement is postponed for several years without identifying the end point—such as the establishment of an independent state, self-determination or the end of occupation.

12. The political landscape of this accord is full of minefields. The future of a Palestinian state and Palestinian sovereignty is still an elusive dream. The future of the PLO itself is in doubt after it conceded most of its program and mandate. The future of the Palestinian people as a people is in great danger. It is apparent that the Israeli final solution to the Palestinian Diaspora is to settle them where they are while transferring the majority of them from Lebanon and the Gulf to Iraq as part of a final US deal with the Iraqi regime before the sanctions are lifted, as several Israeli officials have hinted. But this accord goes beyond the Palestine question and borders to affect the whole region. It involves sides who are not even signatories to the agreement or parties to the negotiations. It presupposes the "forceful" integration of the Zionist regime in the whole region. It calls for a new Middle East order with Israel as its pillar. All new economic developmental plans in the area have to include the Zionist state. It would have the right to share resources such as water resources and raw material.

Arab markets have to open to Israeli products and technology and the cost burden taken by the US to sustain Israel has to be now dumped on the region. The Arab masses should accept these new realities and revise their

understanding of their culture, religion and modern history in order to accommodate Israel. The acceptance of this agreement simply guarantees the strategic imbalance of power in favor of Israel and preserves its hegemony and strategic control. Moreover, it threatens any Arab and Muslim solidarity in face of Israeli intransigence and belligerency since it weakens the position of the other parties, particularly Syria and Lebanon. It exacerbates the division and discord that already exist in the Arab camp and further deteriorates the security concerns.

13. The international and Islamic support of the Palestine problem has been undercut. The international isolation of Israel as a pariah state is quickly being lifted since no one could be more Catholic than the Pope.

There is a tremendous pressure on many former allies to the Palestinian side to normalize their relations with the Israeli state. This pressure came to fruition in many countries such as China, India, Indonesia, African countries, the Vatican and others at the expense of Palestinian support, and despite the continuation of Israeli defiance to all international resolutions in favor of Palestinian rights and demands.

**The international and Islamic support of the Palestine problem has been undercut. The international isolation of Israel as a pariah state is quickly being lifted.**

14. This accord also weakened the position of many non-Zionist Jews (a few but vocal) who have been outspoken in their rejection of the Zionist doctrine and in their support to Palestinian rights. It simply tightens the grip of all Zionist organizations over the Jewish communities all over the world. There are many non-Zionist Jews who have fought the destructive outlook of political Zionism and who are trying to save the future of Judaism in favor of a more humane and enlightening future. They have been undercut.

15. Inherent in the agreement is that the Israelis are magnanimous enough to satisfy the Palestinians without tying them down to any acceptable outcomes. There is nothing in the history of the conflict or in the Israeli behavior or even recent statements that suggest the possibility of such outcome. The Taba episode must be a vivid example to all wishful arguments. When the Israelis refused to withdraw from Taba (which is only 1 square kilometer) in 1982, they spent the next 7 years trying to negotiate over it. Although Taba did not have strategic or security importance and was not in the Torah to draw historical or religious claims, it took until 1989 before a settlement was reached. Israel rejected all international tribunals, arbitrations and rulings until its will was finally imposed. The final settlement has an Israeli sovereignty in all but name. It includes the following: 1) Egypt would pay in cash $30 million for the price of the beach hotel. 2) Egypt would hire an Israeli company to manage the hotel for 30 years. 3) There would not be border crossing from Israel into Taba, but all Israeli citizens and tourists would have complete access to the Taba beach and facilities. 4) Israelis and tourists would not have to exchange money but could use the Israeli Shekel. 5) Israel would provide a police force for security while the Egyptian police force would stay farther away. If this is the settlement reached between Israel and Egypt, the biggest Arab country, what kind of future negotiations await the Palestinian negotiating team? With the loaded issues of Jerusalem, the dismantling of settlements, the Palestinian right to return, Palestinian state and sovereignty, water distribution, total withdrawal, etc., how many decades of negotiations would it take to negotiate over each issue with the current balance of power? What incentive or leverage does the Palestinian side have after the issue has been taken out of the international agenda and relegated to an issue of minority rights in (virtually) Greater Israel? How much suffering should be endured and how much blood must be spilled to return this issue back to the attention of the international community to reach a settlement that is just and permanent?

16. Secret negotiations, like the one concluded in Oslo, do not earn the trust and support of the people. It represents an agreement that is forced upon the weaker party which is coerced to give painful, unacceptable and illegal concessions. The lack of truly democratic traditions and representation makes this agreement null and void. The Palestinian people in all its segments—in the diaspora, in the occupied territories of 1967, and in the territories of 1948—must participate in annulling the dangerous consequences of this agreement.

No single person should have the right to make such a great decision on behalf of a people. In fact, no one has the right to deprive future generations from restoring their rights. It is a God-given and universally accepted right.

**A just and comprehensive peace**

The ultimate objective that we must strive for nation-

ally, regionally and internationally is to establish peace which is based on justice and civilization-building. The Arab-Islamic civilization that existed for over thirteen centuries represented an inclusive phenomena in contrast to the exclusive doctrine of Zionism. This civilization was built by Muslims, Christians and Jews since Islam recognized Christianity and Judaism. Tolerance, cooperation, inclusiveness, positiveness, ethical norms, and self-assertion are but few qualities that characterize such civilization.

The real problem at the end of the last century as defined by Europe was "the Jewish Problem." Racist and intolerant Europe created this problem and transformed this problem from being the Jewish problem to being the Palestinian problem. The modern Zionist movement was used as the vehicle and instrument for this transformation. Hence, the solution must address both the Palestinian rights and the Jewish problem. The Islamic world never experienced the so-called Jewish problem. In fact, Islam is the reason that Jews exist today. The Islamic World was a safe heaven to the Jewish communities persecuted in Europe. Jewish philosophy and sciences thrived only under the protection provided by Islam. Modern Israel with all its might failed to assert Judaism or Jewish philosophy or science. In fact, most of the important works by Jews today are done outside of Israel. Israel is seen only as an extension of the secular-humanist non-religious West in the heart of the Muslim land. The pain, suffering and continuos strife that exist today in the land of peace is because of the confrontation between two conflicting doctrines: The inclusiveness of Islam; the culture of the region, and the exclusiveness of Zionism; the extension of the nation-state system of nineteenth century Europe. The future must belong to the powerful forces of inclusion, peace and justice for all. The only acceptable solution must be based on the following principles:

1) Palestinian rights must be restored and all Palestinians must be able to return to their forefathers' lands. Any compensation offered is only for their suffering since countries are not for sale.

2) Jews should be protected from the intolerance and insensitivity of Europe and the West. However that cannot be achieved through the denial of the Palestinians' rights. Therefore, the Islamic world must be open to any Jew and Jewish communities—for them to assert their Jewishness as much as they care to. Moreover, the Zionist-exclusivist state and institutions must be dismantled since they represent injustice not only to Palestinians but also to Jews.

3) The principles of self-determination, popular and representative democracy, right of religious observance and freedom, equality, justice, mutual recognition of civilizations and respect of cultures and peoples must hold true and be enforced in the whole region to ensure real peace, stability, progress and development.

Historical and religious rights cannot be negotiated. When Nations struggle to restore such rights they receive the support of all just and peace-loving people. History is not kind on those who negotiate away their sacred rights. Moreover, such rights are never forfeited because of the passage of time. France occupied Algeria for 132 years, and Algeria became a part of France. Over 2 million French were settled in Algeria. However, the struggle of the heroic Algerian people forced the settler colonialist project to be defeated and all settlers had to leave. The Palestinian people, all Muslims, Arab Christians, and just and peace-loving people in the World have a deep-rooted conviction in their struggle for liberation and freedom. It is this deep conviction and hard struggle that will not only bring down this unjust agreement but will also work for a real comprehensive and just peace for all in the area. ✪

## Editor's Note

**This could be the last issue!**

For over two years Inquiry has been published with great dedication and sacrifice. Although we have gained many readers and supporters we are currently not able to sustain our financial burdens. Since our last issue we prepared two issues but were unable to publish them. We are able to publish this issue after we received a contribution. We will not be able to publish in the future unless we receive more support. Your moral and financial support is welcome and needed.

*The Editor*

# QUOTATIONS

n Washington, Israel secured the following oints:

- United Jerusalem remains under Israeli rule, nd the body that will manage the lives of Palstinians in the territories will have no authority this regard.

- The Israeli settlements in Judea, Samaria nd Gaza will remain under Israeli rule without ny change in their status.

- The jurisdiction of the Palestinian council will ot extend to any Israeli in the territories of udea, Samaria and Gaza.

- The IDF will continue to bear overall responibility for the security of the settlements, the sraelis in the territories, the security of every sraeli while he is in the territories, and for exteral security - that is the defense of the current onfrontation lines along the Jordan River and he Egyptian border.

- The IDF will be deployed - in accordance ith these missions - throughout the territories Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.

- All maters related to the permanent solution ill be left for negotiation to begin two years fter the date set in the agreement, with the sraeli Government remaining free to determine s positions as to the nature of the permanent olution.

Namely, the Declaration of Principles leaves all he options open in this respect."

*Yitzhak Rabin, in his address to the Knesset on September 21, 1993*

• ——————————— •

"I met Crown Prince Hassan at the White House and President Clinton asked us if this was our first meeting, and I said, "As a matter of fact, publicly it is our second meeting and the first hand shaking, because I heard Prince Hassan making an eulogy at the memorial service of De Gaulle." And I told the President that the Prince spoke a superb French, as he speaks a superb English. And then I said it was my impression that the prince speaks even the Hebrew language. So the President asked, "Your Highness, do you speak the Hebrew language?" He said, "Yes, I studied for two years the Talmud and Mishna, and then he said in Hebrew, ... "Rise and go through the land, its length and its width." I closed my eyes, and I went through the land, its length and its width."

*Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, in his address to the Jerusalem Business Conference on October 31, 1993.*

• ——————————— •

"The actual content of the Israeli-Palestinian agreements are not far-reaching. They fall short of what the Palestinians could have achieved by accepting the autonomy provisions of the Camp David accords backed by both Likud and Labor in 1979."

*Aba Eban, Former Israeli Foreign Minister and Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee in the Knesset.*

• ——————————— •

"What is good about this agreement is that it puts everybody to the test of peace, mostly the Palestinians. For us, today, there is no more room for the kind of "phased plan" talked about in 1974."

*Nabil Shaath, senior political adviser to Yasir Arafat.*

• ——————————— •

"The fact that someone engages in a tyrannical act and then they force the tyrannized person to accept that tyranny without any yield-

ing from the oppressor and without reducing his injustice, is this peace? Or is it a disgrace, is it a surrender to tyranny? This is the act which is forbidden and condemned by the holy shari'a of Islam. Today they are celebrating, thinking that the issue of Palestine is over. I say that the issue of Palestine is not over. They should not make a mistake. The issue is not over. There is no change in the issue. The issue of Palestine is still here as it has always been."

*Ayatollah Khamenie', Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran in his address, September 16, 1993.*

• ——— •

"It's totally forbidden to recognize the Zionist entity or giving up Jerusalem or any part of the Muslim land. It's a betrayal to God, his messenger and the trust given to Muslims. This agreement was not signed by the Muslim Khalifa and no international Islamic council has endorsed it and therefore it is not legally bound on the Muslims and it is not valid."

*Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, prominent Egyptian Islamic Scholar, September 20, 1993.*

• ——— •

"It's ironic that the Israelis and Palestinians signed this agreement fearing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism but, what they have done is to fuel the rise of fundamentalists whether they like it or not."

*Mohammed Hasanin Haykal, the famous Egyptian Author and Journalist, September 14, 1993.*

• ——— •

"This agreement is an ugly example of the arrogance in the world. It shows that the US is ready to do anything to please Israel."

*Nejmeldin Erbakan, Leader of the Welfare Islamic Party in Turkey.*

• ——— •

"This agreement represents a mortal danger to the Palestinian people. Any agreement that legitimizes the occupiers of Palestine is illegal and forbidden religiously and politically."

*Fathi Shikaki, Secretary General of the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine.*

• ——— •

"The Signing of Gaza-Jericho agreement will not give freedoom and independence to the Palestinians. It's only another face of the occupation. The leadership of Arafat does not represent our people— they only want to satisfy America and the Zionist entity."

*Spokesman for Hamas in the Occupied Territories*

• ——— •

"This agreement is not based on the frame of reference of the peace process. We were neither consulted nor participated in this agreement. We should not give Israel any right to claim any of the occupied territories. This agreement will not provide permanent and just peace."

*Haider Abdul Shafi, Leader of the Palestinian Negotiating Team to the Peace Process.*

• ——— •

"The PLO is finished. It's final role now is to sign a peace accord with Israel. Its institutions, offices and committees are paralyzed. It looks like we have abandoned our destiny of attaining freedom and independence."

*The Palestinian Poet Mahmoud Darwish in announcing his resignation from the PLO executive Committee, August 30, 1993.*

• ——— •

"The PLO executive Committee has abandoned and exceeded its mandate given to it by the Palestine National Council. It has embarked on a completely different program than the program given to it."

*Abdullah Hourani in his resignation letter from the PLO executive committee.*

• ——— •

"Today was the happiest day in our marriage. Anwar became a martyr."

*Intisar, 22, widow of Islamic Jihad Activist Anwar Aziz who died in a car bomb injuring several Israeli soldiers, December 13, 1993.*

By: Naseer Aruri *

# The PLO-Israeli accords and the Clinton Administration

The two documents signed by Israel and the PLO on September 13, 1993 created a fundamental change in the political terrain on which the struggle for a diplomatic settlement had begun nearly twenty years ago. The "Declaration of Principles" and the "Mutual Recognition" statements, which were signed in an atmosphere of euphoria and exultation, are said to have signaled a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict; to have ushered in a new epoch and to represent a breakthrough. The reluctant handshake between Arafat and Rabin was seen as a sign of a new dawn; the start of a new chapter that would enunciate a historic change that would convert a perpetual conflict to a new peaceful co-existence.

There was little to be gained in trying to reflect on the real significance of these accords as the media appeared fully mobilized to produce instant analysis—optimistic analysis to be sure—and to summon at a short notice a standing army of so-called Middle East experts who would overwhelm a stunned audience with an endless variety of explanations for the miraculous event. One would announce that the "deal" was a real coup for President Clinton—the domestic policy President, who had the good fortune to reap diplomatic capital at almost no cost. Another would have you believe that the agreement was well-crafted, sophisticated and so-called mutual recognition is asymmetrical and non-reciprocal. The agreement is predicated on the faulty assumption that the Palestinians, who were subjected to dispossession, dismemberment, disenfranchisement and subjugation, are the party which had done wrong and must apologize for their legal resistance to a military occupation as if it has been an act of random violence. Nothing is said about the Israeli practices, which fill hundreds of thousands of pages in numerous reports of the most reputable human organizations in the West and in Israel itself.

Arafat's men in Oslo did not or could not extract a simple statement from Rabin's representatives pledging a refrain from now on from practices which have been described as crimes of state in the Nuremberg sense. Middle East Watch which cannot possibly be described as anti-Israel reminded Warren Christopher that deportations as a form of collective punishment prohibited by article 33 of the 1949 Geneva Convention and is specifically cited as a "grave breach," or a war crime punishable under the convention in Article 147.

The second issue is recognition. What is being recognized? Israel recognized two things: a) In the preamble of the Declaration it recognized "mutual legitimate and political rights" but not national rights or the right of return enshrined in UN resolutions. In fact, the only UN resolutions Israel recognizes are 242 and 338 but that applies to the form and excludes substance. b) In the exchange of letters, Israel recognizes the PLO but qualifies it by the statement in light of your renunciation of violence.

For Palestinians that recognition has a psychological and political importance but it does not denote legal recognition because the Declaration does not envision a sovereign entity. Moreover, the mindful of the protagonist's major concerns, but that "the devil is in the detail." So we must wait for the two parties to marshall their diplomatic resources and embark on tedious tasks and technical details. Still, a third would have us believe that while the agreement does not grant the Palestinians independence, it nevertheless represents the first and necessary step towards Palestinian statehood.

The third issue is withdrawal. What does it really mean? The Declaration provides for a withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Jericho (not clear whether the town or the area) but for a re-deployment from population centers in the West Bank. Moreover, this partial and limited withdrawal will not abolish the military government. And the fact that Israel did not acknowledge its status as occupier will mean that its military government will remain the body in which sovereignty is vested under international law even in Jericho and Gaza. It also means that the code of military orders of respect (to put it mildly) of the human rights of Palestinians by not only Mr. Rabin but by Arafat himself and Clinton as well.

It is public knowledge that President Clinton had telephoned President Assad of Syria on September 15 requesting that he silence critics of the agreement (Middle East Watch report on Lebanon, vol. 5 issue Sept. 7, 1993, page 2). The following quotation from Rabin (Yediot Ahoronot Sept. 7) illustrates the point rather well:

"I prefer the Palestinians to cope with the problem of enforcing order in the Gaza (strip). The Palestinians will be better at it than we were because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent the (Israeli) Association for civil rights from criticizing the conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule there by their own methods, freeing—and this is most important—the Israeli army soldiers from having to do what they will do."

To understand the agreement, we must place it in its proper context. That would help us answer the question of "why now?" Why after twenty years of active but futile diplomacy and after 22 months of a crippling impasse in the Madrid process, this agreement was finally reached in Oslo with the involvement of no more than a half dozen trusted aides, if that, on each side? The second question we need to answer is how much of a breakthrough this agreement is, and how much of a departure from the present situation does it signify or promise? Are we then on the threshold of an emergent situation?

**The context**

Simply put, the proper context of the PLO-Israel agreement is the new political reality which resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the destruction of Iraq. That reality permitted the United States to effectively emerge as the only arbiter and sole peacemaker in the Middle East. The hegemonies ambition it was pursuing in the region for a quarter of a century was finally achieved, and more importantly, I might add, accepted by all the protagonists—those whose inclinations were pro-Western anyway, and the Arabs who viewed themselves as a vanguard of Arab liberation and spokesperson of the South in the struggle for a new economic world order. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, and thus terminated whatever leverage those vanguards might have achieved; the Gulf War signaled an important victory of the North over the South in the battle for resources. It was the start of the New World Order.

The corresponding shifting alignments, which for example, saw the Syrian army on the side of the allies and that of Israel, have created a profoundly altered strategic landscape, which made Arab - Israeli negotiations not only possible but desirable as well. Whereas Mikhail Gorbachev initiated, unwittingly, the process which was hailed by President Clinton only a few weeks ago as a triumph in the struggle for enlarging "market democracies," Saddam Hussein took the fateful step which allowed George Bush to reshape the strategic landscape of the region, terminate the existing Arab political order and resolve a 20 year impasse in favor of Washington's agenda i.e., a solution which negates Palestinian self-determination and restitution. These Dramatic transformations caused by the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War convinced Washington that an Arab-Israeli settlement had become a US national interest. US strategic planners now envisage a post-Cold War redivision of the World in which economic rather than military power will be the catalyst of change, and in which the Middle East, as a potential source of capital, would rest securely in the North American sphere.

Given that US relations with Japan and the EC will have to consume the larger portion of American energies during the next phase, a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict becomes not only desirable, but also necessary from the US vantage point. Moreover, such a settlement would free the conservative Arabs to fully embrace Washington's new political order in the region, and would also free US taxpayers from the huge burden of subsidizing the Israeli treasury in the name of security, a fact which itself continues to fuel anti-American sentiments in the region.

Moreover, as long as America's energy policy remains dependent on the military option, and whereas the flow of oil to the industrial world on exceedingly favorable terms remains vulnerable to national self-assertion, an unsettled Arab-Israeli conflict would constitute a potential threat to the desired stability. Add to this the fact that America's advanced hegemony in the Middle East, at a time of relative economic decline vis a vis Europe and Japan, required the kind of political settlement that would improve a sagging credibility.

**The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, and thus terminated whatever leverage those vanguards might have achieved; the Gulf War signaled an important victory of the North over the South in the battle for resources. It was the start of the New World Order.**

These are the factors which impelled Washington to seize the "opportunity" to pave the road to Madrid and beyond. And while the Oslo affair might have surprised the Americans, what happened there was the culmination of America's own objectives and foreign policy goals.

As for Israel, the Gulf War was also a windfall. It was clearly viewed by Israel and the Zionist movement as a historical juncture that could associate a number of Arab states with its long-standing objective or removing the national rights and grievances of the Palestinian people from the diplomatic agenda. It had absolutely demolished the official Arab consensus on Palestine, eroded Arab solidarity and exposed regime insecurity in the Gulf-Peninsula region, thus enabling Israel to deal with the Arab states bilaterally and largely on the basis of narrowly construed interests. The fact that Arab solidarity against Israeli intransigence had broken down, meant that an important source of pressure

for Israeli concessions was being eliminated.

With deterrence having suddenly vanished at the global and regional levels, the US and Israel were both left without any serious opposition, hence Madrid, Washington and Oslo, where virtual Palestinian surrender was easily extracted in exchange for Israeli and US recognition of the PLO. The question now is why did Arafat do it? What drove him towards Oslo while his own delegation, going through the motions in protracted talks in Washington was left in the dark?

During 22 months of negotiations, the major concern in the Palestinian street was whether the negotiations would lead to genuine independence or to a fractured entity of unconnected bits and pieces in which their destiny would be determined by others. Having participated in the Madrid conference under conditions dictated largely by Israel (bilateral negotiations, transitional arrangements, UN dislodgment, and virtual sole US sponsorship of the process), the Palestinians were acknowledging the bitter realities of the post-Gulf, post-cold war period. Consequently, they expected to make major concessions consonant with the shifting regional and global balance.

But despite the new structure of relationships and the profoundly altered strategic and political landscape of the Middle East, the Arab world and especially the Palestinians had not fully accepted the diplomatic conclusions derived from that change by the US and Israel, hence the perpetual impasse, even after rounds of negotiations over a period of 22 months.

This is not to imply that the conclusions of Washington and Tel Aviv were one and the same; but they were basically similar. Suffice it to say that Bush and Baker had differed somewhat from Israel on the real meaning of UN Security Council resolution 242, the exchange of land for peace, the question of colonial settlements and the status of Jerusalem. But US strategic influences combined with the virtual absence of any Arab pressure on Washington prevented the American "catalyst"" from bridging the diplomatic gap between the Arabs and Israel with specific proposals. At issue were the following basic matters: Whether the Occupied Territories are occupied or not, illogical though it sounds; whether the Palestinian self-governing entity has any geographic definition, a land dimension or only a people's dimension; whether its jurisdiction is derived from the popular will of the Palestinians or conferred and limited by the occupation regime making it an agent of an occupation that would continue to exist under a different label; whether Israel could continue to exclude Jerusalem from negotiable items during the transition, and finally what really lies beyond the transition.

Throughout the period of Bush and Baker, the Palestinians kept hoping to resolve these issues particularly after receiving a set of written US assurances conveyed to them just prior to Madrid—the exchange of land for peace, termination of the Israeli occupation, reaffirmation of the US position that Jerusalem is occupied territory, among others. What is really significant is that this scaled-back position was sustained by a solid consensus in the Palestinian community of 6 million world-wide and the larger Arab world. Madrid signified a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Not only did the Arabs and Palestinians accept the reality of Israel in the era of de-colonization, but they also accepted its legitimacy as a state, even prior to an explicit acknowledgment by Israel of its occupation of their land. Unique as it is in the history of negotiations, the absence of such acknowledgment on Israel's part has impeded any movement away from the diplomatic dead center after 22 months of going through the motions.

**The important legal question involved here is that unless Israel comes to terms with its status as occupier under international law, it would be able to render any agreement regarding withdrawal, security, sovereignty and human rights completely superfluous.**

The important legal question involved here is that unless Israel comes to terms with its status as occupier under international law, it would be able to render any agreement regarding withdrawal, security, sovereignty and human rights completely superfluous. And that is what led the Palestinian delegation under the leadership of Haider Abdul Shafi to stand firm, despite ten rounds. Without acknowledging its status as occupier, Israel would be able to shrug its responsibility to the people while it controls their land. It would be able to set aside, as it has been doing for 26 years, the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians in times of war.

We must be reminded here that the Security Council had adopted resolution 681 in 1990 which unanimously declared that the Convention protects the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. That same convention also protects them from being coerced into illegal agreements that is, agreements which violate their rights.

It also guards against the renunciation of their rights; and significantly,

it restricts Israeli practices in the manner of a de facto sovereign.

It is rather interesting that the United States was legally committed to this perspective on the occupation. The Country Report on Human Rights Practices for the year 1987 recognizes the applicability of both the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Convention to the Israeli Occupation. So did Baker's letter of assurances, though in a somewhat watered-down form.

But the prospects for a negotiated settlement based on the Madrid framework began to look more grim with the ascendancy of Bill Clinton to the presidency. For Yasser Arafat and a small coterie of decision-makers that event was to mark a juncture. The struggle for Palestinian national rights would soon be refocused on municipal rights. Soon the interests of Arafat and Rabin began to converge. Israel had never had a more loyal friend in the White House. Rabin's government had committed itself to the electorate that a settlement would be reached in nine months. Gaza has become a major nuisance with hardly any benefits. Islamic resistance was on the rise threatening both Arafat and Rabin. Arafat has become together with his organization increasingly irrelevant. The Intifada had given him a reprieve after his ouster from Lebanon in 1982, and now he was looking for an extension of that reprieve. It is ironic that he would be rescued by the only two nations that voted "no" on the General Assembly resolution in favor of mutual recognition in the Geneva session in November 1988.

In addition, Arafat's rush to Oslo was pushed along by mounting crisis facing his leadership-financial crisis, governance crisis and outright corruption. The US and Israel were now more than ready to drop their reservations and objection. Terrorism was no longer an issue. A revised and updated renunciation (remember 1988?) by Arafat will do, particularly when the new edition would also imply a virtual renunciation of internationally recognized rights, or at least a deferral of discussing these rights.

The policies of the Clinton administration convinced Arafat, but not his chief negotiator and a large undifferentiated public that the crippling diplomatic impasse will become worse unless he was to give in. The venue was Oslo. We might ask, What exactly did the new administration do to intimidate Arafat in the way it did? First, with the ascendancy of self-described Zionists into top foreign policy positions, the role of the pro-Israel lobby has been transformed from merely pressuring Congress and the Executive Branch to conceptualizing and articulating Washington's Middle East policy. The controversy in Clinton's kitchen debate on the Middle East has become an entirely Jewish family affair with AIPAC, the pro-Israel main lobby and Americans for Peace Now at the ends of a compressed spectrum of discussion.

Secondly, Clinton's indebtedness to Jewish voters represents a serious constraint on the administration's declared position of "honest broker." According to the New York Times (Jan. 5, 1993) American Jews contributed 60% of Clinton's non-institutional campaign funds, and about 80% of Jewish voters supported Clinton. Israel began to test the new administration rather early in January of '93. Three major escalations by Rabin simply illicit acquiescence in Washington. The expulsion of 400 Palestinians to Lebanon in December 1992 led the Clinton Administration to shield Israel from imminent UN Security Council sanctions. The closure of the Occupied Territories rendering them into four unconnected districts and creating enormous economic hardships for the Palestinians failed to produce even a nudge from the self-styled arbiter normally concerned about confidence building measures. The bombardment of Lebanon with the declared objective of depopulating the South causing numerous civilian casualties, the destruction of some 70 Lebanese villages demonstrated how far Israel can go without antagonizing the honest broker.

**Gaza has become a major nuisance with hardly any benefits. Islamic resistance was on the rise threatening both Arafat and Rabin. Arafat has become together with his organization increasingly irrelevant.**

But the real catalyst, which hastened the ongoing secret affair in Oslo was the crucial decision of the Clinton administration to break the impasse with so-called bridging measures-something which Bush and Baker were reluctant to undertake. A proposed "Declaration of Principles" was announced by Warren Christopher on June 30, 1993. Three elements in particular in that declaration resolved the 22 month old impasse in Israel's favor: First, the implication that the West Bank and Gaza are disputed rather than occupied territory. Second, the conspicuous absence of any reference to the exchange of land for peace, or to Israeli withdrawal or even re-deployment, implying that Israel has an equal right to lay claims to the land. Thirdly, the US paper committed the Palestinians to agree, before hand, that all matters relating to sovereignty are outside the scope of the negotiations for the interim phase, hence discussion of Jerusalem, the still expanding settlements and the land issue are to be

deferred for several years. Also, because the issues of land and the nature of authority on that land are treated separately in the US paper, the focus of negotiations would be limited to authority over the people but not the territory, with the people reduced to the status of inhabitants or a minority rather than a people with national rights.

This manifest departure in US policy, which effectively modified the Madrid framework and the context of the US letter of assurances, is the real context for the PLO-Israeli agreement. Now, the last question I must answer relates to the agreement itself. What kind of an agreement? Is it really a breakthrough? What kind of a future does it promise for the people? Will it bring about an enduring peace? Let me offer a few observations of a general nature about the agreements:

To those who claimed that this is a sound agreement but that "the devil is in the detail," I say that a major deficiency is the conspicuous shortage of principles in the preamble—nothing about the occupation, the inadmissibility of conquest by force, the exchange of land for peace, the national rights or human rights of the Palestinian people. In fact, there is a more urgent need for guarding against abuse during the transitional period, since the Palestinians would have to contend with a new Palestinian Administration in addition to the occupation regime. Dissidents who oppose the agreement are going to be vulnerable to abuse especially in view of the total absence of clear and effective means of accountability, with two authorities looking over people's shoulders. The urgency is further accentuated by the already demonstrated lack which constitutes the basis for the legal system in the West Bank and Gaza and which will remain in force except in the six spheres enumerated in Article VI No.2: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism.

In case there is any ambiguity about the real meaning of withdrawal, let me refer you to the statement by the Israeli chief of Staff Mordechai Gur (NY Times Sept. 3): "This is re-deployment, not withdrawal. Anything that happens, the IDF will be there." Rabin's statement on this subject was even more explicit: "The forces of the Israeli army will be re-deployed on locations determined only by us, unlike the Camp David agreements which mandated a withdrawal of the Israeli army forces. In the agreement we reached, we didn't consent to use the formula "withdrawal of Israeli army forces' except when it applied to the Gaza Strip. In application to all other places the only term used is 're-deployment'. In fact, Article XIII No.3 makes further redeployment contingent on the ability of a strong Palestinian police to control the situation."

The Source of Authority: Clearly it is the occupation regime. The Palestinian Council has legislative power, both only relating to the six areas in Article VI and in annex II. That excludes the Israeli settlements and the network or roads connecting these settlements with each other and with Israel proper. It also excludes Settlements, Jerusalem, military locations and Israelis under the heading "Specific Understands and Agreements." There is Article VII (5) which can easily be glossed over by the non-specialist in Constitutional law. It says:

"The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council."

The implication of this Article is that Israel claims what is known as "reserved powers" or inherent powers. Such broad construction is of course deliberate and makes no secret of who is really sovereign.

Given these few observations, the level of jubilation which greeted the agreement was truly out of place. For the Palestinian people, the Oslo agreement may very well be a "done deal," the only game in town. And yet, it is also an uncertain path, if not a blind alley. Negotiations usually constitute a process of conciliation with a possible outcome already in place; for example, the current negotiations in South Africa are expected to lead to the termination of Apartheid and the realization of the principle of majority rule. In the case of Palestine however, there is neither an outline nor a vision of the final outcome. All fundamental issues involving borders, refugees, Jerusalem and indeed the occupation itself are deferred. Self-government, as the sole concern of these negotiations in the immediate term, is seen by the Palestinians as the necessary link towards independence, whereas Israel views that concept as a mechanism to ratify the occupation under a new and different label. ✪

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# The morning after

*By: Edward Said* *

Now that some of the euphoria has lifted, it is possible to re-examine the Israeli-PLO agreement with the required common sense. What emerges from such scrutiny is a deal that is more flawed and, for most of the Palestinian people, more unfavorably weighted than many had first supposed. The fashion-show vulgarities of the White House ceremony, the degrading spectacle of Yasser Arafat thanking everyone for the suspension of most of his people's rights, and the famous solemnity of Bill Clinton's performance, like a 20th century Roman emperor shepherding two vassal kings through rituals of reconciliation and obeisance: all these only temporarily obscure the truly astonishing proportions of the Palestinian capitulation.

So first of all let us call the agreement by its real name: an instrument of Palestinian surrender, a Palestinian Versailles. What makes it worse is that for at least the past fifteen years the PLO could have negotiated a better arrangement than this modified Allon Plan, one not requiring so many unilateral concessions to Israel. For reasons best known to the leadership it refused all previous overtures. To take one example of which I have personal knowledge: In the late seventies, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance asked me to persuade Arafat to accept Resolution 242 with a reservation (accepted by the US) to be added by the PLO which would insist on the national rights of the Palestinian people as well as Palestinian self-determination. Vance said that the US would immediately recognize the PLO and inaugurate negotiations between it and Israel. Arafat categorically turned the offer down, as he did similar offers. Then the Gulf War occurred, and because of the disastrous positions it took then, the PLO lost even more ground. The gains of the intifada were squandered, and today advocates of the new document say "We had no alternative." The correct way of phrasing that is "We had no alternative because we either lost or threw away a lot of others, leaving us only this one."

In order to advance towards Palestinian self-determination which has a meaning only if freedom, sovereignty and equality, rather than perpetual subservience to Israel, are its goal, we need an honest acknowledgment of where we are, now that the interim agreement is about to be negotiated. What is particularly mystifying is how so many Palestinian leaders and their intellectuals can persist in speaking of the agreement as a "victory." Nabil Sha'ath has called it one of "complete parity" between Israelis and Palestinians. The fact is that Israel has conceded nothing as former Secretary of State James Baker said in a TV interview, except, blandly, the existence of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people." Or as the Israeli "dove" Amos Oz reportedly put it in the course of a BBC interview, "this is the second biggest victory in the history of Zionism."

By contrast Arafat's recognition of Israel's right to exist carries with it a whole series of renunciations: of the PLO Charter, of violence and terrorism of all relevant UN resolutions, except 242 and 338, which do not have one word in them about the Palestinians, their rights or aspirations. By implication, the PLO set aside numerous other UN resolutions (which, with Israel and the US, it is now apparently undertaking to modify or rescind) that, since 1948, have given Palestinians refugee rights, including either compensation or repatriation. The Palestinians had won numerous international resolutions - passed by, among others, the EC, the non-aligned movement, the Islamic Conference and the Arab League, as well as the UN - which disallowed or censured Israeli settlements, annexations and crimes against the people under occupation.

It would therefore seem that the PLO has ended the intifada which embodied not terrorism or violence but the Palestinian right to resist, even though Israel remains in occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The primary consideration in the document is for Israel's security, with none for the Palestinians security from Israel's incursions. In his 13 September press conference Rabin was straightforward about Israel's continuing control over sovereignty; in addition, he said, Israel would hold the River Jordan, the boundaries with Egypt and Jordan, the sea, the land between Gaza and Jericho, Jerusalem, the settlements and the roads. There is little in the document to suggest that Israel will give up its violence against Palestinians or, as Iraq was required to do after it withdrew from Kuwait, compensate those who have been the victims of its policies over the past 45 years.

Neither Arafat nor any of his Palestinian partners who met the Israelis in Oslo has ever seen an Israeli settlement. There are now over two hundred of them, principally on hills, promontories and strategic points throughout the West Bank and Gaza. Many will probably shrivel and die, but the largest are designed for permanence. An independent system of roads connects them to Israel, and creates a disabling discontinuity between the main centers of Palestinian population. The actual land taken by these

settlements, plus the land designated for expropriation, amounts - it is guessed - to over 55 percent of the total land area of the Occupied Territories. Greater Jerusalem alone, annexed by Israel, comprises a huge trance of virtually stolen land, at least 25 percent of the total amount. In Gaza settlements in the north (three), the middle (two) and the south along the coast from the Egyptian border past Khan Yunis (twelve), constitute at least 30 percent of the Strip. In addition, Israel has tapped into every aquifer on the West Bank, and now uses about 80 percent of the water there for the settlements and for Israel proper. (There are probably similar water installations in Israel's Lebanese security zone). So the domination (if not the outright theft) of land and water resources is either overlooked, in the case of water, or, in the case of land, postponed by the Oslo accord.

What makes matters worse is that all the information on settlements, land and water is held by Israel, which hasn't shared most of these data with the Palestinians, any more than it has shared the revenues raised by the inordinately high taxes it has imposed on them for 26 years. All sorts of technical committees (in which non-resident Palestinians have participated) have been set up by the PLO in the territories to consider such questions, but there is little evidence that committee findings (if any) were made use of by the Palestinian side in Oslo. So the impression of a huge discrepancy between what Israel got and what the Palestinians conceded or overlooked remains uncertified.

I doubt that there was a single Palestinian who watched the White House ceremony who did not also feel that a century of sacrifice, dispossession and heroic struggle had finally come to rough. Indeed, what was most troubling is that Rabin in effect gave the Palestinians speech while Arafat pronounced words that had all the flair of a rental agreement. So far from being seen as the victims of Zionist, the Palestinians were characterized before the world as its now repentant assailants; as if the thousands killed by Israel's bombing of refugee camps, hospitals and schools in Lebanon: Israle's expulsion of 800,000 people in 1948 (whose descendants now number about three million, many of them stateless); the conquest of their land and property; the destruction of over four hundred Palestinian villages; the invasion of Lebanon; the ravages of 26 years of brutal military occupation—it was as if these sufferings had been reduced to the status of terrorism and violence, to be renounced retrospectively or passed over in silence. Israel has always described Palestinian resistance as terrorism and violence, so even in the matter of wording it received a moral and historical gift.

In return for exactly what? Israel's recognition of the PLO - undoubtedly a significant step forward. Beyond that, by accepting that questions of land and sovereignty are being postponed till final status negotiations, the Palestinians have in effect discounted their unilateral and internationally acknowledged claim to the West Bank and Gaza; these have now become "disputed territories." Thus with Palestinians assistance Israel has been awarded at least an equal claim to them. The Israeli calculation seems to be that by agreeing to police Gaza—a job which Begin tried to give Sadat fifteen years ago—the PLO would soon fall foul of local competitors, of whom Hamas is only one. Moreover, rather than becoming stronger during the interim period, the Palestinians may grow weaker, come more under the Israeli thumb, and therefore be less able to dispute the Israeli claim when the last set of negotiations begins. But on the matter of how, by what specific mechanism, to get from an interim status to a later one, the document is purposefully silent. Does this mean, ominously, that the interim stage may be the final one?

Israeli commentators have been suggesting that within, say, six months the PLO and Rabin's government will negotiate a new agreement further postponing elections, and thereby allowing the PLO to continue to rule. It is worth mentioning that at least twice during the past summer Arafat said that his experience of government consisted of the ten years during which he "controlled" Lebanon, hardly a comfort to the many Lebanese and Palestinians who recollect that sorry period. Nor is there at present any concrete way for elections to be held should they even be scheduled. The imposition of rule from above, plus the long legacy of the occupation, have not contributed much to the growth of democratic, grass-roots institutions. There are unconfirmed reports in the Arabic press indicating that the PLO has already appointed ministers from its own inner circle in Tunis, and deputy ministers from among trusted residents of the West Bank and Gaza. Will there ever be truly representative institutions? One cannot be very sanguine, given Arafat's absolute refusal to share or delegate power, to say nothing of the financial assets he alone knows about and controls.

In both internal security and development, Israel and the PLO are now aligned with each other. PLO members or consultants have been meeting with Mossad officials since last October to discuss security problems, including Arafat's own security. And this at the time of the worst Israeli repression of Palestinians under military occupation. The thinking behind the collaboration is that it will deter any Palestinians from demonstrating against the occupation, which will not withdraw, but merely redeploy. Besides, Israeli settlers will remain living, as they always have, under a different jurisdiction. The PLO will thus become Israel's enforcer, an unhappy

prospect for most Palestinians. Interestingly, the ANC has consistently refused to supply the South African government with police officials until after power is shared, precisely in order to avoid appearing as the white government's enforcer. It was reported from Amman a few days ago that 170 members of the Palestine Liberation Army, now being trained in Jordan for police work in Gaza, have refused to co-operate for precisely that reason. With about 14,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails - some of whom Israel says it may release - there is an inherent contradiction, not to say incoherence, to the new security arrangements. Will more room be made in them for Palestinian security?

The one subject on which most Palestinians agree is development, which is being described in the most native terms imaginable. The world community will be expected to give the nearly autonomous areas large-scale financial support; the Palestinian diaspora is expected, indeed preparing, to do the same. Yet all development for Palestine must be funneled through the joint Palestinian-Israeli Economic Cooperation Committee, even though, according to the document, "both sides will cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims." Israel is the dominant economic and political power in the region—and its power is of course enhanced by its alliance with the US. Over 80 percent of the West Bank and Gaza economy is dependent on Israel, which is likely to control Palestinian exports, manufacturing and labor for the foreseeable future. Aside from the small entrepreneurial and middle class, the vast majority of Palestinians are impoverished and landless, subject to the vagaries of the Israeli manufacturing and commercial community which employs Palestinians as cheap labor. Most Palestinians, economically speaking, will almost certainly remain as they are, although now they are expected to work in private sector, partly Palestinian controlled service industries, including resorts, small assembly plants, farms and the like.

A recent study by the Israeli journalist Asher Davidi quotes Dov Lautman, president of the Israeli Manufacturers Association: "It's not important whether there will be a Palestinian state, autonomy or a Palestinian-Jordanian state. The economic borders between Israel and the territories must remain open." With its well developed institutions, close relations with the US and aggressive economy, Israel will in effect incorporate the territories economically, keeping them in a state of permanent dependency. Then Israel will turn to the wider Arab world, using the political benefits of the Palestinian agreement as a springboard to break into Arab markets, which it will also exploit and is likely to dominate.

Framing all this is the US, the only global power, whose idea of the New World Order is based on economic domination by a few giant corporations and pouperization of necessary for many of the lesser peoples (even those in metropolitan countries). Economic aid for Palestine is being supervised and controlled by the US, bypassing the UN, some of whose agencies like UNRWA and UNDP are far better placed to administer it. Take Nicaragua and Vietnam. Both are former enemies of the US: Vietnam actually defeated the US but is now economically in need of it. A boycott against Vietnam continues and the history books are being written in such a way as to show how the Vietnamese sinned against and "mistreated" the US for the later's idealistic gesture of having invaded, bombed and devastated their country. Nicaragua's Sandinista government was attacked by the US financed Contras movement; the country's harbors were mined, its people ravaged by famine, boycotts and every conceivable type of subversion. After the 1991 elections, which brought a US-supported candidate, Mrs. Chamorro to power, the US promised many millions of dollars in aid, of which only $30 million have actually materialized. In mid-September all aid was cut off. There is now famine and civil war in Nicaragua. No less unfortunate have been the latest of El Salvador and Haiti. To throw oneself, as Arafat has done, on the tender mercies of the US is almost certainly to suffer the late the US has meted out to rebellions or "terrorist" peoples it has had to deal with in the Third World after they have promised not to resist the US any more.

Hand in hand with the economic and strategic control of Third World countries that happen to be close to, or possess, resources like oil that are necessary to the US, is the media system, whose reach and control over thought is truly astounding. For at least twenty years, Yasser Arafat was taken to be the most unattractive and morally repellent man on earth. Whenever he appeared in the media, or was discussed by them, he was presented as if he had only one thought in his head: killing Jews, especially innocent women and children. Within a matter of days, the "independent media" had totally rehabilitated Arafat. He was now an accepted, even lovable figure whose courage and realism had bestowed on Israel its rightful due. He had repented, he had become a "friend," and he and his people were now on "our" side. Anyone who opposed or criticized what he had done was either a fundamentalist like the Likud settlers or a terrorist like the members of Hamas. It became nearly impossible to say anything except that the Israeli-Palestinian agreement - mostly unread or unexamined, and in any case unclear, lacking dozens of crucial details - was the first step towards Palestinian independence.

So far as the truly independent

critic or analyst is concerned, the problem is how he is to free himself from the ideological system which both the agreement and the media now serve. What is needed are memory and skepticism (if not outright suspicion). Even if it is parently obivous that Palestinian freedom in any real sense has not been achieved, and is clearly designed not to be, beyond the meager limits imposed by Israel and the US, the famous handshake broadcast all over the world is supposed not only to symbolize a great moment of success but to blot out past as well as present realities.

Given a modicum of honesty the Palestinians should be capable of seeing that the large majority of people the PLO is supposed to represent will not really be served by the agreement, except cosmetically. True, residents of the West Bank and Gaza are rightly glad to see that some Israeli troops will withdraw, and that large amounts of money might start to come in. But it is rank dishonesty not to be alert to what the agreement entails in terms of further occupation, economic control and profound insecurity. Then there is the mammoth problem of the Palestinians who live in Jordan, to say nothing of the thousands of stateless refugees in Lebanon and Syria. "Friendly" Arab states have always had one law for Palestinians, one for natives. These double standards have already intensified, as witnessed by the appalling scenes of delay and harassment that have occurred on the Allenby Bridge since the agreement was announced.

So what is to be done, if crying over spilled milk is useless? The first thing is to spell out, not only the virtues of being recognized by Israel and accepted at the White House, but also what the truly major disabilities are, pessimism of the intellect first, then optimism of the will. You can't improve on a bad situation that is largely due to the technical incompetence of the PLO - which negotiated in English, a language that neither Arafat nor his emissary in Oslo knows, with no legal advisor - until on the technical level at least you involve people who can think for themselves and are not mere instruments of what is to be now a single Palestinian authority. I find it extraordinarily disheartening that so many Arab and Palestinian intellectuals who a week earlier had been moaning and growing about Arafat's dictatorial ways, his single minded control over the money, the circle of sycophants and countries that have surrounded him in Tunis of late, the absence of accountability and reflection, at least since the Gulf War, should suddenly make a 180 degree switch and start applauding his tactical genius, and his latest victory. The march towards self-determination can only be embarked on by a people with democratic aspiraions and gools. Otherwise it is not worth the effort.

After all the hoopla celebrating "the first step towards a Palestinian state," we should remind ourselves that much more important than having a state is the kind of state it is. The history of the post-colonial world is disfigured by one-party tyrannies, rapacious oligarchies, social dislocation caused by Western "investments," and large-scale pauperization brought about by famine, civil war or outright robbery. Any more than religious fundamentalism, mere nationalism is not, and can never be, "the answer" to the problems of new secular societies. Alas one can already see in Palestine's potential statehood the lineaments of a marriage between the chaos of Lebanon and the tyranny of Iraq.

If this is not to happen, a number of quite specific issues need to be addressed. One is the Diaspora Palestinians, who originally brought Arafat and the PLO to power, kept them there, and are now relegated to permanent exile or refugee status. Since they comprise at least half of the total Palestinian population their needs and aspirations are not negligible. A small segment of the exile community is represented by the various political organizations "hosted" by Syria. A significant number of independents (some of whom, like Shafik al-Hout and Mahmoud Darwish, resigned from the PLO) still have an important role to play, not simply by applauding or condemning from the sidelines, but by advocating specific alterations in the PLO's structure, trying to change the triumphalist ambience of the moment into something more appropriate, mobilizing support and building an organization from within the various Palestinian communities all over the world to continue the march towards self-determination. These communities have been singularly disaffected, leaderless and indifferent since the Madrid process began.

One of the first tasks is a Palestinian census, which has to be regarded not just as a bureaucratic exercise but as the enfranchisement of Palestinians wherever they are. Israel, the US and the Arab states - all of them - have always opposed a census: it would give the Palestinians too high a profile in countries where they are supposed to be invisible, and before the Gulf War, it would have made it clear to various Gulf governments how dependent they were on an inappropriately large, usually exploited "guest" community. Above all, opposition to the census stemmed from the realization that, were Palestinians to be counted all together, despite dispersion and dispossession, they would be that very exercise come close to constituting a nation rather than a mere collection of people. Now more than ever the process of holding a census - and perhaps, later, world wide elections - should be a leading item on the agenda for Palestinians everywhere. It would constitute an act of historical and political self realization outside the limitations imposed by the absence of sovereignty. And it would give

body to the universal need for democratic participation, now ostensibly curtailed by Israel and the PLO in a premature alliance.

Certainly a census would once again raise the question of return for those Palestinians who are not from the West Bank and Gaza. Although this issue has been compressed into the general "refugee" formula deferred until the final status talks some time in the future, it needs to be brought up now. The Lebanese government, for instance, has been publicly heating up the rhetoric against citizenship and naturalization for the 350-400,000 Palestinians in Lebanon, most of whom are stateless, poor, permanently stalled. A similar situation obtains in Jordan and Egypt. These people, who have paid the heaviest price of all Palestinians, can neither be left to rot nor dumped somewhere else against their will. Israel is able to offer the right of return to every Jew in the world: individual Jews can become Israeli citizens and live in Israel at any time. This extraordinary inequity, intolerable to all Palestinians for almost half a century, has to be rectified. It is unthinkable that all the 1948 refugees would either want or be able to return to so small a place as a Palestinian state: on the other hand, it is unacceptable for them all to be told to resettle elsewhere, or drop any ideas they might have about reparation and compansation.

One of the things the PLO and independent Palestinians should therefore do is raise a question not addressed by the Oslo Accords, thereby, ask for reparations for Palestinians who have been the victims of this dreadful conflict. Although it is the Israeli Government's wish (expressed quite forcibly by Rabin at his Washington news conference) that the PLO should close its so called embassies, these offices should be kept open selectively so that claims for repatriation or compensation can be pressed.

In sum, we need to move up from the state of supine objectness in which the Oslo Accords were negotiated (we will accept anything so long as you recognize us) into one that enables us to prosecute parallel agreements with Israel and the Arabs concerning Palestinian national, as opposed to municipal aspirations. But this does not exclude resistance against the Israeli occupation, which continues indefinitely. So long as occupation and settlements exist, whether legitimized or not by the PLO, Palestinians and others must speak against them. One of the issues not raised, either by the Oslo Accords, the exchange of PLO-Israeli letters or the Washington speeches, is whether the violence and terrorism renounced by the PLO includes non-violent resistance, civil disobedience, etc.

These are the inalienable rights of any people denied full sovereignty and independence, and must be supported.

Like so many unpopular and undemocratic Arab governments, the PLO has already begun to appropriate authority for itself by calling its opponents "terrorists" and "fundamentalists." This is demagoguery. Hamas and Islamic Jihad are opposed to the Oslo agreement but they have said several times that they will not use violence against other Palestinians. Besides, their combined away amounts to fewer than a third of the citizens of the West Bank and Gaza. As for the Damascus based groups, they seem to me to be either paralyzed or discredited. But this by no hearts exhausts the Palestinian opposition, which also includes well known secularists, people who are committed to a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, realists and democrats. I include myself in this group which is, I believe, far bigger than is now supposed.

Central to this opposition's thinking is the desperate need for reform within the PLO, which is now put on notice that reductive claims to "national unity" are no longer an excuse for incompetence, corruption and autocracy. For the first time in Palestinian history such opposition cannot, except by some preposterous and disingenuous logic, be equated with treason or betrayal. Indeed our claim is that we are opposed to sectarian Palestinians and blind loyalty to the Leadership: we remain committed to the broad democratic and social principles of accountability and performance that triamphalist nationalism has always tried to annul, I believe that a broad based opposition to the PLO's history of bungling will emerge in the Diaspora, but will come to include people and parties in the Occupied Territories.

Lastly is there confusing matter of relationships between Israelis and Palestinians who believe in self-determination for two peoples, mutually and equally. Celebrations are premature and, for far too many Israeli and non-Israeli Jews, an easy way out of the mormous disparities that remain. Our peoples are already too bound up with each other in conflict and a shared history of persecution for an American-style pow-wow to heal the wounds and open the way forward. There is still a victim and a victimizer. But there can be solidarity in struggling to end the inequities, and for Israelis in pressuring their government to end the occupation, the expropriation and the settlements. The Palestinians, after all, have very little left to give. The common battle against poverty, injustice and militarism must now be joined seriously, and without the ritual demands for psychological security for Israelis - who if they don't have it now, never will. More than anything else, this will show whether the symbolic handshake is going to be a first step towards reconciliation and peace. ✪

* *A Prominent Christian Palestinian American, Distiguished Professor at Columbia University.*

By: Noam Chomsky **

# The Israel-Arafat agreement

## A just and lasting peace or reductionism?*

On August 30, the Israeli Cabinet approved a draft agreement on "Palestinian self-rule" that had been reached by the government of Israel and PLO chair Yasser Arafat's personal representatives. Parts of the agreement have not been revealed or are not yet settled at the time of writing (September 2), but it is likely that something much like the published text (NYT, Sept. 1) will be instituted, and that it will be followed by separate agreements between Israel and Arab states.

To understand what has been achieved, it is necessary to recall the relevant background, much of it familiar to readers of this magazine.

### The Barriers to Diplomacy

The June 1967 war brought the superpowers perilously close to confrontation, driving home the importance of a diplomatic settlement. In November 1967, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242, which expressed a broad international consensus on the general terms for a settlement. The current agreement is based entirely on UN 242 (and 338, which endorsees it). Article I of the 1993 draft agreement, outlining the "Aim of the Negotiations," specifies that "the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338," no other UN Resolutions are mentioned, thus resolving a central issue in the controversy in accord with US-Israeli demands.

UN 242 "emphasize[es] the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by wars and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security." It calls for "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and "Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." It calls for an agreement among states; Palestinian rights are mentioned only in the call for "a just settlement of the refugee problem," left unspecified. UN 242 is therefore thoroughly rejections, if we understand the concept of reductionism in non-racist terms: as denial of the right to national self-determination of one or the other of the two contending parties in the former Palestine.

With varying degrees of ambiguity, UN 242 was accepted by the contending states of the region over the next few years, though their interpretations differed. The Arab states rejected full peace, Israel rejected full withdrawal.

The phrase "withdrawal from territories" has been a particular bone of contention. In most of the world (including Europe), it has been understood to imply Israeli withdrawal from all of the territories occupied during the war, with at most minor and mutual adjustments. At first, that was also Washington's interpretation. UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg informed King Hussein of Jordan that the US insisted that "there must be a mutuality in adjustments," a classified State Department history observes: to both Israel and the Arab states, "US officials emphasized that any territorial adjustments would be limited in nature and would not, of necessity, be detrimental to the Arab states." There would be at most "minor reciprocal border rectification's" with no "substantial withdrawing of the [pre-war] map." It was on this understanding, explicitly conveyed by US government mediators, that the Arab states accepted the resolution, and the US itself unequivocally held to this interpretation until 1971. In those years, Israel was alone among major actors in rejecting this interpretation of the document.

The disagreements over interpretation came to a head in February 1971, when UN mediator Gunnar Jarring presented a proposal to Egypt and Israel that called for full peace between them in return for full Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. Egyptian President Sadat accepted the proposal. Sadat's acceptance of Jarring's "famous" peace proposal was a "bombshell," Prime Minister Rabin recalls in his memoirs, a "milestone." While officially welcoming Egypt's expression "of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel," the government of Israel rejected the agreement, stating that "Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines. The reasoning was explained by Haim Bar-Lev of the governing Labor Party: "I think that we could obtain a peace settlement on the basis of the earlier [pre-June 1967] borders. If I were persuaded that this is the maximum that we might obtain, I would say: agreed. But I think that it is not the maximum. I think that if we continue to hold out,

we will obtain more."

The crucial question was how Washington would react. The Jarring-Sadat agreement was consistent with official US policy. There was, however, a conflict between the State Department and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, who was then engaged in a campaign to undermine and displace Secretary of State Rogers, as he was soon to do, Kissinger insisted that the US must insist upon "stalemate": no diplomacy, no negotiations. His position prevailed, the Sadat's peace offer was rejected.

Since 1971, the US and Israel have been virtually alone in rejecting the standard interpretation of the withdrawal clause of UN 242. The basic cause for the misery and suffering that followed is their conviction, which has proven to be correct, that "if we continue to hold out, we will obtain more." The isolation of the US and Israel became still more marked by the mid-1970s, when the terms of the international consensus shifted to include a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thus departing from earlier reductionism. In January 1976, the US vetoed a Security Council resolution calling for a settlement in terms of UN 242, with this amendment. The US veto, repeated later, excluded the Security Council from the diplomacy. The General Assembly continued to pass near-unanimous resolutions in similar terms (the US and Israel opposed); a negative US vote amounts to a veto. The US also blocked initiatives from Europe, the Arab states, the PLO and others. The last of the regular UN resolutions was in the midst of the Gulf conflict in December 1990 (144-2).

Through this period, the US and Israel were the leaders of the rejectionist camp, joined by increasingly marginal elements of the Islamic world, justly termed "extremist." The conclusions being unacceptable, the facts have been "vetoed" along with numerous peace initiatives, buried deep in the memory hole together with Sadat's "famous milestone" and much else that is inconvenient.

Israel's policy spectrum with regard to the occupied territories is illuminated in a study by Peace Now, which compares four different plans for the territories from 1968 to 1992, asking how many Palestinians would be within areas annexed by Israel if these plans were enacted today: (I) the 1968 Allon Plan (Labor); (II) the 1976 Labor Party Settlement Plan (never officially adopted though "it has informed practical decision-making and action"); (III) the Ariel Sharon Plan of 1992 (Likud), which created 11 isolated and discontinuous "cantons" for Palestinian autonomy; (IV) the Defense Establishment Plan of 1992 (Labor), which deals only with the West Bank. The number of Palestinians in settlements to be annexed are as follows:

(I) Allon Plan: 385,000; 91,000 in the West Bank and the rest in Gaza.

(II) Labor Party Settlement Plan: 603,000; 310,000 in the West Bank.

(III)Sharon Plan: 393,000; 378,000 in the West Bank.

(IV) Defense Establishment Plan: 204,000 in the West Bank, Gaza unspecified.

To these figures must be added the 150,000 Palestinians of East Jerusalem, to be annexed in all plans, the Peace Now study notes. "The Labor Party plan of 1976 would annex the greatest number of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza," while the Sharon Plan "is the maximalist plan with regard to the West Bank," though ceding self-rule to more Gaza Palestinians than the Labor plans.

As the analysis indicates, the policy spectrum has been narrow, and invariably rejections. The political blocs have differed on West Bank Arab population concentrations, Labor being more concerned than Likud to exclude them from areas scheduled for Israeli takeover. Washington has favored Labor Party rejectionism, more rational than the Likud variety, which has no real provision for the population of the occupied territories except eventual "transfer" (expulsion).

After the Gulf war, Europe accepted the US position that the Monroe Doctrine effectively extends over the Middle East; Europeans would henceforth refrain from independent initiatives, limiting themselves to helping implement US rejectionist doctrine, as Norway indeed did in 1993. The Soviet Union was gone from the scene, its remnants now loyal clients of Washington. The UN had become virtually a US agency. Whatever space the superpower conflict had left for non alignment was gone, and the catastrophe of capitalism that swept the traditional colonial domains of the West in the 1980s left the Third World mired in general despair, disciplined by forces of the managed market. With Arab nationalism dealt yet another crushing blow by Sadam's aggression and terror and PLO tactics of more than the usual ineptitude, the Arab rulers had less need than before to respond to popular pressures with pro-Palestinian gestures. The US was therefore in a good position to advance its rejections program without interference, moving towards the solution outlined by Secretary of State James Baker well before the Gulf crisis: any settlement must be based on the 1989 plan of the government of Israel, which flatly bars Palestinian national rights (Baker Plan, December 1989).

Washington's general goals have been stable for a long period. The basic concern is the enormous oil wealth of the region. Planning has long been guided by a strategic conception that assigns local management to an "Arab Facade" of weak and dependent dictators, who will ensure that profits from Gulf oil flow primarily to the US

(and its British client), not to the people of the region. A network of regional gendarmes is to keep order; local "cops on the beat" as Nixon's Defense Secretary, Melvin Laird, described them in the context of the Nixon Doctrine. The responsibility of the Middle East cops was outlined in 1973 by the Senate's leading expert on the topic, Henry Jackson: to "inhibit and contain those irresponsible and radical elements in certain Arab States, who, were they free to do so, would pose a grave threat indeed to our principal sources of petroleum in the Persian Gulf"—more accurately, to the vast wealth they yield. Senator Jackson was referring specifically to the tacit alliance between Israel, Iran (under the Shah), and Saudi Arabia.

As for Kurds, Palestinians, slum-dwellers in Cairo, and others who contribute nothing to the basic structure of power—they have no right, by the most elementary principles of statecraft. Perhaps they can occasionally be used in one or another power play, but that is where their rights end, as the history of the Kurds has demonstrated, today once again. The status of the Palestinians has been even lower than that or other worthless people; their value is not zero, but negative, in that their plight has had a disruptive effect in the Arab world, thus interfering with US goals. They must therefore be marginalized somehow, perhaps under a form of "autonomy" that leaves them to manage their own affairs under Israeli supervision. That plan, proposed at Camp David, was taken up when the "peace process" was renewed at Madrid in the Fall of 1991. As the conference opened, one of Israel's most knowledgeable and acute observers of the territories, journalist Danny Rubinstein, wrote that the US and Israel were proposing "autonomy as in POW camp, where the prisoners are 'autonomous' to cook their meals without interference and to organize cultural events," Palestinians are to be granted little more control over local services, he wrote, adding that even advocates of Greater Israel never call for literal annexation of the territories, which would require Israel to provide the "restricted services" available to Israel's second-class Arab citizens, at enormous cost.

**The US and Israel were proposing autonomy as in POW camp, where the prisoners are 'autonomous' to cook their meals without interference and to organize cultural events.**

As discussed here at the time, the best outcome, from Washington's point of view, would be a settlement that entrenches the traditional strategic conception and gives it a public form, raising tacit understandings to a formal treaty. If some arrangement for local "autonomy" can suppress the Palestinian issue, well and good. Meanwhile security arrangements among Israel, Turkey, Egypt, and the United Sates can be extended, perhaps bringing others in if they accept the client role. There need be no further concern over possible Soviet support for attempts within the region to interfere with such designs.

While the negotiations were proceeding without issue, Israel stepped up the harsh repression in the territories, following the thinking outlined by Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin (now Prime Minister). In February 1989, he explained to Peace Now leaders that the US had granted Israel time to suppress the Intifada by force, diverting attention by meaningless diplomatic maneuvers: "The inhabitants of the territories are subject to harsh military and economic pressure," Rabin said. "In the end, they will be broken" and will accept Israel's terms. These policies achieved much success, extended with Rabin's recent "closure" of the territories, a crushing blow to the staggering Palestinian economy.

From the early days of the Intifada, if not before, it was becoming clear that the PLO leadership was losing its popular support in the occupied territories. Local activists from secular nationalist sectors, while still recognizing the PLO as the sole agent for negotiations, spoke with open contempt of its corruption, personal power plays, opportunism, and disregard for the interests and opinions of the people it claimed to represent. By all indications, the disaffection increased in the years that followed, while the fundamentalist opposition that Israel had initially nurtured gained popular support, feeding on this growing discontent and on the demoralization as Rabin's program was implemented, with constant US support at all levels: economic, diplomatic, and ideological.

These matters, reviewed with particular detail and depth in Israel Shahak's regular reports, have received only sporadic and inadequate coverage here.

With its popular support in decline and its status deteriorating in the Arab world, the PLO became more tolerable to US-Israeli policy makers, particularly as the growing fundamentalist movement evoked memories of the resistance that had driven Israel out of much of Lebanon. Informal Israel-PLO contacts were increasingly reported. These reached their culmination with the August 1993 agreement, which bypassed the delegations engaged in the official "peace pro-

cess," and indeed also excluded the PLO, apart from Arafat and a few close associates.

**The Scale of the Victory**

The agreement was welcomed with great acclaim, marred only by skepticism as to whether it could hold. "America's own greatest interest," the twin goals of "enhanced security for Israel and regional peace," both seem closer to achievement this morning than ever before," the New York Times editors observed as the agreement was announced. Apart from omission of the tacit background understanding that the "regional peace" must ensure US control, their identification of Washington's highest priorities is accurate, though automatic identification of US government policy with "America's greatest interest" takes a leap of faith; it is not obvious that ignoring Palestinian national rights and the security of others is in the interest of the people of the United States.

The editors may, however, be right in thinking that long-standing US policy goals have been advanced. The intended eventual outcome of the 1993 agreement falls well within the bounds of traditional US-Israeli rejectionism, adopting essential features of the Sharon Plan as well as the Labor Party's Allon Plan. That much was spelled out the same day on the facing page of the Times by Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Bellin, a close associate of foreign Minister Shimon Peres. He informed his US audience that "the permanent solution will be based on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and from most of the West Bank. We agree to a confederated formula between Jordan and the Palestinians in the West Bank, but we will not return to pre-1967 borders. United Jerusalem will remain the capital of the State of Israel."

In return, "After years of rejection of Israel as part of the Middle East, the Arabs will accept and recognize Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state within secure and defined borders in this region"—as they did, for example, in the vetoed Security Council resolution of January 1976, gone from history along with much else like it, so that Beilin's statement will ring true to American ears.

The reasons for preferring "confederation" to Palestinian independence have nothing to do with security. As has been understood since 1948, when Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion made the point explicit, an independent Palestinian state serves Israeli security interests better than "a state linked to Transjordan [now Jordan], and maybe tomorrow to Iraq." The problem is that an independent state would be a barrier to eventual integration of parts of the territories and control of their resources, primarily water. As for "united Jerusalem," that is a concept of broad and as yet undetermined scope. "Withdrawal from Gaza" and other territories is understood to exclude Jewish settlements and the resources they control. And even this "permanent settlement" lies well down the road.

It is understandable then that the Times editors, expressing the prevailing view, should see the "historic deal" as a great opportunity. It is "the Middle East equivalent of the fall of the Berlin wall," chief diplomatic correspondent Thomas Friedman proclaimed. The projected arrangements represent the "triumph of realism over fanaticism and political courage over political cowardice." "Realists" understand that in this world, you follow US orders. Those who are not convinced of the justice of traditional US-Israeli rejectionism are not only wrong, but are "fanatics" and "cowards," thus excluded from respectable society. The hysteria of the rhetoric suggests that more is understood than appears on the surface.

While some Israeli advocates in the US felt that the victory was not far-reaching enough, more perceptive ones recognized the scale of what had been achieved. The PLO had been forced "to become more reasonable," acceding to Israel's demands, as Times columnist William Safire, a self-described "pro-Israeli hawk," put the matter. "Arafat finally appears to be ready to accept [Menahem] Begin's approach [of 1978], adding the Gaza-Jericho twist," Safire comments, "having been softened by 15 years of Israeli hard line"—to which we may add US intransigence.

**"Realists" understand that in this world, you follow US orders. Those who are not convinced of the justice of traditional US-Israeli rejectionism are not only wrong, but are "fanatics" and "cowards," thus excluded from respectable society.**

The draft agreement makes no mention of Palestinian national rights, the primary issue on which the US and Israel broke with the international consensus from the mid-1970s. Throughout these years, it was agreed that a settlement should be based on UN 242. There were two basic points of contention: (1) Do we interpret the withdrawal clause of 242 in accord with the international consensus (including the US, pre-1971), or in accord with the position of Israel and US policy from 1971? (2) Is the settlement based

solely on UN 242, which offers nothing to the Palestinians, or 242 and other relevant UN resolutions, as the PLO had proposed for many years in accord with the nonrejectionist international consensus. Thus, does the settlement incorporate the right of refugees to return or compensation, as the UN has insisted since December 1948 (with US endorsement, long forgotten), and the Palestinian right to national self-determination that has repeatedly been endorsed by the UN (though blocked by Washington)? These are the crucial issues that have stood in the way of a political settlement.

On these issues, the agreement explicitly and without equivocation adopts the US-Israeli stand. As noted, Article I states that the "permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338," nothing more. Furthermore, as Bellin made explicit, the withdrawal clause of UN 242 is to be understood in the terms unilaterally imposed by the US (from 1971). In fact, the agreement does not even preclude further Israeli settlement in the large areas of the West Bank it has taken over, or even new land takeovers. On such central matters as control of water, it speaks only of "cooperation" and "equitable utilization" in a manner to be determined by "experts from both sides." The outcome of cooperation between an elephant and a fly is not hard to predict.

The victory of the rejectionists is complete, even in the ideologically sphere; given US global power, the version of history designed by its doctrinal institutions becomes the general framework for discussion in most of the world, including Europe.

For Palestinians in refugee camps and elsewhere outside the territories, the agreement offers little hope, and they have expressed understandable bitterness. Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon also "criticized the PLO for making concessions with Israel that could jeopardize Palestinian national rights and undermine the joint Arab negotiating strategy," Lamis Abdoni reported from Amman, given "Israel the upper hand in imposing its conditions on each Arab country separately."

A separate matter entirely is whether the two sides would be well-advised to accept the agreement devised by Israel and Arafat. For the US and Israel, the question hardly arises: the agreement falls within the framework on which they have insisted. For the Palestinians, the question is more complex. The agreement entails abandonment of most of their hopes, at least for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, realistic alternatives may be much worse.

Given US power, refusal to accept US-Israeli terms is at once translated into a demonstration of the worthlessness of such "fanatics" and "cowards," who thereby cede any rights they might have been thought to have. Palestinians were once "the darling of many Western liberals," Thomas Friedman writes (meaning, presumably, that some Western liberals regarded them as at least semi-human); but they are beloved no more, and unless they toe the line their former admirers may abandon them to their fate. Furthermore, the agreement should offer Palestinians some relief from the barriers to development imposed by the military administration, no small matter. And it moves beyond Rubinstein's "autonomy of a POW camp" in that Palestinians are assigned control over "direct taxation." As Israeli-supervised "strong police force" of Palestinians might, at worst, be the local counterpart of Israel's South Lebanon Army, subduing the population by terror and threat while the masters observe closely ready to move if the iron fist is needed. But it might turn out that Palestinian police will treat the population less harshly than the Israeli army and border police, and settler degredations should reduce. Though the agreements say nothing about the matter, there may be a decline in Israeli settlement and in the development programs designed to integrate the extensive areas designated for Jewish settlement into the Israeli economy, leaving Palestinians on the side. Many issues can be debated, but not—at least not seriously—within a doctrinal framework that identifies "realism" as what the US and Israel demand, and dismisses critical analysis in advance as "fanaticism" and "cowardice."

The respected head of the Palestinian delegation, Haidar Abdul Shafi, had some observations on these matters in a talk in Bethlehem on July 22, 1993, just as Arafat was secretly moving to take matters into his own hands, bypassing local Palestinians. Abdul Shafi held out little hope for the "peace process" which excludes entirely the possibility "that Palestinians must be the main authority in the interim period for the people and for the land," leading to true national self-determination. He stressed, however, that "the negotiations are not worth fighting about. The critical issue is transforming our society. All else is inconsequential. We must decide amongst ourselves to use all our strength and resources to develop our collective leadership and the democratic institutions which will achieve our goals and guide us in the future. The important thing is for us to take care of our internal situation and organize our society and correct those negative aspects from which it has been suffering for generations and which is the main reason for our losses against our foes."

His remarks seem to me apt, and of much broader import. We might do well to heed them ourselves. ✪

* *With permission from* Z Magazine, *October 1993.*

** *Prominent Jewish American, Distinguished Professor at MIT.*

By: Isa Nakhleh *

# The U.N. and the need for a just and permanent peace in the Mid-East

After signing the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements at the lawn of the White House on September 13, and after Yasser Arafat shook the hands of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, many people in the world believed that, at last, peace has been made between the Arabs and the Jews. Many members of the United Nations so believe. On Friday, October 1, President Clinton met with Prince Hassan of Jordan and Shimon Peres at the White House and both shook hands before the television cameras.

Now Israel and the United States wish to convince the world that all the Arab-Israeli problems have been solved, and therefore, the archaic United Nations resolutions relating to the Palestine problem must be repealed. Arab economic boycott of Israel must be abolished. Israeli relations with the Arab states must be normalized.

This is a big deception. What was signed on September 13 is only a "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements." Paragraph 3 of Article IV states:

"It is understood that the negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest."

In the signed agreement, Israel is giving the Palestinians self-rule in the Gaza strip and Jericho while it is keeping its authority on foreign affairs and security. Israeli armed forces will remain on the borders of Gaza and Jericho and in the Israeli settlements. Israel and the Palestinians will negotiate within three to five years the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza and all the issues mentioned in Paragraph 3 of Article IV. This agreement between Israel and the PLO was rightly described by an Israeli citizen, Maxim Ghilan, editor and Publisher of Israel and Palestine Political Report as follows:

"What is now unfolding is far from a just peace and will not, and cannot, lead to a lasting peace in the immediate. Working within the parameters of this scheme is like building a house without strong foundations in an earthquake-prone land."

## Background of the Arab-Israeli problem

In order to understand how to make peace in the Middle East, it is important to review the background of the Arab-Israeli problem. We do not wish to go back to 1917 but only to 1947.

1. In 1947 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 (II) partitioning Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state and an international regime for Jerusalem. The area of the Jewish state was 54% of the area of Palestine and the area of the Arab state was 45%. The Arabs in Palestine were 1,350,000 Christians and Muslims and the Jews numbered 650,000. Some of them were Palestinians and many were illegal immigrants and aliens.

2. The Jewish minority was well-armed and militarily better trained than the Palestinians, and was aided and abetted by the forces of Great Britain. The Soviet Union sent large quantities of weapons and ammunition to the Jews through Czechoslovakia. The Jewish minority was able to occupy 80% of the territory of Palestine and committed against the Palestinian Arab majority the following War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide:

(a) They violated the territorial integrity of Palestine and occupied 80% thereof.

(b) They expelled from Palestine more than 800,000 Palestinian Arabs by violence and massacres.

(c) They prevented the Palestinian refugees from returning to their homes.

(d) They committed many massacres against the Palestinians.

(e) They erased from the map of Palestine 492 Arab small towns and villages and usurped all of the houses, lands and properties of Palestinian Arabs in these towns and villages.

(f) They usurped about 95% of the houses, apartments and commercial buildings of Palestinian Arabs in 625 small towns and villages and in 12 cities, namely, Safad, Tiberias, Acre, Beisan, Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramleh, New Jerusalem, Majdal, Beersheba and Ainkarem.

(g) They looted, pillaged and plundered all of the furniture, machinery, equipment, merchandise and all worldly possessions of the Palestinian Arabs in 80% of Palestine.

(h) They destroyed and desecrated Christian holy places.

(i) They destroyed and desecrated Muslim holy places.

(j) They violated the right of self-determination of the Palestinian Arabs, their sovereignty over their wealth and natural resources, and their political, civil, proprietary and religious

rights and made the Palestinians a refugee nation, thereby committing the crime of Genocide against the Palestinians.

3. The Jewish minority declared a Jewish state in the area occupied by them and in the Declaration of Independence made in Tel Aviv on May 14, 1948, relied on the Resolution of the General Assembly 181 (II) of the 29th of November, 1947. It stated;

"On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution requiring the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine."

4. When the Provisional Government of Israel requested the recognition by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations, it stated:

"The State of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within the frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution of November 29, 1947."

An Irgun poster for distribution in Central Europe.

These facts prove that the only recognized boundaries of Israel are the boundaries specified in the United Nations general Assembly Resolution 181 (II), and therefore, Israel has no rights or sovereignty in the parts of Palestine which were illegally occupied in 1948 and thereafter outside these boundaries.

5. In 1967 Israel, by a war of aggression, occupied the remaining 20% of Palestine, namely, the West Bank and Gaza. It occupied the Syrian Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt.

Since 1967 Israel usurped 65% of Palestinian lands in the West Bank and Gaza and 95% of the water resources, in violation of the principles of the Law of Belligerent Occupation. It established 203 Jewish settlements on usurped Palestinian lands and transferred 150,000 Israelis to these settlements, and settled 250,000 Israelis in buildings in East Jerusalem and in settlements in Jerusalem suburbs. The usurpation of Palestinian lands, the establishment of Jewish settlements in the occupied Arab territories, and transferring Israeli citizens to the occupied territories and Jerusalem constitute War Crimes.

Security Council Resolution 242 is very clear. It emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and ordered Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied by war. All members of the United Nations made statements in the General Assembly and the Security Council urging that Israel should withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories and reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.

All declarations made by United States secretaries of state and by United States representatives in the United Nations and by other United Nations members since 1967 called upon Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories and reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.

6. Since the beginning of the Intifada in 1987, Israel has committed, and is still committing, the following War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide against the Palestinians:

(a) It is keeping 15,320 Palestinian men, women and juveniles in concentration camps and prisons. These prisoners are tortured and subjected to the most inhumane treatment similar to the Nazi treatment of Jews and non-Jews during the Nazi occupation of Europe.

(b) Israeli forces until the end of July, 1993, murdered 1,240 Palestinians amongst whom were more than 350 children, their ages ranging from 3 to 17 years. It injured more than 140,000 Palestinians, many of them were maimed for life. It destroyed and cut more than 161,180 olive and fruit trees. It imposed curfews on many communities of more than 11,500 hours. It destroyed or sealed more than 2,449 houses, thereby rendering more than 15,000 people homeless. During the last few months Israeli forces evacuated 50 families from their homes in the Gaza Strip and destroyed these homes by rockets and tank missiles.

Israeli soldiers entered these homes and destroyed furniture, refrigerators, televisions and food stuff. They made more than 300 Palestinian men, women and children homeless. Their last crime was the expulsion of the 410 Palestinians to the southern part of Lebanon. These expelled are from the West Bank and Gaza. Many of them are doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, farmers, religious leaders and businessmen. Israel refused to abide by the Security Council resolution 799 and return these expelled to their homes and families at once.

## Peace between Israel and the Palestinians

The negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel are supposed to be on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 of 22 November 1967, 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, 252 of 21 May 1968, 267 of 3 July 1969, 271 (1969) of 15 September 1969, 298 (1971 of 25 September 1971, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 726 of January 6, 1992. And on the basis of the General Assembly Resolutions 181 (II), 194 (III) and all the General Assembly resolutions relating to the Palestine problem.

In light of all these resolutions, Israel must declare that it is willing to live in the Middle East, not as a colonial regime of apartheid, but as a peace-loving state.

Moreover, Israel must recognize the Palestinian state which was established by Resolution 181 (II) and which was again declared by the Palestine National Council. As Yasser Arafat recognized the existence and sovereignty of Israel, it is the duty of Israel to recognize the existence and sovereignty of the Palestine state, which was recognized by 193 states. More members of the United Nations recognized the Palestine state than those members which recognized Israel. If Israel is really interested in peace, it must act in fairness and justice in accordance with the United Nations resolutions and the principles of international law. Israel should forget the ridiculous idea of self-rule which was pushed by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an agent of the Likud Party. Self-rule is only a device to defer facing the facts and negotiate honestly, sincerely and in good faith to solve the Palestine problem and to resolve all the problems and disputes between Israel and the Palestinians.

## The issues which must be negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians

1. The withdrawal by Israel of its armed forces, civil administration and Israeli citizens from the West Bank and Gaza within 15 days.

2. The release from prisons and concentration camps of the 15,320 Palestinian men and women incarcerated without any justification.

3. The boundaries between Israel and the Palestinian state: These boundaries have been already defined by Resolution 181 (II) and they are the only U.N. recognized boundaries for Israel.

4. Arrangements for co-existence between Israel and the Palestine state in Jerusalem and guarantees for the Holy places and religion for all faiths. Jerusalem can be an international city as provided by Resolution 181 (II) or can be united as the capital of Israel in the West and the capital of the Palestine in the East.

5. The usurpation of Palestinian lands in the West Bank and Gaza and the establishment of the Jewish settlements and transferring Israeli citizens to these settlements constitute War Crimes. Therefore, Israel must withdraw all Israeli citizens from these settlements and should give all the settlements to the Palestine state as part of a settlement between Israel and the Palestine state when discussing the restitution and compensation regarding Palestine properties which were illegally usurped by Israel since

1947.

6. The restitution to the Palestine refugees of all their tangible properties which were illegally usurped by Israel from 1948 to 1993 in the areas Israel occupied between 1947-1950 and compensation for the private property which cannot be restituted. Under international law private property is sacred and therefore, Israel is under legal and moral obligation to restitute to Palestinians all their private properties or compensate them for those properties that cannot be restituted. Israel obtained compensation from Germany exceeding $30 billion, and at present requesting restitution of, or compensation for, private Jewish properties which were usurped in all European countries.

7. The implementation of the General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) and other United Nations resolutions regarding the return of Palestinian refugees who must be given the option to return to their homes, or not to return, and be compensated.

Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians over these issues must be made now and not within two years or five years as prescribed in the ridiculous agreement of self-rule. There is no valid reason for this delay. Now is the opportune time to make peace. More delaying may sabotage all efforts to make peace.

## Issues to be settled between Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan

The issues which must be settled between Israel on the one hand and Syria, Lebanon and Jordan on the other are the following:

1. The withdrawal of Israeli-armed forces and citizens from the Golan Heights and giving all the settlements illegally established by Israel in the Golan Heights on account of compensation to be paid by Israel for the destruction of Syrian towns and villages.

2. Security arrangements between Israel and Syria, which guarantees the Mutual security of both states.

3. The withdrawal of all Israeli forces and mercenary Israeli-armed forces from Southern Lebanon to the international boundaries existing between Palestine and Lebanon in 1947.

4. Payment by Israel of compensation to Lebanon for the destruction of Lebanese towns and villages and the city of Beirut during the Israeli wars of aggression against Lebanon in 1978, 1982 and 1993.

5. The withdrawal of Israeli forces and citizens from the areas of Jordanian territory which were occupied in 1948 and 1967.

6. The destruction of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in Israel and Syria.

## Signing of a comprehensive peace treaty

Peace between Israel and the Arabs is indivisible. A peace between Israel and one party to the conflict is not peace. In order to be permanent and stable, the peace must be made with Palestine, with Syria, with Lebanon, and with Jordan, and must be signed in one peace conference. Israel claims to be always worried about its security. Its security cannot be guaranteed by occupying any part of the Palestine state or Syria or Lebanon or Jordan as an expansionist aggressive neighbor.

After agreements are concluded between Israel on the one hand and the Palestinians, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan on the other, a peace treaty must be signed by a comprehensive settlement under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.

## A guarantee for the security of all states in the middle east

In order to guarantee the security of all the states and nations in the Middle East, the permanent members of the Security Council should make a declaration similar to the Tri-partite Declaration of May 20, 1950, expressing their commitment to the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the Middle East and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. Should the United Nations and its members find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers, it should, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation. This declaration may be adopted as a resolution by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The United States of America should join hands with the other permanent members of the Security Council to solve the Arab-Israeli problems on the above-mentioned principles. The half measures and secret negotiations and self-rule principles and delaying tactics will not bring peace to the Middle East. Dealing seriously with the problems as outlined above is the only way to bring permanent peace, justice, security and prosperity to all the states and peoples in the Middle East. ✪

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By: Uri Davis*

# The "Declaration of Principles" evokes a Palestinian nightmare: Not once is the word "sovereignty" mentioned

The text of the "Gaza-Jericho First" agreement, which was prepared during a series of secret negotiations between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel, in Oslo, Norway, during the last several months is fair and square a defeat, a capitulation and the end of a sequence of Palestinian resistance to Zionist colonialism and Israeli occupation. A sequence that began with the onset of the year 1965, when Fatah executed its first military operation in Israel proper, and now it is ending with a "transitional agreement" between Israel and the PLO, and which includes mutual recognition. The Palestinian people, though, remain scattered throughout the Diaspora or under Israeli occupation, subject to Israeli racist laws. With the signing of this agreement, a new chapter begins for the liberation of Palestine; it shall be entitled: Either Annexation or Independence.

We, the Palestinians, are not the first people to fight for independence. We will not be the last neither. We say to all peoples of our time whose struggle inspired us, and to all peoples who are inspired by our struggle: "We believe that all humans are born equal, and that their Creator parted to them inalienable rights: The right to life, freedom, and the pursuit of happiness in this world. To achieve these rights, governments are formed. These governments gain their jurisdiction from the consent of the governed. When any form of government turns negative it destroys these objectives. It then becomes the people's right to change the government and establish a new one, with principles realizing people's security and well-being, with regulations conforming to those principles."

The transitional agreement, finalized in Oslo, is tantamount to a Palestinian surrender. It becomes our obligation to give it an accurate description, to better understand and fathom it. The Oslo Accord negotiates away all the issues that were not breached by the "transitional agreement" in its Article IV, and the details therein, (i.e., Jerusalem, the refugees, security arrangements, frontiers, military encampments, etc.). These issues were deferred to specific negotiations defining permanent conditions. These are scheduled to begin no later than the beginning of the third year of the transitional period.

Parenthetically, I have read with special care the text of the final draft, including the addenda, the protocols and the minutes of the meetings and not once was the word sovereignty mentioned. Not even the issue of sovereignty is to be discussed during the arrangement of the final and lasting conditions in Palestine. On the other hand, the issue of frontiers was discussed. These two problems though are not one issue. There may be recognized borders between a future Palestinian state on one side and Israel and Jordan on the other side. But Palestine may still be devoid of sovereignty. There are borders between the Bantustan state of Transkei and the Republic of South Africa, but sovereignty remains the domain of the apartheid racist government in Pretoria and not the preserve of the Bantustan government in Umtata.

The UN Charter, its Covenants and International Law respect the Palestinians right to independence, i.e., their return to their homeland, self-determination and sovereignty within the borders stated in UN Partition Resolution No. 181 (11/29/1947) which gives Palestinians sovereignty over 50% of Palestine. The transitional agreement between the PLO and Israel is not a first step towards Palestinian independence. Rather it is a first step towards establishing a Palestinian Bantustan, lacking in sovereignty, a clone of the Bantustan with the Republic of South Africa.

The true secular and democratic response to an eventuality of a Palestinian Bantustan entity under Israeli, Zionist, and racist sovereignty is to arise the banner of "Either Annexation or Independence." The true weakness of the secular, democratic opposition within the Palestine National Council (PNC) is its inability to present an alternate, constructive political vision to the peace process which was unleashed at Madrid. That is what it is expected for the majority of the PNC, once it convenes to look into this agreement and vote yea or nay on it.

Those who, like myself, supported Palestinian participation in the Madrid Conference and criticized Palestinian political negotiations with the framework of the peace process have come to realize that their worst fears have

come to pass. We should come to grips with this agreement in a spirit of realism.

I, like all other principled Palestinians, have to weigh the cost of establishing a Palestinian Bantustan, having no sovereignty, with whatever advantage comes out of legitimizing the PLO within Israel. This is the option presented to us by our leadership. I will not dodge this issue and my personal responsibility. The PLO is the executive apparatus of the PNC. Both are regulated by the Palestine National Charter.

Now the PLO is proposing amendments to its Charter due to Zionist pressure as a means of legitimizing the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO must not compromise its principles by recognizing Israel as a state in the area and a member of the UN; otherwise it will seriously compromise the Palestinian position if the PLO recognizes Israel as a Zionist, Jewish state, and a state for the Jewish people.

**It is not a Victory**

A diplomatic recognition of the legal presence of an Israeli state as a member of the UN and a full fledged state in the Middle East does not mean legalizing and legitimizing the following Israeli laws:

* The absentee landlord rules of 1950
* The law of return, 1950
* The status laws by the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization, 1952
* The Jewish National Fund Law, 1953
* The Basic Law of Israeli Land, 1960
* The Covenant between the Israeli government and the Jewish National Fund, 1961

These are the most infamous of Israeli apartheid laws in chronological order. With all the regional and worldwide endorsements of this transitional agreement, we, the Palestinians, in the spirit of truth and trust, should not disguise surrender and the reversal of 30 years of struggle under a pretense of victory. This is not a victory. It is not our victory. It is not the victory of the 1948 refugees. It is not a victory for Jerusalem. It is not a victory for those small in number, but significant Jews opposed to Zionism inside Israel. It is not a victory for the masses of Hebrew people within Israel. It is not our victory. It is their victory, the victory of our enemies, the victory of Zionist settlements, apartheid and Israeli occupation that seeks to reinforce its gains by "conceding" to a "transitional government of self-rule" in occupied Gaza and the West Bank. In other words, to erect a Palestinian Bantustan entity under Israeli hegemony. The Israelis are now taking American advice: reap the investments of 45 years of war and occupation. Nelson Mandela refused to bind himself and the African National Congress (ANC) to renouncing violence as long as there is Apartheid in South Africa. Nelson Mandella thinks (and rightly so) that violence against racial discrimination is not violence but rather self-defense, and a defense of UN covenants, resolutions and agreements.

**Arafat is no Mandela**

The reason why Mandela was released from prison after 27 years of detention was his and his people's steadfastness. It led to the lifting of the ban on the ANC and its armed wing. All were part of the process of destroying the laws of racial discrimination in South Africa. Mandela achieved all that without compromising his principles and the use of violence before the annulment of apartheid in South Africa.

The declaration of principles concerning self-rule does not touch the laws of Zionist apartheid. A Palestinian Bantustan entity will not be threatening, rather it will aggrandize the ongoing Israeli presence as a Zionist Jewish state. Arafat is not a Palestinian Mandela. Arafat not only forced the PLO to renounce "terrorism", but also to cease to use force against the Zionist Apartheid apparatus.

In the near future we will discover that the transitional agreement is but a formula for a Palestinian civil war, a prescription for inter-Palestinian violence, and Palestinian-Israeli battles. When our leadership speaks to our people it should not mask capitulation with victory.

If this leadership wants to deceive us by disguising capitulation with an attire of victory, then it will only merit disgust and outrage, in addition to the accusation of treason. The new chapter to be written has to spell out the integral unity of all of Palestine (regardless of past division). The idea of dividing Palestine into two states: a Palestinian state and an Israeli state within the framework of UN resolutions, with a combined economy and with Jerusalem as an internationalized city, the capital of both states, cannot be supported except if it is a first step towards establishing a unified, democratic, non-sectarian state, i.e., the Palestine State with sovereignty over all the area covered by the British mandate in which there are now around 9 million Palestinians living, all of whom are, with their descendants, the citizens of a united future Palestine. Of them there are 5 million Arab Palestinians and 4 million Hebrew Palestinians.

There should be a National Palestinian Front under the banner of "Annexation or Independence." Membership should be open to all Palestinians (Arabs and Hebrews) and to all Palestinian organizations that recognize the Palestinian State that was declared in Nov. 1988. This Palestinian Front should be established immediately. ✪

* *A Jewish Palestinian Professor of Political Science in Englad, and a former member of PNC.*

By: Bilal Al-Hasan *

# PLO annuls all legal advice

*A Study by a Professor of International Law Requested by the PLO is Annulled, Item by Item.*

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), at the onset of the Madrid Conference, solicited an International-legal reading on negotiations for self-rule from a professor of International Law at the University of Illinois, Dr. Francis Boyle. But when the agreement with Israel was concluded, the PLO had abandoned all advice and prudence therein.

For at least the coming five years, the Palestinian - Israeli agreement will remain a bone of contention, among Palestinians, Arabs and many International parties, until a final agreement is arrived at. How and what that will be is anyone's guess at this time.

Until these five years are over (we have yet to begin them) we watch a colossal difference between the pro's and con's of this agreement. There are those who figure: given the circumstances, there couldn't have been a better outcome. And there are those who figure that the generation sacrifices of the Palestinians, the last of whom is the Intifada generation, deserve better than the results of clandestine negotiations, under deep cover, far from the involvement of leading Palestinian institutions.

As is to be expected, two views emerge from such an agreement: the lay person's view and the leader's view. The run-of-the-mill person is attracted by the appearances of such an agreement—the Israeli soldier leaving his city or town, the Palestinian flag hoisted high. This commoner is jubilant, happy, celebrating and supportive. But the leader X-rays the appearances to scan for answers to more serious issues: sovereignty, strategy, destiny. A leader is not a leader if he relinquishes responsibility and dances like lay persons in the streets. In due time the question will consciously surface, and then it will be aimed at the leader. He will be questioned: What type of agreement have you committed?

In everyday life, a lay person is taken to task if he breaks the law. But then if the leader, who is part of that law, begins to break laws, what type of punishment would he deserve? Especially when the leader does so knowingly and in a pre-meditated manner! The recent Palestinian - Israeli agreement has the above ingredients.

The Palestinian leadership was not in the dark; it knew precisely what the Israelis and Americans were asking them to do. They conceded then signed on. The PLO ignored all the advice and legal probes it sought. These were specifically prepared for the PLO on demand.

With the onset of the Madrid Conference negotiations, the PLO solicited feedback from an authority on International Law as it pertains to interim agreements for self-rule. On 12/10/92, an American Professor of International Law at the University of Illinois, Francis Boyle presented his memorandum to the PLO. It was in accordance with this memorandum's findings, observations and demonstrations that the PLO delegation, chaired by Dr. Haidar 'Abd al-Shafi steered its dialogue with the Israelis in Washington, while receiving supportive signals from Tunis. But when the secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway surfaced, a strange thing happened: those (PLO) clandestine negotiators vetoed the comments, references and assertions spelled out by Prof. Boyle, and went ahead to endorse the opposite. Here are some examples:

**1. UN Resolution 242 as reference:**

Professor Boyle's memorandum stated that Israel will refuse to sign on to any temporary agreement that refers to UN 242. In such an event the PLO should insist on having the two sponsoring powers (USA and Russia) guarantee a UN resolution stating that Resolution 242 will remain in effect and binding as far as the occupied lands are concerned, even after signing an interim agreement and a peace with the Arab countries.

Such a procedure would bind Israel to the continuing validity of 242, whether it likes it or not. The memorandum stated: "You (PLO) cannot rely on any written conjunction between an interim agreement and a final solution. To protect your rights you cannot rely on invitation letters to Madrid or on American reassurance letters."

The Palestinian - Israeli agreement never mentioned UN 242 as a reference to solving the issue in its interim phase. And there was a written conjunction pointing to a discussion of a final solution leading to the application of UN Res. 242 and 338. The PLO also did an about face on a warning in the memorandum saying that the PLO should be prepared for an interim period which may extend for as much as 20 years, hence you should consider an interim agreement as a final agreement.

**2. The Method of Endorsement**

The Memorandum says: "First, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations should initial the agreement. After the initialing, the agreement goes to the Palestine National Council (PNC) for endorsement. The Council then gives

a mandate to the negotiating delegation to sign it on behalf of the PNC."

Standing the memorandum on its head, the PLO did not initial the agreement, nor was it presented to the PNC, nor was anyone legally authorized to sign it. It must also be mentioned that the leadership of Fatah did not endorse the agreement in its Central Committee meeting. It rather decided to pass on the issue to Fatah's Revolutionary Council. The PNC was not called to discuss this agreement. The only meeting there was a one meeting of the Executive Committee of Fatah. Out of its 16 members only 9 endorsed it, which is short of the 12 members minimum who are needed to pass any decision.

**3. Accepting the Legality of Occupation**

Prof. Boyle's memorandum spells this out: "Don't sign an agreement giving Israel the right to withdraw and then re-deploy its troops. This is what the Israelis want. They will try to send troops to the territories from time to time. They will want this documented in the interim arrangement. You should reject that because it will give an air of legitimacy to the occupation."

And once again the PLO turns it topsy-turvy: It is understood that in accordance with Israeli withdrawal, Israel will be responsible for external security, general security, the settlements and Israelis. Israeli forces and civilians may continue to have free access to the Gaza strip and Jericho. Rabin, in a speech to the Knesset, (8/30/93), said that security, as far as Israelis are concerned, is not a matter of settlements. Security is for every Israeli wherever he is, this security is in the hands of Israel.

**4. Legislation**

The memorandum took a close look at the right to legislate. It considered legislation an integral part of sovereignty and the building of an independent state. It reminded the PLO, in their discussions with the Israelis and Americans, that self rule should have an independent legislative body. Without legislative authority, self-rule amounts to no more than a vassal state.

The PLO turned this advice upside-down and gave up its right to have an elected legislative body. The PLO agreed to elect a council, but without any power to legislate.

We can go on and on discussing these many recommendations and warnings by Dr. Boyle which were given to the Palestinian negotiating team at the request of the Palestinians, and how the clandestine negotiators skillfully reversed all of them. We can evoke those forewarnings and admonitions about Jerusalem, the settlements, Israeli military orders, the status of Israeli civilians, and so on and so forth.

We can go on for at least five years, in the course of which there will be plenty of surprises. ✪

* *Member of PLO Palestine National Council and Palestinian journalist.*



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*By: Ayman Nasir*

# Will PLO's relinquishment of armed struggle satisfy "Israel"?

The Israeli government was hoping that "moderate" Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza would take the initiative away from PLO outsiders. However, Arafat's successful attempt to prove that his leadership has the ultimate say in the ongoing peace talks forced Rabin to conclude that the Palestinian delegates were not capable of delivering without active PLO participation.

This observation was made by an American reporter in the 23rd of August issue of the Time Magazine. Only few days later, her remarks were manifested by the announcement of the "Gaza-Jericho" agreement which came as a result of lengthy secret talks held in Norway between Israeli and PLO representatives.

**Hamas has expressed absolute rejection of the agreement and of opening up any dialogue. The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine declared that the confrontation with the Zionist entity will go on until the occupation is ended and Palestinian rights are restored.**

In brief, the agreement, which was signed on the 13th of Sept. during a Washington "peace ceremony," calls for Palestinians to assume a limited self-government of Gaza and Jericho and requires a Palestinian council to be elected. This council would eventually extend this autonomy to the rest of the West Bank. The autonomy system would then last for no more than five years after which the fate of the territories occupied in 1967 will be decided. During these five years, the Palestinian self-rule authority will assume control over police force as well as educational and health services. Moreover, as a result of the agreement, the PLO and "Israel" have agreed to mutually recognize each other.

Several questions, however, have, intentionally or otherwise, remained unanswered as to the kind of impact these latest developments may have on the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) and the status of Jerusalem. Also, a lot of ambiguity surrounds the fate of the Israeli settlements, and the Palestinian refugee problem was clearly eluded.

While in one section of the "Gaza-Jericho" agreement there is a call for the Palestinian self-rule interim government to adopt the proper arrangements after an Israeli withdrawal, it grants "Israel" the right to control external security and to retain responsibility for protecting Israeli settlements and citizens in the West Bank and Gaza in another section.

Meanwhile, several Islamic sources have raised their concerns about the agreement and warned of the grave consequences it may particularly have on the city of Jerusalem. They fear that the magnitude of concessions already made by the PLO leadership will only tempt the inflexible Israeli government to win more over the question of Jerusalem. They have also expressed their dismay over the proposed joint "Israeli-Palestinian" effort to confront what the agreement termed as "fundamentalism." They added that such an effort can only be interpreted as a declaration of war on Islamic activities and as an attempt to stop the spread of political awareness among Palestinians in the occupied territories.

Several Palestinian officials have also expressed their disapproval of the "Gaza-Jericho" agreement. Abdullah Al-Horani, a member of the PLO's executive committee, has objected to the agreement claiming that it does not address the Palestinian human rights adequately and was not formulated in accordance with the agreements of the fourth Geneva convention. He also added that the agreement creates a self-rule government which will primarily safeguard the Zionist entity by suppressing any potential opposition in the territories. He also warned that Israel will be the sole economic beneficiary as a result of the accord.

Mr. Al-Horani's concerns were also shared by Khalid Al-Hassan, a prominent member of Fatah Central Committee, who warned that such an agreement will only help "Israel" couple their military superiority with an economic domination of the region by exploiting Palestinian as well as Arab natural and human resources (gas, oil, cheap labor). Mr. Al-Hassan, has also criticized the agreement for not fulfilling the minimum demands

of the Palestinian people such as the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 including Jerusalem, and an immediate end to any further construction of Israeli settlements as a good gesture of Israel's willingness to consider their possible removal in the future. He also pointed out Israel's lack of any serious commitments to a comprehensive peace in the region by referring to a statement made lately by Rabin in the Israeli Knesset indicating his unwillingness to compromise over the territories, remove any Jewish settlements, or agree to an independent Palestinian state.

Farook Al-Kadoomi, chairman of the political committee of the PLO, said that he would rather have his right-hand cut than sign what he referred to as the "death certificate" of the Palestinian people. He has also indicated that no leadership has the authority to force the Palestinians to abandon their armed struggle and right to self determination. He also pointed out that the autonomy agreement is clearly not in compliance with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and the founding covenant of the PLO.

On the other hand, the ten Palestinian factions, whose headquarters are based in Damascus, have strongly denounced the agreement orchestrated by Arafat. Muhamad Nazzal, Hamas representative in Jordan, has expressed his organization's absolute rejection of the agreement and of opening up any dialogue with the Zionist enemy. He also added that adherence to this agreement is only an obligation of those who agreed to sign it, and the Palestinians cannot be required to abide by it. Dr. Fathi Shikaki of the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine declared that as far as that movement is concerned the confrontation with the Zionist entity will go on until the occupation is ended and Palestinians rights are restored. ✪

**NEWS ANALYSIS**

*By: Mohammad Kamal*

# The accord, the PLO, and the regional system

The latest "peace accord" signed between Arafat and Israel undoubtedly and unequivocally signals the final defeat of the PLO and its elimination as a force which at one time represented the aspirations and sometimes the will of a significant segment of the Palestinian people. To call it a defeat is proper because when one accepts the only alternative offered, or more accurately, enforced by the enemy, then one is virtually defeated. To many, the defeat of the PLO was predictable because of the PLO's misguided philosophy, its undemocratic leadership and the guidance and financial support that it received from the Arab governments who did not see, and rightly so, the creation of Israel as a threat to their thrones, but, on the contrary, as further protection of their regimes. If the defeat of the PLO was the worst thing that came out of the agreement, then we would not be extremely disappointed. After all, and despite all the social and cultural institutions that it helped to create, the PLO never had a sound agenda nor did it ever believe in the revolutionary and progressive slogans that it created only for the consumption of the Palestinian masses. The problem, however, is much bigger. The Arafat-Israel accord signals a new phase in the American-Israeli plans to neutralize the remaining obstacle standing between the Zionist entity and full legitimacy within the Arab and Muslim worlds—a phase so crucial to sustain the American's long term strategic interests in the region.

The fundamental fact that Arafat and his PLO did not have a clear mandate to represent the Palestinian people makes strong ground for dismissing his agreement with the Zionists as irrelevant and, therefore, it will be meaningless to question and debate its terms. Despite this, however, the agreement has major consequences that will affect the majority of the Palestinian people including those stateless refugees in Lebanon and Syria, and especially those Palestinians presently living under direct Zionist occupation. From American and Israeli perspectives, the "peace" accord and the meeting in Washington was not just a public relations affair; Israel, the US and its surrogate Arab Governments will work very hard to see that the agreement and its anticipated consequences are brought to completion.

By virtue of the Arafat-Israel agreement and with the overwhelming backing by the international community, the Palestinians who were forcibly driven out of their homes in 1947 and 1948 and who are now living as refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, have become permanently stateless. The denial of their right to return to their land has become *a fait accompli*. Israel knows very well that the return of the Palestinian refugees will be a violation of the spirit that "purified" the Jewish character of their apartheid nation. To some of the Palestinians who reside in the West Bank and Gaza, the peace agreement might bring tremendous prosperity through the largess that the Arab governments and the West are distributing under the guise of development. It is also expected, judging from the experience of "development" projects sponsored by the West and its financial organs elsewhere in "third

world" countries, a good slice of the "aid" will filter through Arafat's loyalists to further strengthen their loyalty and to maintain their grip over administrative affairs and effectively monopolize power. The empowerment of the West Bankers and Gazans that the media talks about as an outcome of the West's aid and benevolence can hardly be taken seriously when the very concept of empowering the people runs contrary to the totalitarian philosophies of the Arab governments and to the West itself.

As an outcome, Arafat's PLO will be reduced, by its choice and design, to an internal police force concerned primarily with riot control (as can be already confirmed from photos taken in Jordan for the future Palestinian police being trained for riot control.) The end of the second Palestinian Intifada this time will come at the hands of Palestinians themselves, a prospect that is most disturbing. Effectively, thus, the PLO is being transformed from a liberation movement to a repressive administrative police rendering itself defunct; it will cease to be a liberation movement. And to make the transfer complete, a name change will be in order; the words "liberation" and "Palestine" become meaningless and contradictory to the objectives and mission of the new PLO and thus should be abandoned.

Surrogate Arab governments, on the other hand, were not surprising in their warm reaction to the accord. In fact the spirit of cooperation and coexistence with the Zionist entity was championed long time ago in the Fez summit.

The strong momentum and backing that the international community has given to the Arafat-Israel accord signify that the pressure is on all parties involved to work hard to assure the "success" of the accord. The government-controlled media in Arab countries has shifted its language overnight to accommodate the "new reality."

Clearly, the agreement has implications much beyond giving the PLO control over some arid land, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a source of instability for the region from the American "national interest" point of view, which jeopardizes America's vast oil resources in the region (as American policy makers view it.). The defeat of the agreement will mean, according to Israel and Arafat, the triumph of radical and extremist forces, who are by definition the Islamists. This is rightly so, but we should not get carried away with insufficient optimism. Whether the agreement has taken place or not, the power structure in the Middle East has stayed the same.

The only challenge to Israel and the West's designs for the region is through a process of massive restructuring that will empower the Arab people and give them control over their resources—this is the very thing that Israel was created to prevent. ✪



# An Interview with Dr. Khalil Shikaki An Expert on Palestinian Security Affairs

### The Palestinian Authority will have only two options: Either to confront the Palestinian opposition or take on the Israeli Settlers and army

The following are excerpts from an interview with Dr. Khalil Shikaki, Professor at al-Najah University, in Nablus in the West Bank, Dr. Shikaki is the leading Palestinian expert on Security affairs.

Q. *What are the issues that will pre-occupy the Palestinians as the "agreement" goes into effect and Israel begins to pull out of Gaza and Jericho?*

A. The major problem that the Palestinians will face in Gaza and Jericho is how to maintain internal Palestinian security, or, in other words, how to deter (Israeli) settlers from acts of intimidation and hostility, and to see to it that the Israeli Army does not engage the Palestinians in violent acts, in addition to stopping the Palestinians from attacking the Israelis. These demands mean that there will be immense responsibilities placed upon the Palestinians. But I think the issue will be easier in the Jericho area because it does not have a considerable number of settlers. Hence, the presence of the Israeli army will be a limited one, presenting no big problem. So the real test is going to be Gaza.

**For the Israelis, the Gaza strip will be a way to test Palestinian ability to maintain order, before further jurisdictions are handed over from the Israelis to the Palestinians. The Israelis will evaluate the Palestinian performance in maintaining internal security in Gaza.**

Q. *There are Palestinian and Israeli fears concerning the way security will emerge in Gaza after Israel re-deploys its forces, especially in light of threats from the Islamic movements to undermine the agreement by attacking settlers and the Israeli Army that protects these settlers. Do you share these fears?*

A. The problems in implementing law and order are, in the first place, problems of a professional nature. Regarding internal security, the issue is a political one, and peculiar to the Gaza area more than to Jericho. For the Israelis, the Gaza strip will be a way to test Palestinian ability to maintain order, before further jurisdictions are handed over from the Israelis to the Palestinians. The Israelis will evaluate the Palestinian performance in maintaining internal security in Gaza. If everything goes well, then the Israelis will be more apt to accept a transfer of power to the Palestinians in other parts of the West Bank. But if the Palestinians are not capable of maintaining law and order in Gaza, then the Israelis are apt to say that Palestinian failure in Gaza will breed Palestinian failure in Ramallah. In other words, the Israelis will themselves remain in charge of security in all other parts of the West Bank. And that is why the Palestinians are going to be obsessed with the issue of internal security.

Q. *What will be the Palestinians biggest problem?*

A. The most explosive issue has to do with the maintenance of settlements and the Israeli Army's free access to thoroughfares and roads. These are the two most volatile problems because attached to them are a series of very complex issues. The problems with retaining settlements are:

1. There are settlers whose very presence is meant to browbeat and bully the Palestinians.

2. This will mean a role for the Israeli Army to protect these settlers terror-tactics, and this also compounds a reign of Israeli terror. It also means the Israeli Army is still

going to be around at a time when it is supposed to have been gone.

3. These two issues (settlements and Israeli Army on the roads and highways) will be an incentive for Palestinians (who oppose the "agreement") to mobilize for attacking/assaulting Israeli military and nearby settlements. This may lead to a fourth problem; and that is:

4. Inter-Palestinian strife, which also means that the very presence of these settlements will secure an internal security problem. Had it not been for these settlements, security threats would have been almost non-existent. It would not be far-fetched to say that the presence of these Israeli settlements will detonate a bitter and bloody internecine Palestinian war, especially in the Gaza area. And this may abort the whole process of negotiations because of Palestinian security failure in Gaza.

Q. *But isn't it possible to diffuse any type of future clashes?*

A. Inspite of these anticipated problems, there are some things that can be done to dilute the security question. I believe that those parts of the "agreement" that authorize the Israelis to freely use the roads and highways in Palestinian areas are extremely dangerous. With reference to these statements in the "agreement" it becomes very likely that the settlers will begin to roam these roads; and then they may venture into the Palestinian camps and cities. That is why I believe that one of the measures that should be taken to avoid some nasty developments pertaining to security is to restrict settlement areas and the roads used by settlers, and to depopulate Israeli settlements located in a predominantly Arab areas.

Q. *How will the economic conditions impact the security climate in Gaza?*

**I believe that those parts of the "agreement" that authorize the Israelis to freely use the roads and highways in Palestinian areas are extremely dangerous. With reference to these statements in the "agreement" it becomes very likely that the settlers will begin to roam these roads; and then they may venture into the Palestinian camps and cities.**

A. If people's standard of living does not improve, and if unemployment is not wiped out, then the people's penchant for violence will increase and turn against the new arrangements. In a recent poll, Palestinians in the occupied lands were asked about what they consider to be legitimate means for resisting the "agreement." Six percent in the West Bank said that violence is one legitimate way of resisting the Israelis; but in Gaza 28% said that violence is legitimate. This means that people in Gaza are more volatile; this is a very ominous issue ingrained in their pulverizing poverty and unemployment. It also relates to the presence of a strong, principled and ideological resistance which will make it very difficult for them to adjust to a new political "arrangement."

Q. *What are the capabilities of the Palestine Liberation Army and the Palestinian Security Forces to quash opposition in Gaza?*

A. The Israelis who have occupied the area for a quarter of a century are not able to control the Gaza sector; they are soliciting the help of anyone who can relieve them of this burden. What can an army unfamiliar with this area do?✪



*By: The Center for Palestine Research and Study, Nablus*

# Palestinian Elections and the Declaration of Principles

## Results of a Public Opinion Poll

### Introduction

The following are the results of a public opinion poll that was conducted in the West Bank and Gaza on the 12th of December, 1993. A random sample of 1137 Palestinians, over the age of 18, were interviewed. The sample was distributed according to population size. Effort was made to represent all residential areas (i.e., city, town, village and refugee camp). Age and sex were also considered.

The interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis in West Bank major towns (Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Nablus, Jericho, Tulkarm, Qalqilya and Jenin). Researchers were unable to conduct interviews in Hebron because of the imposed curfew on the city. In Gaza, interviews were conducted in the following areas: Al-Shati', Khan Yunis, Rafah (town and refugee camp), Al-Breig refugee camp, Beit Lahia village, Al-Zaytoun, Al-Shuja'iyah, Al-Rimal, Qararah village and Jabalya village.

Fifty-four well-trained field workers were instructed to visit areas that attract all of the society's groups and strata. These areas included, among others, bus/car stations that lead to villages and refugee camps, main markets, city centers, hospital entrances, etc.

682 questionnaire were received from the West Bank, and 455 were received from Gaza. The margin of error for this study is plus or minus 3%, with a confidence level of 95%.

### Methodology

CPRS researchers are constantly trying to refine and improve the validity of the research methodology and the reliability of the collected data. For these purposes, more female data collectors were hired to ensure the representation of women in the sample. They were instructed to visit public institutions that attract women.

Furthermore, the majority of our data collectors participated in an intensive workshop where the goals of the poll were discussed. They were also lectured on survey methods, scientific research, field work, and sampling. A specialized two day workshop took place in Gaza on 7-8 December, 1993, to discuss field work and propose solutions to possible problems.

Data collectors worked in groups supervised by qualified researchers. CPRS researchers made random visits to interview stations and discussed the research process with data collectors. All interviews took place on the same day. Data collectors were assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 30) to allow for careful and intensive interviewing.

### Limitations

A poll, such as this one, may have a number of limitations. Errors may have resulted as a consequence of surveying only a random sample, and not the complete population. Errors may also have resulted from non-response which is estimated at 10%. Women comprised the majority of non-respondents. Others refused to respond because they believed that their opinions were irrelevant and were not taken into account when making decisions. A number of non-respondents explained their position as a statement against Palestinian - Israeli agreements.

The reader must also be reminded that 28.9% of those who responded identified themselves as "independents" or "others." Some of them said that they "gave up" on Palestinian politics. Others have "negative" views of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, but did not identify themselves as part of the opposition groups.

### Remarks

The findings of this poll must be placed in their proper context especially in relation to time. The poll took place on the 12th of December, the date before the start of the agreed upon Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. News of a likely delay in the application of the Palestinian-Israeli agreement caused a great deal of frustration among Palestinians. The credibility of the Israeli government has further declined. Palestinians are becoming more doubtful about their ability to achieve their rights under the present political circumstances. At the time of the poll, emotions were running high, as a result of the widespread violence and settlers' provocation's in the area. People were also

**Sample Distribution**
(Expressed as a % of the total sample)

**Geograpshical Distribution**
60% West Bank "including Jerusalem"
40% Gaza Strip

**Area of Residence**
48.1% Town
28.7% Villages
23.2% Refugee Camps

**Gender**
61% Males
39% Females

**Age**
53% 18-28
27% 29-39
12% 40-50
8% Over 50

**Occupation**
8.5% Laborers
11.1% Merchants
10.5% Craftsmen
15.9% Students
9.0% Housewives
1.4% Farmers
28.4% Employees
8.4% Specialists
5.8% Unemployed
1.0% Retired

**Education**
3.0% No education
18.7% Two-year college
18.3% Up to 9 years
25.6% Bachelors
32.7% 10-13 years
1.7% Masters & PhDs

**Marital Status**
42.0% Single
57.0% Married
1.0% Divorced & Widowed

**Refugee Status**
50% Refugee
50% Non-refugee

**Place of Interview**
11.4% Nablus
10.0% Ramallah
20.8% Gaza/North
9.3% Jenin
6.8% Bethlehem
6.7% Gaza/Middle
10.6% Tulkarm
9.0% Jerusalem
12.7% Gaza/South
2.8% Jericho-Hebron

becoming impatient and frustrated with the "no-change" situation on the ground.

The findings of the poll can be summarized as follows:

First, support for the Palestinian - Israeli Declaration of Principles (DOP) has declined sharply.

The poll shows that Palestinians are divided when it comes to their stand towards the Palestinian-Israeli DOP. 41.5% said that they approve of the DOP (23.4% decline from our poll in September). A larger percentage of Palestinians indicated that they are "not sure" about the DOP (20.4% in this poll, as opposed to 6.6% in the September poll). Support for DOP has declined in all political groups including Fateh. While support for Fateh did not decline, only 75.6% of Fateh supporters declared that they approve of the DOP (compared with 91.3% in the September poll). 17.3% of Fateh supporters are "not sure" about the DOP (compared with 2.5% in the September poll). The largest decline in support, however, is among "independents," "others," and Hizb Al-Sha'b. We also notice that in the age group 18 to 28, those who oppose the DOP (40.3%) are more than those who support it (38.9). There is a correlation between educational attainment and attitudes towards the DOP. Those with the least and the most education are more supportive of the agreement than those who have college or university degrees.

Second, Palestinians support general elections as the best means to choose the members of the Palestinian Interim Council (PIC).

The majority of Palestinians (71.6%) insist that general political elections is the best means to choose the members of the PIC. 65.9% declared their intention to participate in general elections. As compared with previous polls, less Palestinians (12.5%, compared with 15.4% in the October poll) want the PLO to appoint the members of the PIC (see enclosed chart).

Third, Palestinians are hopeful that Palestinian police and security forces will treat all Palestinians equally.

The poll shows that Palestinians are both hopeful and fearful of Palestinian police and security forces. Fear of anarchy and political and social turmoil prompted many Palestinians (50.8%) to indicate that police will treat all Palestinians equally. This has also resulted in many Palestinians (31.2%) to express their fear that Palestinian police may be used as an oppressive tool against the opposition.

Fourth, minimum support for a Palestinian-Israeli-Jordanian confederation.

The poll shows that Palestinians' first choice is an independent Palestinian entity (52.5%). Their second choice is a confederation with Jordan (26.7%).

In this respect, we notice a wide difference between the West Bank and Gaza, with 35.4% of West Bank respondents preferring a confederation with Jordan, and only 13.8% of Gazans preferring such a confederation. This may be due to the historical ties between the West Bank and Jordan. We also notice that support for a confederation with Jordan increases with age. 20.6% of the age group 18-28 support such a confederation and 43.2% of those over 50 support it. The most support for a confederation with Jordan can be found among independents, Fateh, and Feda supporters. Fewer Palestinians indicated support for a Palestinian-Israeli-Jordanian confederation.

1. Three months after signing the Palestinian - Israeli Declaration of Principles "Gaza-Jericho First," how do you evaluate the agreement?

| | **West Bank & Gaza Strip** | **West Bank** | **Gaza Strip** |
|---|---|---|---|
| a) I approve of it | 41.0% | 41.0% | 42.4% |
| b) I don't approve of it | 38.1% | 37.8% | 38.5% |
| c) I am not sure | 20.4% | 21.2% | 19.1% |

2. In your opinion, what is the best way to choose members of the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian interim Self-Government Authority?

| | **WB&GS** | **WB** | **GS** |
|---|---|---|---|
| a) Appointment by PLO leadership | 12.5% | 13.5% | 11.1% |
| b) Appointment by political groups | 8.6% | 5.6% | 12.9% |
| c) Political elections | 71.6% | 75.7% | 65.5% |
| d) Others | 7.3% | 5.2% | 10.5% |

3. Will you participate in the elections for the "Palestinian Council" of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority?

| | **WB&GS** | **WB** | **GS** |
|---|---|---|---|
| a) Yes | 65.9% | 66.9% | 64.4% |
| b) No | 21.6% | 19.9% | 24.3% |
| c) Not sure | 12.5% | 13.2% | 11.3% |

4. Do you think that Palestinian police and security forces:

| | **WB&GS** | **WB** | **GS** |
|---|---|---|---|
| a) Will treat all Palestinians on equal bases? | 50.8% | 47.4% | 56.1% |
| b) Will oppress the opposition? | 31.2% | 34.5% | 26.1% |
| c) Others | 18.0% | 18.1% | 17.8% |

5.After the formation of a Palestinian entity, I prefer:

| | **WB&GS** | **WB** | **GS** |
|---|---|---|---|
| a) A confederation with Jordan | 26.7% | 35.4% | 13.8% |
| b) A confederation with Jordan and Israel | 7.1% | 7.1% | 7.1% |
| c) No confederation, maintain an independent Palestinian entity | 52.5% | 45.0% | 63..8% |
| d) Not sure | 6.9% | 6.8% | 7.1% |
| e) Others | 6.8% | 5.7% | 8.2% |

6. If elections were held today, you will vote for candidate affiliated with:

| | **WB&GS** | **WB** | **GS** |
|---|---|---|---|
| a) Forces allied with the agreement [Fateh, Feda (Abed Rabo), Hizb El-Sha'b (the Communists)] | 45.1% | 45.1% | 44.2% |
| b) Secular Opposition [Popular Front (PFLP) and Democratic Front (DFLP)] | 10.6% | 8.3% | 13.7% |
| c) Islamic Opposition [Hamas, Islamic Jihad] | 15.4% | 13.4% | 18.2% |
| d) Independents* | 13.8% | 16.9% | 9.4% |
| e) Others* | 15.1% | 15.7% | 14.5% |

**The study notes that many "individuals" and "others" had similar answers as the Islamic opposition but was probably fearful of stating their Islamic affiliation.*

By: Inquiry Research Unit

# Labor's strategy: Improvisation to the peace process

The Zionist decision makers see in the international and regional shifts, under what has been called the "New World Order," and in the ensuing regional imbalance of power, as well as in an international redeployment vis-a-vis the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict, a tilt towards the Zionist entity and a historical opportunity to move the Zionist project up one notch. That, they think, can be done by a settlement that mirrors this new repositioning of forces, with Arab and international endorsements. This envisaged settlement will not affect the core issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict which are, according to Zionist understanding of things, a strategic conflict resistant to any compromise, at least before the absolute fulfillment of Zionism. There may be respites in this on-going struggle dictated by Zionist needs for internal reconstitution. These respites are permitted, in the Zionist scheme of things, provided that they are a function of Arab compromise and concessions.

If there are any differences among the internal members of the Zionist body politic, those parties belonging to right-wing Zionism who raise the slogan "peace for peace" and refuse to budge from one inch of land occupied in 1967, on the one hand, and the Zionist Labor alignment that calls for a compromise, these differences in light of previous experiences, and in the course of this on-going peace process, are a matter of formalities only. For practical purposes, the defining line between the two is not a dividing line. The Zionist right-wing, whether in government or in opposition, due to the fact that it has political clout and a make or break advantage on the Zionist political map, will always have the potential to jeopardize a compromise. The decision to go to war or to make peace, given the nature of internal Zionist politics, demands a consensus, or a semi-consensus, among all parties so that the process can move ahead.

**A no, never and nay compromise**

The Zionist Labor Party professes its designs for a settlement based upon the well-known Zionist negations:

*No return to the borders of June 4, 1967.
*No yielding of Arab Jerusalem.
*No acknowledgment of Palestinian self-determination.
*No to dismantling of Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The Zionist Labor Party claims (as a basis for its peace gestures) that the Arab-Israeli conflict is not a Palestinian issue or an issue of Arab occupied land, rather it is the Arabs refusal to recognize the Zionist entity and its right to survive and flourish within "secure and recognized borders." The Labor Party claims that the "peace process" can only begin when the Arabs recognize "Israel" and declare that they are willing to establish a full peace with it before discussing such issues as evacuating occupied lands and Palestinian rights. The Zionist Labor Party, like all other Zionist forces, builds its case on rejecting UN as well as Security Council resolutions pertinent to the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Labor party ostensibly accepts UN Resolution 242 and the principle of "land for peace" as a basis for a solution, but then Labor goes on to interpret this resolution consistent with Zionist expansionist cravings, and consistent with schemes to liquidate the Palestinian cause by

reducing it to a discussion of the future of the Gaza and West Bank populations, as an internal affair of the Zionist state. The Zionist Labor Party coaches its overtures in security terms to facilitate more expansion within a rubric of compromise. Labor figures that these overtures, defined by security necessities are convincing and acceptable. It sees it as a public relations stunt for the world audience and its own Zionist constituency. At least it sounds better than right-wing's "historical right" argument. Hence, Labor and its "regional settlement," which amounts to nothing more than an ambiguous catch-all, lending itself out to a variety of definitions and interpretations by all who belong to the labor alignment. There is a faction within the Zionist Labor Party whose position is akin to the Zionist ultra-right. Its interpretation of a "regional settlement" is: insignificant symbolic withdrawal of Israeli forces from a token of lands occupied in 1967.

There is a faction within the Zionist Labor Party whose position is akin to the Zionist ultra-right. Its interpretation of a "regional settlement" is insignificant symbolic withdrawal of Israeli forces from a token of landoccupied in 1967.

The Zionist labor party assumes that its "regional settlement," once endorsed by the relevant Arab parties will fulfill a Zionist strategic objective. But should this "regional settlement" option fail, then Labor and its administrations will have scored publicity points which will enhance Israel's image world-wide. This has been pointed out by two leading figures of the Zionist Labor Party. In 1977, the Zionist minister Yigal Alon, the fore-runner to the "regional settlement" which is also synonymous with his name, wrote the following: "I am not confident that an Israeli regional settlement will bring peace. But by proposing a regional settlement, Israel will accomplish a few objectives: If the Arabs reject this conciliation gesture they will be held responsible. By advancing this reconciliation, Israel will gain favorable international public opinion. And if war flares up, then Israel and its sons will know that Israel did all it could to avoid it." (Ha'aretz, 3-5-1977)

In 1979, Abba Eban, an ex-foreign minister wrote: "Each Israeli peace offer should have a dual purpose: it should be workable and not at cross-purpose with overall strategy once it is agreed upon; but if it doesn't fall through it should at least improve Israel's image to the outside (world)." (Davar, 3-12-1979)

Therefore, scrutiny of Labor's "peace position" reveals, from a practical standpoint, that there are no essential differences between its "peace" contents, range and "conciliatory" aims and those of the Zionist right. In reality, there is no dissimilarity between Likud's refusal to withdraw from any land occupied in 1967 and the "regional solution" which appears to be relatively moderate. In both cases the practical objective is the entrenchment of the occupation. All Zionist conditions, hence, were fulfilled in the current deal.

Concerning the occupied Golan Heights, the non-uniformity between Likud and Labor is insignificant. That was demonstrated on December 14, 1981 when an overwhelming majority of Zionist parties passed the resolution annexing the Golan Heights to "Israel". The current leader of Labor, the prime minister of the Zionist entity today (Rabin), reiterated during the last election campaign and after the formation of his present cabinet the same things he said about the Golan when he was prime minister in 1976. A sample of his reiterations: "It is prohibited for Israel to withdraw from the Golan, even in exchange for peace." The "regional solution" presented by Labor and its government concerning the Golan is in Rabin's words, (which he repeated time and again): is not more than cosmetic adjustments of the cease-fire line, not to exceed 2-3 kilometers in exchange for: "full peace with Syria, with all that that means," i.e., recognition, diplomatic ties and normalization of relations.

The disagreement between Labor and Likud about the West Bank and Gaza is a matter of formalities. The reason is that Labor sees a demographic problem which will lead to a dilution of the Jewish state if these areas are added on to "Israel." This may lead to a bi-national state. Labor can not countenance an "Israel" with less than an 80% Zionist population. While Likud and other right-of-center parties acknowledge the demographic problem, they can not see a solution by a partial Israeli withdrawal from these areas.

Their solution is to intensify the Jewish aliya, while expelling and forcing out the Palestinians. Some of these parties make these internal thoughts and shelved plans public. They have uttered schemes of mass expulsion of Palestinians to be executed when the time is right. At the same time that Labor dismisses the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza because of a demographic nightmare, it also dismisses a total military withdrawal from these areas. By proposing the "regional solution," which practically annexes 40% of the overall area of the

West Bank and Gaza and isolating whatever Palestinian enclaves like South Africa's Bantustans, cut off from the Arab world, de-linked from Jordan, separated from Sinai, with heavily populated Zionist settlement belts, in Rabin's words "security settlements," with a battery of security measures and advance warning points Zionist accessibility will ensure Zionist hegemony.

**The Alon Plan as basis**

The signed peace plan is the Alon Plan in everything but name. Alon's plan was formulated July 13, 1967. It was, and continues to be, one of the main pillars of Labor's policies towards the West Bank and Gaza . The Alon blueprint was meant to facilitate the occupation. At that time mainstream Zionist thinking professed that it was premature to speak about a solution. The Alon design spoke of the Jordan River as the Eastern frontier of the Zionist entity. For security consideration, the Alon draft called for an annexation of more than 40% of the West Bank, in addition to Jerusalem and its surroundings, plus Gaza and its original inhabitants. Other refugees living in Gaza would be relocated to Sinai or the West Bank. Whatever was left of the West Bank would be divided into two separate parts. One partition would extend from the Jordan Valley to the Jerusalem area, westward onto Latrun, halfway between Jerusalem and Yafa (Jaffa). Alon called for an "independent entity" confederated to the Zionist entity. Later, though, the Labor Party dropped the confederation idea for fear of a demographic problem. That was replaced with the idea of "functional partition" which assumes a detachment between a land belonging to the Zionist entity and the land's citizens, who according to this new definition, are a Jordanian or a Palestinian population. They would be considered foreigners, just like any foreigner living in an alien land. This "functional partition" allowed Palestinians a self administration, while political and security control remain the duty of the Zionist occupation forces.

This "functional partition," the brain child of the Labor Party, gave birth to all projects for self administration or self rule. More than one attempt went into implementation as a means for reinforcing occupation and eradicating the Palestinian issue. In 1967, Begin synthesized "functional partition" with Likud's ideas to come up with administrative self-rule. With minor adjustments, it was entered into the Camp David deal. Since that time administrative self-rule entered the Labor agenda as a transitional solution towards a final settlement.

**A self administration government is the only practical proposal advanced by the Zionists in a serious manner; because it does not, in actual fact, change the status quo on the West Bank and Gaza, i.e., it doesn't interfere with the continuation of occupation, the creeping process of annexation.**

With the assumption that a solution along the lines of the Alon Plan will not be acceptable to Arabs or Palestinians as a final solution to the Palestinian issue, the generals, the architects and strategists in the Zionist Labor party believe that administrative rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza will only be a theoretical and interim solution, but a perpetual solution from a practical standpoint. Rejecting a regional solution will entrench administrative governance as a fait accompli with a window of opportunity for negotiations. Here, again, the delineation's between Labor and Likud disappear. They both agree that self administrative rule is the optimum range of a solution to the West Bank and Gaza.

A self administration government is the only practical proposal advanced by the Zionists in a serious manner; because it does not, in actual fact, change the status quo on the West Bank and Gaza, i.e., it doesn't interfere with the continuation of occupation, the creeping process of annexation. In addition, it assists the Zionist entity in containing international pressure by making it appear that the Palestine question is on its way to a solution. It also relieves the occupiers of the burden of daily administration. It has become the common denominator of proposed solutions to the West Bank and Gaza, since 1967 all the way up to the current deal. Implementing this collusion of self-rule for the Palestinians has become a matter of Zionist priority since the outbreak of the Intifada, and the failure of the "iron fist policy" with its military/security arrangements.

The Zionists have placed conditions, specifications and checks on "administrative self-rule" to ensure it does not go beyond what it was meant to be. Even though the Zionist Labor Party appears to accommodate some marginal adjustments to administrative self-rule, it still adheres to the basic conditions that restricts self-rule within pre-defined constrictions whereby jurisdiction does not go beyond a precinct or a municipality within 60% of the area of the West Bank and Gaza. The Labor Party and Rabin's government refuse to tie an interim solution to a final solution, or to abide by UN resolutions as a frame of reference on the principle of "land for peace" as a basis for reaching and

understanding on territories occupied in 1967. Rabin's government also refuses, in the course of the current negotiations, to discuss the issue of Jerusalem, the settlements, land acquisition and sovereignty, as well as water sources in the occupied territories, alleging that these issues will be dealt with during the final negotiations in a matter of three years after implementing administrative self-rule. These, in conformity with Zionist recommendations, shall be open ended questions.

**Administrative self-rule, the end result of a solution**

Various Zionist quarters from both major parties, especially from Labor, propose administrative self-rule for the Gaza Strip as a way of testing its applicability to the West Bank. The argument is that Gaza is less complicated than the West Bank; there is no Jerusalem, no settlement saturation, no disputes about water, etc. Another reason is that Labor conceives of Gaza as a time human bomb and a source of resistance to the occupation. It should be noted here that because Labor failed to empty Gaza of its refugee inhabitants (2/3 of the population) between 1969 and 1972, during the mid 70's Labor omitted the Gaza annexation to the Zionist entity from its agenda. It was content with having the southern strip of the Gaza sector as a "buffer" between Gaza and Egypt. Since the mid 80's, Labor dropped all reference to the annexation of Gaza from its election campaigns. The reason: demographics. Recently, though, it has been observed that most Zionist settlements in Gaza have been incorporated into what is called "security settlements," in accordance with Rabin's government's definitions.

We believe that the implementation of administrative self-rule is the fundamental and probably only objective of this deal. This can be deduced from Shamir's government's definition and objective of this "peace process" which is normalization of relations with the Arab governments on the basis of peace in "exchange for peace," and an interim solution with the Palestinians. In his first days after being elected, Rabin said: "The priority shall be to solve the Palestinian issue by beginning with self-rule. After which comes Jordan, then Syria." He linked a Lebanese solution to Syria. But the Zionists insisted on having any agreement with any Arab side in the "peace process" independent of all other tracks of negotiations.

The framework of the future negotiations is best described by the foreign minister of the Zionist entity, Peres: "We should be very generous with words; we should be flexible in expressing our desire for negotiations. We shall not express our determination except at the negotiating table where we will be forthcoming with words but not with land."

**Zionist settlements: political, security and economic dimensions**

Throughout all the phases of the Zionist enterprise, during the past century, settlements (kibbutzim, moshav, etc.) were, and still are, first and foremost, of a political nature. Basically they serve to create a holographic reality (human geographical facts) as a basis for a Zionist political structure. This structure was envisaged to expand through consecutive stages within a strategic master plan to cement a complete and absolute Zionism. In other words, to put together what is called "greater Israel" so all Jews around the world are to emigrate to it.

The Zionist settlement policy is unlike those European settlements in countries rich in natural resources but relatively unpopulated. Zionist settlements were not immediately economically viable to begin with. Palestine is lacking in natural resources. The economic viability of the Zionist venture was, and still is, intertwined with the strategic and geo-political concerns of the Imperialist powers. Likewise, it was these Imperialist powers who supported and reinforced the Zionist enterprise with all means of power and the ability to survive. Such symbiotic relationship facilitated Zionist functions in the service of Imperialism and its Middle Eastern strategy, a strategy motivated by monopolistic plundering of the area's oil wealth. Hence, building, planning and geographically distributing Zionist settlements was not purely an economic choice, or of a strict economic priority. During all this time, economic considerations were pale in comparison with the political and demographic factors. After having constructed these settlements upon political and demographic elements, the Zionists endeavored to fill in with vital projects, investments, and industrial infrastructure to sustain a workable and self supportive economy. During those years, Zionist settlements were, and remain to be, sustained by infusions of foreign assistance and aid, in addition to Zionist and world-wide Jewish funds.

**Settlements as political outposts**

Prior to the erection of the Zionist entity, settlement volume and dispersion corresponded to the scale of Jewish immigration to Palestine and the area of land possessed through purchasing power which, until May 1948, was no more than 1.82 million dunums. That amounts to less than 6% of Palestine. 195 thousand dunums were "given" to the Zionists by the British mandate. These were public lands. On this piece of land 291 settlements were established, some of them concentrated in the northern shore area between Yafa (Jaffa) and Haifa, and in

their environs, in Marj ibn Dabeq. The rest were scattered on the eastern slopes of Galilee, especially in Hula and around Tiberias, between Jerusalem and the Jerusalem-Jaffa highway. The Zionists were serious about building settlements everywhere they could grab land, to serve as political watchtowers. They managed to build only a limited amount of settlements in Western Galilee and the southern shore. Up until the end of 1946 the Zionists had but two settlements in the Negev. (The Negev area is equivalent to half the total area of Palestine). There, they owned 158,000 dunums, out of which 64,000 dunums were handed to them for political reasons by the mandate government, south of the Dead Sea. To justify acquisition of the Negev, the Zionists the night before UN deliberations on the Palestine issue, hastily put together eleven settlements in Negev in a few days time (November 1946).

**After the Zionist-Imperialist conspiracy managed to cobble together a Zionist entity in 1948, grabbing land and kicking people out, it took on new dimensions.**

After the Zionist-Imperialist conspiracy managed to cobble together a Zionist entity in 1948, grabbing land and kicking people out, it took on new dimensions. The Zionists would occupy around 20.85 million dunums, around 78% of the total area of Palestine, a whopping addition of 6.3 million dunums above and beyond the UN partition allocation of 1947. Henceforth, Palestine was wide open for mass Jewish immigration. The immediate concern at that time was to substantiate the armistice boundaries as transitional frontiers for the Zionist entity. It was also meant to create new facts to deter the return of Palestinian refugees to lands and homes from which they were expelled. New settlements were constructed at the frontier areas to reinforce existing ones. New settlement concentrations were placed in hitherto unsettled areas such as the West Galilee and the southern shore. The Zionist occupiers were not content with destroying more than 400 Arab villages and towns and then giving away Arab lands to adjacent encroaching settlements, while Judaising Palestinian urban areas ala Akka (Akre), Haifa, Yafa (Jaffa), Lydda (Lod), al-Ramlah, Bir al-Sab'e (Beersheba), Majdal, Asqalan (Ashkelon), Safad, Tabariyeh (Tiberias), Beesan and others, these Zionists tread what has become a Palestinian minority in Galilee, the triangle, al-Naqab (Negev) and other cities whose population was 165,000, like unwanted. This Palestinian population turned minority, throughout the years, was the victim of maltreatment, repression and racial discrimination. The purpose was to "lock them in" as a prelude to up rooting them. More than 75% of their lands were confiscated, step by calculated step. Since 1950, and in the spirit of what is called "the law of development," the Judaisation of Galilee and the Negev continued unabated. The new development projects became known as "development cities".

When mass Jewish immigration dwindled in 1965, there was 1.25 million Jewish settlers in place. That is twice the number of Jews living in Palestine prior to 1948. Palestine had 771 settlements; 72 of them were urban and 699 were rural. Within the settlement framework which, as pointed out above was of a political nature, and with the strategy of aggression and expansion in mind, the concept of "security settlements" emerged. In pre-"Israel" times, settlements were engineered with military considerations in mind: the location of the settlements, their plots and method of assembly bespeak a military purpose. These were virtual fortresses and bunkers for training the Haganah and other Zionist terrorist gangs. With the rise of Palestinian resistance to the Zionist enterprise and the onset of the 1936 Palestinian revolt, the Zionists put together what is known as Megdal and Homa settlements (tower and barricade). Around 50 settlements of this model were intended to shield other settlements and at the same time monitor the adjacent Palestinian towns. Most of these types of settlements were placed on the hills around Marj ibn'Amer where there is a large number of Zionist settlements, also on the northern stretches of Galilee near the Lebanese and Syrian borders.

Once the Zionist entity was assembled within a theory of Israeli security and a strategy of a Zionist military complex, with eyes set on an artificial depth of what was called "a regional defense system" whose mission was to frustrate any Arab attack pending the mobilization and deployment of Zionist reserve forces, those front line settlements were infused into this "regional defense system." Therefore, each of these settlements, for all practical purposes, was a garrison and each string of settlements was a fortified military zone.

**Settlements as formations and probes**

After the June 5, 1967 Zionist aggression, settlements in the freshly occupied territories, especially the West Bank, were given top priority, superseding settlements in the 1948 occupied lands, even those in Galilee and the Negev. Settlements in 1967 occupied territories were classified as "first rate areas for development." These newly occupied lands were given most favorable status: taxes

were exempted, loans were liberalized, funds were forthcoming and many incentives were doled out. With an interplay between the "secure borders" concept and the "historical rights" concept, with an accentuation on "the permanent Israeli presence" in the occupied lands, new settlements mushroomed year after year. Any distinction between "political settlements" and "security settlements" (which are in essence political) became cosmetic. The more these two interpretations of settlements interact, the more quixotic the distinction becomes, even though they were always subject to Zionist cravings and desires for expansion.

**West Bank settlements**

Palestinian steadfastness in the West Bank and Gaza, their resistance to schemes of population transfer, and their Intifada protraction became a stumbling block to Zionist expansionism and stunting schemes. Indeed, things would have developed differently had there been a mass exodus of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza akin to the exodus of 1948. Zionist fears of a "demographic problem" resulting from a full annexation of the West Bank and Gaza, leading, potentially, to a bi-national state and diluting its Jewish character, these fears gave the occupiers the idea of "creeping annexation" which means gradually changing the status quo in the West Bank and Gaza by expropriating lands, building new settlements, forging economic dependencies, etc.

By adhering to a policy of "land in limbo", disguised to entice Arabs and Palestinians into compromising positions, the Zionist Labor Party and its successive governments adopted what is called the "regional solution" parallel to Yigal Alon's blueprint, Alon himself being a stalwart of the Labor party. The blueprint by Alon was subsequently modified to add on to the Zionist entity 40% of the West Bank. In addition to the Jerusalem area which was attached to the Zionist state, there was the Jordan Valley—an area northwest of the Dead Sea, the countryside near Jerusalem and al-Khalil (Hebron) [located in the southern West Bank, towards the Dead Sea], and an area of mass Zionist settlements: Gosh Atzion in the Bethlehem, Hebron and the Nablus mountain area. The armistice line in the northern West Bank, in the area of Tulkarm, Qalqiliyah and Latrun and an east-west stretch of land of 10 kilometers from the northeast of the Dead Sea eastward towards Jerusalem, then westward, midway between Jerusalem and Jaffa. With that the West Bank is partitioned into two separate divisions that are also kept apart from Jordan, except for a 17 kilometer corridor in the Ariha (Jericho) area.

During the 1967-1977 period, the Zionist government synchronized security settlements with the stipulations of the Alon blueprint. Settlements were concentrated in areas considered to be of vital importance to the Zionist entity's security, areas whose Arab population is relatively manageable. These areas are the Jordan Valley, Jerusalem and the eastern slopes of the Nablus mountains. A main feature of this effort was to have a Jewish majority in a unified Jerusalem. Areas with an Arab majority were avoided. Alon advocated relinquishing them with a regional solution.

When Likud came to power in 1977, the previous security settlement demarcations were by-passed. A new orientation sought to annex the occupied lands and preserve "all the land of Israel." New facts were created on the ground to obstruct a regional solution. The green line was eliminated. Settlement mania gripped the whole West Bank, especially in those areas of Palestinian concentration: the summits and western slopes of the Nablus mountains. Since the end of 1979, individual settlers were permitted to own land in the West Bank and to build their homes any way that pleased them. Zionist construction companies were given a free hand to build special settlements. Large parcels of confiscated Palestinian land were given to them at token prices upon which 40 such settlements were defined as extensions to the Zionist entity. Since the beginning of 1984, Zionist laws, regulations and jurisdiction became the order of the day. Roads and highways were paved in all directions to tie these settlements to the Zionist entity proper.

**800,000 more dunums for the year 2,000**

Since 1977 these settlements were meant to detach and disjoin the West Bank. Arab cities and villages were surrounded by Zionist settlements as an act of siege. Surrounding settlements were meant to stall and stem Arab population centers and curb Arab urbanization. Since Likud came to power, a series of clustered settlements burst forth on the West Bank. In the northern sector (the counties of Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus, and Ramallah) there are 15 settlement clusters. In the southern sector (al-Khalil (Hebron), and Bayt-Lahm (Bethlehem)) there are three clusters. Zionists have settled in four areas inside al-Khalil (Hebron). These four areas are on a course of expansion until they close in on the heart of al-Khalil. Settlements in the West Bank are synonymous to mass takeover of Arab lands. Yezhar Bar, (Ha'aretz, 4/17/91) says that around 2/3 of the West Bank (3.74 million dunums) have been seized in many ways and fashions. Around 1.25 million dunums were appropriated under the pretext that it was government land. One million dunums were put off-limits for military purposes. 430,000 dunums

were classified as "absentee land." A quarter of a million dunums are defined as "wilderness," 100,000 dunums were expropriated under the pretext that they were needed for the public interest. 120,000 dunums were usurped through forced transactions and forgery. According to Zionist sources, 460,000 dunums in the West Bank have been allocated for settlements, rising to 800,000 by the end of the decade. This plan by the settlement authorities goes back to 1982.

Zionist sources have it that in the West Bank 145 settlements have been constructed up until the end of 1992, with a population of more than 120,000 settlers. But according to a US State Department report (May 1992) the number of settlements in the West Bank is 180. This discrepancy between Zionist and American figures may be due to the fact that the American report factored in Jewish concentrations as settlements, or that the Zionists do not include recent settlements, considering them extensions of pre-existing ones. In East Jerusalem (occupied in 1967) and environs, and allegedly annexed by the Zionist entity, 70,000 dunums were impounded, well beyond Jerusalem into distant hamlets and towns. Twelve settlement districts ring Jerusalem from south, east and north. Eight of them were established during the 1967-1977 period. Since the beginning of the 80's another layer of suburbs and settler neighborhoods encircle Jerusalem, most of them outside the subjoined areas of 1967. A number of ministries, institutions, Zionist government departments have been transferred to East Jerusalem.

**Garrisons and training centers**

Since the 1970's, the Zionist objective has been to maintain a fixed ratio between the Palestinians and the Zionist settlers in a "unified Jerusalem." The Jews should be around 72% and the Arabs 28% of the total population. Zionist figures indicate that in 1990 the number of Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem and vicinity is 124,000 or around 45% of the total population, compared with 140,000 Arabs. With the new wave of Jewish immigration, and with immigrant concentration living in occupied Jerusalem, the number of Jewish settlers jumped to 165,000. Teddy Kollek, the former mayor of occupied Jerusalem says that the number of settlers in East Jerusalem and vicinity at the end of 1992 was about 180,000.

**Since the 1970's, the Zionist objective has been to maintain a fixed ratio between the Palestinians and the Zionist settlers in a "unified Jerusalem." The Jews should be around 72% and the Arabs 28% of the total population.**

The occupation forces' agenda, since this mass immigration movement began, has exuded plenty of projects and plans to extend and intensify settling in the Jerusalem area. This augers well with the Judaisation of Jerusalem. Some of these plans are in an implementation mode: thousands of new residential units are being built in the settlers suburbs. New settlements are appearing on the Arab lands of Sur Baher village, southeast of Jerusalem, another on the Shu'fat hills. According to Zionist sources, the number of residential units which will be built in and around Jerusalem by 1995 will be 36,000 Zionist residential units, added on to the existing 70,000 units. There are plans to spread a string of settlements all the way from Jerusalem to Jericho and the Dead Sea. This will be called the Eastern Gate.

In 1992 it was noted that the area of civil administration in the "unified city" would include an additional 15,000 dunums south (Palestinian expropriated lands, of course). Thereby the Jerusalem area would be enlarged by the Zionists to 125,000 dunums, 38,000 of them in occupied Arab East Jerusalem. The most ominous program to Judaise Jerusalem, and the most extremist, is the Greater Jerusalem Project devised in 1983 by the settler wing of the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization. This stipulates that the administrative frontiers of Jerusalem extend from Ramallah north to Bethlehem south, and from Bab al-Ead (halfway between Jerusalem and Jaffa) west to the red line between Jerusalem and Jericho east.

**Mushrooming settlements**

In addition to the neighborhood and suburb settlements around Jerusalem, the "security settlements" according to Rabin should be placed in areas coveted by the Zionist entity as it pursues a regional solution. These settlements include the Jordan Valley, the northwest area of the Dead Sea, the Gush Atzion cluster areas adjacent to the armistice line at the north end of the West Bank and the south end of the Khalil (Hebron) mountains. Miron Benvenitsi (Ha'aretz, 7/4/92) refers to security settlements covering an area of 2,800 sq. kilometers, more than half the West Bank. These are 76 settlements occupied by 71,000 settlers in contrast to 51 settlements considered by Rabin to be political settlements. With their 24,000 occupants, these later settlements may be bargained away within the framework of the "regional solution."

Rabin's map of these security settlements extend beyond the scope of the pre-1977 Labor coalition. According to a new map by a committee headed by the general director of the Zionist prime minister's office, Shimon Shieft, a number of settlements, especially in

upper Galilee are to be integrated; even though the Rabin government had initially expressed its intention to revoke their privileges.

As has been the case in all previous stages, political considerations are the basis for settlements in the West Bank and all 1967 occupied lands. The worth of these settlements pale in comparison to the billions of dollars spent on constructing them. Al Hamishmar (4/17/87) quotes settlement expenses in 1967 occupied territories between 1968 and 1985 as being more than $2.6 billion, $2 billion in the West Bank. Nissim Agency, and the secretary-general of the Zionist Labor Party points out that between 1977 and 1987 settlements in the West Bank alone cost $2 billion (Ha'aretz, 7/1/88). In recent years, with the influx of mass immigration and the outspread of settlements the average expense is 1 to 1.5 billion dollars annually.

**The Judaisation of Jerusalem**

To encourage settlements and offer an economic basis, the occupation authorities relocated a number of industries and built a number of factories in many settlements, especially large settlements on higher grounds, e.g. Esteel to the south of Nablus; Mali Adumim, east of Jerusalem; Kiryat Arba, next to al-Khalil (Hebron). An industrial sight near Qalandia, north of Jerusalem, called Atrut was set up. Many incentives are given to settlers and Zionist firms to open shop in various settlements. Income tax could be cut by 70% if "development areas, class A" were invested in. Settlements were exempt from purchase tax, received a cut of 30% on land and residence levies. Real estate improvement taxes, labor taxes, settlers and investors receive financial discounts in what was called "operation Galilee." Labor insurance; 15% of labor wages, are written off. A factory in a West Bank settlement receive 35% of its investment money as a grant. Loans and credit galore. Labor wages were subsidized; even though in the West Bank labor wages are far less than they are in pre-1967 territory. If a factory exports its product it receives special incentives to spur investment. Homes on these settlements are practically free. The average cost of such homes is 25-50% less than what they would cost in the 1948 occupied lands. Mortgages are lax, interest rates are low, and terms are liberal.

The settlements in the Jordan Valley rely on agriculture. These settlements were given 85,000 dunums; 36,000 of them for agriculture, 30,000 of them irrigated. Each settlement has an allotted agricultural area, some as high as 2,500 dunums. Eleven wells have been dug; depths range from 500 to 800 meters, resulting in 12 Arab wells going dry. Subterranean water is decreasing while its salinity is increasing. Most of these settlements sustain different industrial projects and ventures. The number of settlers in these 23 settlements, in the Jordan Valley, along a 115 kilometer stretch, are no more than 3,600.

Demographically, 90% of the West Bank settlers in 1967 occupied areas are adjacent to Jerusalem, such as Maali Adumim, Besenjay Zeif, Jafat Hadar, etc. and in the northwest West Bank near the armistice line, such as Kiryat Shuhroon, Alfi Manshieh, Yi Nuteel, Kafa, Ariel, Nukhim and others are within a 5-15 minute drive from Tel Aviv. These settlements are more retreats, as most of their occupants work or are employed in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and other sea-side areas. These number 20 out of 139 in the West Bank. The others are small settlements with populations of 10-20 families and sometimes less than that. There are 15 settlements having no more than 3-10 families. These are called ghost settlements. At the beginning of 1992 the number of settlers in 107 settlements was not more than 500 per settlement. Twenty seven settlements had no more than 100 persons per settlement. That is the rational for high altitude settlements, forward garrisons in a scheme of expansionism and strangulation of Arab towns and cities. This has been the saga of Galilee and the triangle area. Fifty observation points (mini-settlements) have gone up in areas to deliberately sever Palestinian geo-reality.

**Settlements in Gaza**

Settlement plans for Gaza were originally formulated with the assumption of annexation after evacuating the Palestinian refugees (two third's of Gaza's population) to al-Ariesh and beyond. This was stated in the Alon Plan. 120,000 dunums were confiscated under the pretext that it is government land, which amounts to 34% of Gaza. 40,000 dunums of it were for settlements, with a potential expansion of 56,000 settlement dunums.

Two settlement plans were contrasted at the time: one of them envisaged three settlement amusements, referred to at that time as "the fingers' theory." The intent: to cut-off the Gaza Strip and sterilize its demography. The second plan shunned settlements inside a congested Arab area but sought settlements south and southwest of Gaza to link with the Rafah settlements. This would disband Gaza from Egypt. The attempts to evacuate the refugees from Gaza to Sinai or the West Bank failed (1969-1972). Alon's plan was amended. In 1976 the "fingers' theory" was abandoned. The Zionists concentrated on establishing a settlement line from northwest D'ayr al-Balah, parallel to the sea, all the way to Egypt, where it links up with the Rafah area settlements. 30,000 dunums in Gaza were for the establishment of Mifia Di'it on the seashore, south of Rafah. This plan has settlements extending from Rimal al-Samiri area, west of Dayr al-Balah, to Rafah. Up to

1977 there were only two settlements in Gaza. An industrial complex called Eries was also there, lands confiscated from the inhabitants of Bayt Hanun, (in North Gaza , 1969).

With Likud in power the "fingers' theory" and the "settlement belt" were fused. The number of settlements reached 20. According to Zionist information, there are 5,000 settlers living in three settlement masses. The largest is Gush Qatif mass, from southeast Dayr al-Balah to West Rafah (30,000 dunums). The Kutlat Nashrim mass, on the sea, between Gaza and Dayr al-Balah (4,000 dunums). The third, Elie Sinai, north Gaza, near the armistice line (6,000 dunums) stolen from Arab Bayt Hanun and Bayt Lahia.

In July 1991, the Gush Qatif settlements were linked by a road to the Western Negev. In July 1992 Rabin's government announced the annulment of incentives, facilities and tax exemptions to the Gaza settlements. Rabin characterized them at the time as "political settlements." But in December 1992 these settlements reverted, within the new development plan, concocted by the Shieft committee, to the status of all other Gaza settlements (Development Areas, Class A) with all the previous fringe benefits that go with "security settlements."

Economically speaking, the Gaza settlements are not unlike the West Bank settlements. Besides the Eires industrial park, large swaths of land were designated for agriculture. 45% of the Gaza strip depends on irrigation, but is suffering a lack of water. The occupation authorities have clamped strict restrictions on the use of water. Drilling for new water is banned. Meters are placed on the existing wells and limits are set on water consumption. Harsh penalties are meted out to violators. These measures are ostensibly taken because of water scarcity, salinity problems and depleted aquifers. While in the Zionist settlements of Gush Qatif two irrigational projects in Rafah and Khan Yunis produced between 35 and 40 water wells, pumping one half of the water allowed to Palestinians in the area whose number is over 750,000.

**Golan settlements**

According to the most recent Zionist figures, up to now, the Golan Heights has around 34 settlements with 13,000 settlers. All of them, in keeping with Rabin's definition, are "security settlements," which according to the "development plan" receives all the priority investments, loans, grants, incentives and tax exemptions. Since the beginning, there never were any discrepancies between the two major parties who shared power in the Zionist entity, Labor and Likud. They saw eye to eye, with a fixation on Golan absorption and annexation. This was apparent during the time the decision was made to usurp the Golan Heights (12/14/81). Even though the current Rabin himself declared, more than once, changes on the Golan will amount to no more than cosmetic adjustments along the current cease-fire line, two to three kilometers only.

Since the beginning, strategic considerations went into the Golan settlements construction. These settlements extend along two corridors. The first in an arc shape from the slopes of Jabal al-Sheikh (Mt. Hermon) near Baniyas, parallel to the cease-fire line, adjacent to al-Qunietra, al-Rafid, al-Himmah; the second is concentrated southwest of Golan, parallel to Lake Tiberias and the Batiha steppe.

The settlement plans, reiterated since 1969, talk about a settler population of 50,000. Also discussed is a condensed settlement belt stretching from the Golan and the Jordan Valley all the way to the Gulf of Aqaba. This would parallel the shore belt of settlements. This was dubbed the "two backbone project" of Zionist settlements.

The Golan settlements, by and large, were designed to serve agricultural purposes. 85,000 dunums were placed under settlement authority control, in addition to 300,000 dunums of pastoral land. Each settlement was allocated an average of 3,500 dunums. A number of factories were assembled in the Kitsrin settlement, the regional center of Golan settlements. Some industries were located at other settlements. Settlements on the slopes of Jabal al-Sheikh (Mt. Hermon), such as Yatif and Haradum, specialize in the tourist industry. Settlers on the Golan acquire homes virtually at no cost. Mortgages are 50 year mortgages with an interest rate of only 2%.

With all these amenities and facilities, and the fact that the Golan and Jordan Valley settlements are the most prosperous economically in comparison to the other post 1967 settlements, there were 43 Golan and Jordan Valley settlements on a list of one third of the Zionist settlements that are financially burdened with a debt of 6 billion shekels ($3B). Another indicator that economic factors are secondary in post 1967 settlements.

In summary, Zionist settlements in all areas are strictly political. These settlements are devised by an expansionist Zionist agenda within a strategy of destined annexation, aggression and confrontation with the surrounding Arab context. Rabin's attempt to differentiate between "security settlements" and "political settlements" is a Zionist media ploy concealing deceit and misinformation.✪

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The historic Bosnian cities of Sarajevo, Mostar,Gorazde, Foca, Visegrad, Jajce, Travnik and many others have suffered continuous shelling and loss of human life as well as cultural, educational and religious monuments and institutions (including over 600 mosques, and many churches and synagogues). These barbaric and sadistic atrocities urge all of us who love freedom and democracy to stand up in solidarity with the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We request that the United Nations member states in general and the United States of America in particular act immediately on the following concrete steps to stop genocide in Bosnia:

1. **To lift the arms embargo on defenseless Bosnian People.**

2. **To order Serbian forces and affiliated terrorist groups to withdraw from all occupied Bosnian territories and to assist refugees in returning to their homes.**

3. **To place U.N. peacekeeping forces on the Bosnian border with Serbia and Montenegro in order to protect innocent civilians, to prevent the supply of oil, weapons, ammunition and spare parts to Serbia's war machine in Bosnia, and to assure delivery of international humanitarian aid.**

If the United States, the United Nations, and the European Community believe in the principles of democracy, they should stand up and immediately protect the innocent and defenseless Bosnian people, and stop the ongoing mass atrocities.

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By: Jamal Al-Kudsi*

# The Economies of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under occupation

Since its occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip in 1967, the Israeli authorities have worked to annex and control the economies of the territories by every mean possible. They have taken advantage of the poor conditions of these economies, and their direct link with both the Egyptian and Jordanian economies before occupation. The Israelis have worked hard to make the West Bank and Gaza a convenient consumer market of its products, and also an important source of cheap labor, raw materials, and water. In other words, the occupation authorities have succeeded (via direct occupation) in freezing, if not putting a handicap on, the development of the economies of the territories. It has also had a relative success in distorting these two economies, and made them subordinate to its own economy. This was done through well studied and planned schemes over two decades. Probably what benefited the Zionists most in achieving their goal is a convergence of interests with world imperialism represented by Britain at the time, in addition to the role of the Ottomans in handicapping the Palestinian economy, and furthering its under-development. The road was thus made easy by these factors for implementing the Zionist policies, which aimed mainly at total annexation with its own economy. We find that the occupation authorities, managed to strike over a quarter of a century a dangerous balance of power well in the favor of the Zionist entity. This fact has left devastating consequences on the ground, through forceful overtaking of land, building of settlements on them, and the destruction of whatever local economy existed.

Was the Intifada able to shake the balance of power, or even tilt it a bit? Did it contribute to the development of a popular economy, which might impose a withdrawal, and evolvement toward protecting the local economy and breaking the chain of subordination to Israel? If that had indeed taken place, to what degree was the success? And is the Intifada alone sufficient to carry on this? Two important aspects have to be taken into account, beside all other data on the subject: The primacy of politics over economy, despite their hand-in-hand involvement in serving the Zionist ideology and established strategy of expansion, and confiscation of lands to establish Greater Israel. The nature and structure of the occupation settlement policy in Palestine. In this respect, one has to point out that the Zionist occupation is a process of uprooting rather than the exploitation of resources of the occupied territories and its reduction to a mere consumer market. Zionist occupation aims at the total destruction of the structure of the occupied land, and its economy with the objective of complete annihilation.

**The economies of the occupied land until 1967**

Before looking into the various factors that lead to annexation of the local economies of the territories with those of Israel, it is important to have an overview of the nature and status of these economies before occupation. In other words, what was the state of the economies of the West Bank and Gaza found by the Israelis at the time of the occupation in 1967?

The West Bank and Gaza economies have been subject to a terrible shake up after the occupation of what became to be known as the 1948 lands, and the establishment of the Zionist state on those lands. This event has dictated the necessity for restructuring and overhauling the internal economies of the West Bank and Gaza. This is beside rebuilding the external economic relations to adjust to the new reality, with its exceptional conditions. Not only this, the economy of the territories had to face the 250,000 refugees fleeing toward the West Bank, and 160,000 to the Gaza Strip, all fleeing from the 1948 land. These refugees have been piled up in crowded "temporary" refugee camps, without any chance for finding work, and with no productive structure ready to accommodate them. At the same time, the economy of the Zionist entity at the eve of its establishment, was already enjoying the special treatment of its relation with Britain, and an advanced level of development from the start. This had only worsened the heavy overburdening of the economies of the territories which were underdeveloped to begin with.

The agricultural nature of the economies of the occupied territories- along with light industry and trade—has in itself prevented any smooth economic readjustment to accommodate the refugees. This has lead to a strangling economic situation resettling from poor resources and the high increase in population.

It is known that the West Bank economy remained tied to that of Jordan (which is mainly agricultural) until prior to 1967. An expert in the economy of the area has for example pointed out that during 1966, the agricultural

production, which turned out as merchandise (a portion of the total output) was more than three times the output of the industrial sector. Probably the most important thing to note in this regard is that the rural economy of the West Bank preserved to a large extent the prevailing feudalism. The few wealthy landlords for example possessed for themselves more than 10,000 and sometimes 20,000 dunums (4 dunums = 1 acre) of land. Therefore, this rural economy with predominantly feudal was characterized by an underdeveloped industry mostly light, and hand-made, lacking modern machinery, and for the major part does not employ more than 15% of the total labor force—mainly the manufacturing of vegetable oils, and soap has characterized the economy of the territories prior to 1967; no more than a rural industry. Adding to it the light industry like wood hand crafting, and metal shaping. It can be stated in summary that the West Bank industry remained underdeveloped because of its dependence on the Jordanian economy, which in itself is severely limited and underdeveloped. This in addition to the policies of Jordan aimed at developing the eastern bank of the Jordan river, and marginalizing through various legislation the West Bank. Such policies have made of the West Bank simply a small scale hand crafting industry to the detriment of any mechanized work.

Jordan, which annexed the West Bank in 1950 (and was followed by tens of thousands of refugees both from the 1948 lands, or the West Bank itself) has used the reality on the ground for its own advantage—i.e. toward development of the east bank, at the expense of the West Bank. An Israeli expert, who wrote extensively on the economics of the area, states that "the West Bank is characterized as a region of relative prosperity, with severe industrial under-development. In 1948, it was the industrial center of Jordan. With the coming of 1967, the added value in the industrial sector in the East Bank became about three times its corresponding one in the West Bank. Hence, here one can see that the pre-1967 economic conditions in the West Bank, were at a low level which contributed favorably to the implementation of the various policies of the occupying force which of course aimed at the total destruction of its economy.

Likewise, in the Gaza Strip, the number of refugees which fled to it after the 1948 occupation (of mainland Palestine) was almost equal to its original population. Contrary to the West Bank, Gaza was economically separate from Egypt (although under Egyptian administration). Its economy was however very similar to that of the West Bank, for example 1/3 of the local production was agricultural and employed 40% of the work force. Thus the general character of the economic activity was agricultural. The industrial sector was as in the West Bank, very slow to develop, and did constitute more than 40% of the total local economic output.

On the other hand, the economy of the Zionist entity was enjoying special privileges, which made the task of crippling and later annexing the economies of the West Bank and Gaza to itself much easier. This task was assisted by two major factors: first, the Jewish agency; virtually the State, before the establishment of the Zionist entity and second, the British protectorate, representing world imperialism. These two factors have contributed in implementing a new mode of production at the cost of Palestine before 1948, namely a modern capitalist economy. On the other hand, it had worked at repressing any attempt for resistance from the Palestinian side. The British establishment has also helped in infusing large Jewish capital into Palestine for investment in industrial and agricultural sectors, beside the introduction of machinery and modern equipment which was absent in the Palestinian economy.

The British policy did not stop at repressing all attempts for resistance but more dangerously were the policies it implemented on the economic front which were introduced to favor the establishment of Jewish economic institutions, free of any taxation. Laws were generally tailored to suit Jewish activities while barring the same to its Palestinian counterpart, and even working ardently toward its destruction. It is no secret of course that the Jewish agency was the thinking brain and executive force behind these policies which aimed at establishing an independent Jewish economy. The agency always worked in close coordination which the British authorities. When Britain announced the end of its protectorate in 1948 (over Palestine), the largest and most important step which the new Zionist entity took was the complete eradication of the local economic structure, by simply removing the people themselves from the land. They were driven out through terror and massacres. Tens of thousands were pushed out of the lands, considered by Israel as its own in 1948. This has strengthened the settlement structure by providing it with free land, projects and institutions in place ready for the moment to absorb and accommodate the incoming Zionist settlers. Naturally, the Palestinian economy was barred the road for development, and was forced to enter a new era of containment, subject to policies of the various regimes in the area beginning with Israel, but also Egypt and Jordan. For example, Jordan, to which the West Bank belonged after 1948, has worked to center all industrial activity on the East Bank of the river. It has also imposed for example that all industrial institutions whose capital exceeds 10,000 JD be established on the East Bank, or if it were already established on the West Bank, to be moved to the east, as was the case for the industry of potassium. While Egypt has preserved the

demographic component of the territory, the limited resources, overcrowding, and geographic confinements, have prevented any economic development.

Hence, the economies of the territories were weak prior to 1967; despite trade activity, the industrial sector never moved beyond small and simple factories. Israeli economic indicators point out that its total contribution to its economy was never beyond 4.3%. This was the state of the economy and its links to both Jordan and Egypt, which the Israelis found when they occupied the territories in 1967.

**From annexation attempts to the self-rule scheme**

The economy, which was inherited by the Israeli occupation was an economy inherited in a political climate, which favored the Zionist entity to resort freely to practices, and rules that favored its objectives without any credible hindrance, or serious accountability to anyone.

For this reason, it was easy for the occupying authorities, to succeed in making the economy of the occupied lands linked and closely subordinated to the Zionist economy. This is not only by the use of brutal force or unjust laws, but also in terms of unbalanced trade exchange. Israel has in fact confined the trade of the occupied lands in such a way, that Israel is the sole trade partner. It has also effectively incorporated 40% of the occupied lands for serving inside the Zionist economy. This resulted also in the increase of imports of Israeli products to the occupied lands, to the point, in which these imports made up 90% of all of the occupied lands imports.

The occupation authorities have relied on implementing the project of economic annexation which include industry, agriculture, land etc. as well as judicial means, on the top of the practice of deception, and military might represented by the constant presence of the military in the occupied territories.

**The economic policy of the occupation authorities**

The past twenty five years under Israeli occupation, and since the expansion of the occupation to what remained of Palestine, have witnessed drastic changes. These changes were of social, political and psychological nature, and have had an important impact on the various aspects of life in the areas. Probably, the most important and obvious change is the one related to the ever-expansion of capital-based activities in the economic structure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The policy of economic annexation, followed by Israel in the territories, has in fact paralyzed, if not completely, destroyed the quest for improving the economy and the gradual process towards self-development. This policy has also forced the introduction of the needs of the Israeli economy, as a pre-requisite to any improvement in productivity. This is due to the fact that capitalism, at the time of occupation, was in the process of making its way through the economies of the region, and was in the stage of establishing itself. The process went on at a slow pace, which has helped implementing the Israeli economic plans in the area. Adding to the fact that, the small Palestinian bourgeoisie has yet to reach the level of competition with the Israeli capitals, which were supported and protected even before the occupation of the territories. It is this that has helped in the success of the mission which the Zionist government had undertaken, to disassociate the Palestinians from their land and to annex them to the Israeli economy as a paid labor force. For this reason, it was necessary to put an end to any prospect of investment of Palestinian capitals in the territories. When the Palestinian farmer left his land, he found himself unable to sell his labor, except to the Jewish labor-lord who controls the labor market.

The main distinguishing aspect which characterizes the industrial sector in the territories, is the absence of any new industrial development. Also, virtually all of the industry has been confined to the manufacturing of basic foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, textiles and clothing. Some major changes have taken place in the structure of the industrial sector in the occupied areas, which saw the emergence of some activity in the sector of light industries. This came as a response to the demand of the Israeli companies to purchase cheap products for which they have a need, especially in the sector of textiles and its derivatives. So, the main driving force behind the growth of this traditional sector, which relies primarily on manual labor, is the fact that it found in the Israeli companies consumers of cheap products.

In a specific manner, one can thus state that, whatever changes took place in the industrial structure of the occupied territories, are only an unavoidable consequences of "Israeli policies" specifically tailored for "the sake of Israel". For years which followed occupation, there has been consistent breakup of local institutions, only to be replaced by others that responded to the need of Israel. This explains without ambiguity the result of the Israeli policies. The new Israeli institutions, were indeed established on former sites on which Palestinian factories existed and then were either removed, or became unable to continue operating. One can also add that, the number of companies which have stopped operating is much more than the number of those recently established.

In short, the Israeli economic policies in the territories have resulted in an increase in the number of Palestinians, who became exploited laborers, and produced a breakdown of the body of the Palestinian working class. ✪

**A journalist from Jerusalem (Translated by: Mohamed Esseghir)*

By: Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi *

# The prospect of a Palestinian peace

Months of talks between Israel and the Palestinians resulted in a breakthrough and the possibility of a new future for Gaza and the West Bank. The Mother of all Autonomies is presumably approaching. All the dreams of Eretz Yisrael Hagdola (Greater Israel) are being shattered by the political reality of the region.

As a Palestinian-American Muslim, what do I make of all this? Do I rejoice? Do I weep? Do I welcome or reject the current plan? All these years I have been in exile, I have dreamed of going back home to my country, Palestine. My dream is 13 years old. I was born 37 years ago in Nazareth, then part of Israel. I came to United States for graduate school in 1980, when I became exiled and began to dream of the possibility of a return to a sovereign Palestinian state.

The dream of many Palestinians, both women and men, has lasted longer than mine. For many, it started in 1948 with the establishment of Israel.

Exile breeds alienation and alienation breeds bitterness, which, in turn, leads to frustration and to slow death. This is what happened to many Palestinians, especially those who became refugees in post 1948 Israel, in the West Bank and Gaza, and as well as in the Arab world.

Peace is definitely a good thing. But the kind of peace being negotiated does not satisfy most Palestinians, especially those who are not natives of the West Bank and Gaza. The crux of the matter is not a tiny piece of land but the tragedy of millions of Palestinians who have been exiled, terrorized and dehumanized by the state of Israel. Those who stayed inside did not fare better. Their land was confiscated, their homes were destroyed and their very livelihood was endangered.

**Exile breeds alienation and alienation breeds bitterness, which, in turn, leads to frustration and to slow death. This is what happened to many Palestinians, especially those who became refugees in post 1948 Israel, in the West Bank and Gaza, and as well as in the Arab world.**

**The crux of the matter is not a tiny piece of land but the tragedy of millions of Palestinians who have been exiled, terrorized and dehumanized by the state of Israel.**

My father, a contractor, was imprisoned for six years outside Tel Aviv, from the time I was 13 until I was 19, for his political beliefs; the Israelis accused him of belonging to the Palestine Liberation Organization. Every month, because I spoke Hebrew, I accompanied my mother on the long bus trip to visit him in jail. We were 13 children; the youngest was 40 days old when my father was imprisoned. After he was released, he was not permitted to leave the country for six years.

I lost dozens of close relatives in the 1948 war and again in the 1967 Six-Day War. As a student studying English at Bir Zeit University on the West Bank in the late 1970s, I was repeatedly tear-gassed and harassed by the Israeli military simply because I was a Palestinian. I could not pursue the academic career that I wanted within Israel. The only way to succeed professionally was to come to the United States.

My 78 year old aunt, Aminah Bahtia, is a peasant farmer from Nazareth who lost her land when Israel was established. Since 1948, she has lived in Yarmouk Camp in Damascus, whose 500,000 people make it the largest refugee camp in the Middle East.

A few years ago, I went to meet her for the first time. As an Israeli citizen, I wasn't permitted to travel to Syria to visit; I went there as soon as I obtained my US citizenship in 1989.

In a simple human manner she told me "I do not hate Israelis; I just want to return to my home in Galilee." The "peace package" discussed in Washington or Oslo does not guarantee my aunt and numerous others like her the hope of going back to their ancestor's homes.

There are hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living in exile in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, North America and Latin America who would not wish to live in Gaza and Jericho, especially under the mercy of the democracy in the Middle East that possesses the most powerful army in the area.

How can we be expected to forget the pain inflicted on us by the Israelis all these years when the Jews of the world still cannot forget the tragedy and the pain of Auschwitz after more than four decades? Of course, some will object to this comparison on the basis that "Jewish suffering" is unique. Isn't Palestinian suffering, like all human suffering, real and unique to the sufferers?

A few years ago, the US mass media discovered that there are "good" Palestinians who actually are not terrorists. It came as a big surprise to many Americans that there are Palestinians like Hanan Ashrawi, the spokeswoman for the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks in Washington and my former advisor and professor of English at Bir Zeit University. Many of my fellow students and teachers from those days are now playing an important part of the peace process.

**How can we be expected to forget the pain inflicted on us by the Israelis all these years when the Jews of the world still cannot forget the tragedy and the pain of Auschwitz after more than four decades?**

Americans are surprised that there are Palestinians who are well-spoken, articulate, confident and level-headed and that women can assume a leadership role. Americans also have discovered that not all Palestinians are Muslims, but that there is a substantial Christian Palestinian community that is intellectually, socially and educationally active and dynamic.

What a discovery! Hanan Ashrawi and her like were not born yesterday, and the Christians were not planted in the Palestinian soil yesteryear. These people have deep roots that go back thousands of years.

The mass media have unveiled only America's basic ignorance about a sensitive and strategic region of the world. As I welcome the news about the American-sponsored peace, I listen restlessly to the pain and suffering of my people. I stare at the face of many a somber Palestinian mother who lost a child whose only crime was to throw a stone at the army.

I watch the faces of many—an old man who has been made a refugee more than three times in his life—and I listen to the whisperings of political prisoners who dared to defy the status quo. I shudder.

What gives me hope is not the peace plan now being brokered but the humanistic orientation of many Jews, both men and women, who endured much suffering in their long and rich history and who cannot forget our suffering any more than they can forget their own.

**Of course, some will object to this comparison on the basis that "Jewish suffering" is unique. Isn't Palestinian suffering, like all human suffering, real and unique to the sufferers?**

I am sure that these courageous people will not let us suffer any more. These are the people my aunt and I would like to talk peace to and shake hands with.

* *Professor of Religous Studies at Hartford Seminary.*

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By: Dr. M.T. Mehdi *

# The peace of the brave or piece of shame

Israeli terrorism must be renounced, and the agreement must be reciprocal in order to lead to a just peace.

The call for amending the covenant of PLO and eliminate its references to the opposition to the Jewish State makes sense. But it does not call for amendments to the Zionist doctrine that the Jews of the world have the right to occupy Palestine! According to the Zionist doctrine, the Jews have such a right because Joshau had captured Jericho some 3,000 years ago. This is not only an absurd and racist mythology, but also the cause of the problem and the root of the conflict.




The fact that the Declaration of Principles has not discussed the status of Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements on the 1967 occupied land, the Palestinian political prisoners held in Israeli jails, and the return of the Palestinian refugees keeps the agreement ambiguous and possibly "wise!"

But what were the reasons for Rabin and Arafat to agree to such ambiguous and incomplete arrangements at this stage?

The change in the thinking of Mr. Rabin must be attributed to the impact of the Intifada on the Israeli society and the recognition that the "Palestinians won't go away!" The Iraqi Scud missile, hitting Tel Aviv, made Israel cognizant that it is not invincible. Furthermore, Rabin was wise enough to recognize that Israel cannot depend forever on the huge amounts ($6 billion, presently) of American aid which probably will dry out in a few years.

Furthermore, Rabin recognized that the new Palestinians leadership of Intifada and Islamic movements may overshadow Yasser Arafat's PLO and that it is easier to deal with a weak Arafat than a stronger Intifada leadership.

To make a gesture offering limited self-rule was the least he could do. It should be noted that the offer will not affect Israel's security or its basic claims to the land and to Jerusalem.

On the PLO side, Arafat, after more than 30 years of reign and failure to liberate an inch of Palestine, was ready to show some success even by accepting the mirage of semi-independent rule over the small town of Jericho and the 800,000 densely populated 25 miles stretch of Gaza strip!

Furthermore, the PLO recognized, at long last, that the military option was out and that their slogan of Armed Struggle was an empty rhetoric. Of course, they have yet to recognize that the real battleground for the liberation of Palestine is first and foremost in America, and not in the Middle East.

Briefly, the agreement throws a piece of bone, a dry piece of bone, to Yasser Arafat who is pleased to wave it to the naive as the expression of his crowning achievement!

This strange case of lopsided agreement is due to the fact that the two parties to the "negotiations" are not equal. Negotiations to be meaningful should take place between parties who are, plus or minus, equal in strength.

Israel and the Palestinians will become equal negotiating partners if the US gives $6 billion to the PLO or stop the $6 billion to Israel and spend the huge amount to eliminate hunger and homelessness in America!

Only equal partners in negotiation will produce a meaningful instrument for peace. And only if Arafat had waited for two more years that equality would have been approaching. The impact of Intifada on the Israeli society and financial drainage on the Jewish State would have pressured Rabin or even Benjamin Natenyahu of Shaker Heights, Ohio, to recognize the human rights of the Palestinians to their land!

* *Chairman of Arab-American Relations Committee and Council of Islamic Affairs.*

By: *Muhammad al-Asi* *

# The Oslo agreement vs. the Madina agreement

Now that the ink is dry on the documents that were signed on the White House lawn (September 13, 1993), it is prudent to take a holistic look at this Middle Eastern problem that has eluded all attempts at solving it. And when all is said and done the deep-down-inside question that is embedded at the core of Arabs and Israelis (Muslims and Jews) is: can we trust each other? If we can trust each other, we can make room for ourselves to live side by side, coexisting equally and respectfully. There can be no one person who can sign away or sign in forces that have been at work for many generations. That is why there will never be a "magical formula" or a "quick fix" for the time tested issue of how the Holy Land and Jerusalem will be administered. As a Muslim, I can speak from an Islamic perspective and I hope my words, as blunt as they may appear, will not contribute to a complication of the issue, but rather to the first step in diagnosing what is in fact and reality at the core of this Islamic-Jewish tension.

**When all is said and done the deep-down-inside question that is embedded at the core of Arabs and Israelis (Muslims and Jews) is: can we trust each other?**

I would like to start off by saying that no one wants to define this issue, in public, as one between Muslims on one side and Jews and Christians on the other side. Of course, not all Jews and Christians are opposed to an Islamic Holy Land in Jerusalem and the country around it, and not all Muslims are opposed to a Jewish or Christian Holy Land in Jerusalem and the country surrounding it. But the mainstream feature which no one wants to express openly is that there is a systematic and political as well as a military and economic arrangement that defines Jerusalem and the holy lands around it as an exclusive domain for Jews, and to a lesser extent Christians, but with the unmistakable design to depopulate that area of its Muslim inhabitants and natives.

The Christian world, with all its fanfare about objectivity, science, enlightenment and liberalism still has not come to terms with the fact that Jerusalem and its surrounding area, Bethlehem, Nazareth, Galilee and all other geo-Biblical territories are located dead-center in the heart of the Muslim world. Demographically, geographically and socially a rational mind can not escape the fact that Jerusalem and all that go with it are centered in a mass of Muslims. With all the religious and anti-religious fluctuations of the Christian political hemisphere this glaring fact is mentally subdued, emotionally suppressed, religiously inhibited and politically curtailed. That is only one reason why no one speaks about democracy in Muslim lands. If there is a blossoming of self-determination throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia then this fact (the Islamic character of the whole region) will be all the more difficult to disguise any longer.

It is this general Christian complex towards Islamic political, ideological and religious facts that are translated into demographic and geographic realities on the ground that has caused the political expressions in the Christian world to support in so many direct and indirect ways a Jewish state in the land/country of Jerusalem. Such political and religious zealots for Zion in the Christian context can never be even-handed brokers or neutral operators in any serious contemplation of a durable and lasting peace in that land of the prophets. But our concern here is not to probe the confusion, and there is plenty of it, nor the single-mindedness expressed by atheist and church-going decision makers throughout the course of the past century as Zionism was being prepared to lay a claim on Jerusalem and its environs, and then after Zionism had actually usurped Jerusalem and the history rich lands around it.

With the Arafat to Zion signature in the power-house of the Christian world (the White House) I would like to focus on one aspect of this theater: the trust that is needed to have any agreement workable. Without the element of trust, good faith, and good will we would all be exercising our wildest imagination to think that peace is finally in, and war is finally out.

I shall venture into those prohibited areas, the areas no one wants to talk about. "It is not civilized to resurrect these issues" some would say.

Others would retort that by invoking these issues we will stir a hornet's nest of trouble and open up a Pandora's box. And the problem is that yes, by digging up ancient facts, especially difficult and embarrassing moments in history, we will cause plenty of commotion. But the fact of the matter is that both Jews and Muslims do not deny their history. To the contrary, history is a very potent part of their contemporary world. And as long as that is the case, Muslims and Jews, have to understand each other and in doing so we can not avoid the historical component of our contemporary deportment. [In a likewise manner, I would be very interested in and thankful for any Jew who would explain to the Muslims what the historical/religious difficulties the Jews have (if there are any) in reaching the bond of trust upon which a political arrangement is constructed].

**The Christian world, with all its fanfare about objectivity, science, enlightenment and liberalism still has not come to terms with the fact that Jerusalem and its surrounding area, Bethlehem, Nazareth, Galilee and all other geo-Biblical territories are located dead-center in the heart of the Muslim world.**

The following examples are only a sample of the integral Muslim belief based on the Qur'an and Sunnah of why Muslims can not have trust in any political transaction with Zionists.

When the final Prophet of God, Muhammad, peace be upon him (PBUH), sought and was given political asylum and support in Madina (Yathrib) he worked out a constitution for the nascent Islamic state at Madina. The three factions of Jews in Madina were signatories to that political agreement, the "Madina agreement." This mutual political arrangement between God's Prophet and the Jewish community in Madina, to which the Jews signed their names of their own free will, stated that all inhabitants of Madina (Muslims, Jews and others) are one civil society and any attack (by Arab mushriks) against Madina is to be considered by all an attack against all citizens of Madina. The Madina agreement or constitution also stipulated some mutual financial responsibility by both Muslims and Jews.

After the agreement was finalized with the consent of all parties it was left up to both sides to live up to the stipulations and conditions of the agreement. [For further information refer to the agreement in the books of seerah and Islamic History, 1st year of the Prophet in Madina].

After the formalities and the ceremony, the Jews began to violate the spirit of the agreement. The Jews began to plant doubts in the minds of the new Islamic community in Madina. The Jewish comments and remarks about Muslim Jihad were very irritating to say the least. The Jews displayed an outward uneasiness with the Muslim victory at the battle of Badr. The first faction of Jews to divulge itself was the Qaynuqa' district in Madina. These Jews were the downtown or inner-city dwelling Jews. Unlike the others who lived on the outskirts of Madina, their intense contact with the Muslims caused them to take the first position of hostility. Even though these Jews were leaking with acidic comments about Muslims, the Prophet approached them with respect. He spoke to them as a caring neighbor and in his manner of dignity he said on one occasion to them: "People of the Jewish community! Don't be oblivious to God and what His revenge upon Qureish. Submit unto Him. You ought to have realized that I am a Prophet. It is foretold in your Holy Book and in God's Covenant." But how did the Jews reply? These are their words: "Muhammad! Don't be fooled on account of those people who you took on who do not know anything about warfare. You took advantage of them. By God, if we were to wage war against you, you would realize that we are the warriors." The Jews were answered from heaven: *"Say unto those who are bent on denying the truth: You shall be overcome and gathered unto hell - and how evil a resting place! You have already had a sign in the two hosts that met in battle, one host fighting in God's cause and the other denying Him; with their own eyes [the former] saw the others as twice their own number: but God strengthens with His succor whom He wills. In this, behold, there is indeed a lesson for all who have eyes to see."* The Holy Quran, 3: 12-13

These Jewish signatories did not stop at words to erode the Islamic morale, they brazenly went into action. They would even make statements to the effect that they will not honor the Madina agreement. They did not cease criticizing and their incessant attempts at damaging the Prophet's credibility. The issue came to a head when a Muslim woman went to the market of Qaynuqa' (the

Jews). She sat at a jewelry shop. Then the Jews came to her and made fun of her Islamic dress. The jeweler, without her noticing it, tied the end of her dress to her back, so that when she stood up, her private parts would be exposed. When that happened, she screamed. A Muslim man attacked and killed that jeweler. The Jews then attacked the Muslim man and killed him. Then the two communities, Muslims and Jews, were polarized.

Tension led to a military face-off. Muslims took up arms in defense of virtue and moral values. For some time past, the Jews were being tolerated for their intimidations, their prejudice, their foul language and their publicity stunts against the Prophet (PBUH). Muslims put up with them in a manner of patience and to honor the Madina agreement. But when the Jews began to kill, the issue had to be decisively solved. The Prophet placed them under a siege for 15 days. When they could not take it any longer they were evacuated from Madina as they accepted the Prophet's verdict.

As the months went by, another Jewish faction in Madina (Banu al-Nadir) showed their true colors. As the Prophet went to them to enlist their financial support for a citizen who was mistakenly killed by a Muslim they balked at first. The Prophet reminded them of their responsibilities, along with the Muslims, as was outlined in the Madina agreement. Outwardly they told the Prophet they would be forthcoming, but the Prophet noticed that they were maneuvering for time and angling for no good. He (PBUH) suspected a plot of sorts. He was already familiar with their treacherous tactics at what came to be known in Islamic history as Yawm al-Raji' and Bir al-Ma'unah. Their movements grew more frantic; they were engaged in delaying tactics. And God revealed to His Prophet their scheme. The companions who were waiting outside the area were growing impatient with the lapse of time. When it was revealed to the Prophet that the Jews were conspiring to assassinate him he left and met with his companions.

So, here again, the Jews did not honor the Madina agreement. These Jews were not shouldering their responsibilities and the Muslims were the only one honoring their word. Neighborly relations in such an atmosphere with such treacherous people became impossible and the Prophet ordered them to be ejected from Madina, because they proved that they are not able to fulfill the Madina agreement. To abbreviate the details, this faction of Jews was also removed from Madina.

**If they had the rationalization to try to "out-smart" God's Prophet, they certainly have the wits to out-smart a Yasser Arafat.**

And finally the third faction of Jews (Banu Quraidha) committed high treason. Not only did they fail to honor the Madina agreement, they betrayed the Prophet, the Muslim community in Madina and their own word, when these Jews sided with the grand Arab alliance against Madina.

As the whole of Madina was under siege from all directions and as the Muslims were feeling the build up of a life or death encounter, the last Jewish stronghold in Madina, within these most difficult moments, when the Muslims needed cohesion and solidarity the most, the Jews of Bani Quraidha changed sides and joined in a coordinated manner the hostile confederated Arab forces.

After almost six years of signing the Madina agreement the Jews still could not honor their signature. When they committed high treason, and when the battle was over and the assembled forces of Arabia were defeated and after they returned to their places of origin, the Jews had to face the consequences of betrayal under arms. This time justice dictated that the able bodied Jews be sentenced to death for their change of allegiance, disloyalty and turning traitors. Disgorging them from Madina would no longer do justice to such turncoats and fifth columnists.

With the above short history of Jewish political apostasy, what incentives does any Muslim have that will make him believe that this time around the Jews are going to honor an Oslo agreement when they have demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt, their dishonor of the Madina agreement. From an Islamic reading of this affair the leading Jews will break their promises, they will twist their words and they will dodge their responsibilities.

If they had the rationalization to try to "out-smart" God's Prophet, they certainly have the wits to out-smart a Yasser Arafat.

The last time Muslims parted political company with Jewish tribes (1400 years ago) the Muslims knew them as shameless, villainous, unfaithful and perfidious. During those 1400 years, and even though we the Muslims accommodated them during their times of persecution, they have not shown us a change of heart nor a change of mind.

And if there is no trust, there can be no working relationship whatsoever. They can spill all the ink they want on all the paper there is. The fact will remain: Peace is not a legality or a legalism, Peace is a state of mind. ✪

** Imam and educator, Wash. D.C.*

By: Naseer Aruri*

# Clinton and the Middle East: Whose legacy?

## The rhetoric and the reality: Clinton and the Jewish community

What is novel about Clinton's Middle East policy is that the semblance of impartiality, which is generally regarded as necessary for the role of honest broker and catalyst for peace is totally absent. Even the halfhearted pretense is over; we are a long way from the days when Nixon's Middle East envoy, William Seranton described his mission as "evenhanded." In fact, the range of controversy in Clinton's kitchen debate on the Middle East extends between AIPAC, the pro-Israel lobby and Americans for Peace Now (APN) an entirely Jewish family affair.

Having recognized the importance of the Jewish vote and campaign contributions from the Jewish community, Clinton recruited staff and advisors from across the Jewish spectrum. Jewish staff and fund raising operations as well as get vote campaigns were set up in major cities across the United States. A principal goal was to switch 10-20 percent of the Jewish vote from Bush to Clinton. The New York Times (Jan. 5, 1993) reported that Jews contributed about 60 percent of Clinton's non-institutional campaign funds, and about 80 percent of Jewish voters voted for Clinton. Hence, Barbara Streisand's boasting that Clinton owes his presidency to women, Jews, and Blacks.

According to the *New Republic* (Oct. 12, 1992), a well known pro-Israel magazine, both AIPAC and APN signed off on the Middle East component of the Democratic platform. Samuel Berger, the number two man in Clinton's national Security Council served as coordinator. But the process of formulating a Middle East policy for Mr. Clinton and setting up a team of advisors was not free from tensions. The Jewish Peace Lobby, whose membership is drawn largely from APN, was pressuring Clinton not to rely upon AIPAC for advice. The Lobby's criteria for advisor recruitment was expressed in a letter sent to the transition team: "What he must avoid are appointees closely associated with groups that blindly supported the Shamir government, and analysts who crossed over into advocacy for the positions of the Likud." In the jockeying for positions, AIPAC, which was accused of having tilted towards Likud and now fearful of losing its prominence given the ascendancy of Labor in Israel and the democratic party in the U.S, proceeded to clean up its act. Its new director, Democratic activist from Massachusetts and Clinton enthusiast, Steven Grossman journeyed to Israel in early January 1993 at the head of a large delegation and assured Rabin that AIPAC will play by the prime minister's rules. AIPAC had played too active role in the loan guarantees controversy, much to Rabin's dismay, but now its influence remained intact.

Given the parameters of Middle East policy, defined largely, if not exclusively, by hawks, doves, and mainstream Jewish groups, the Clinton approach to the issue was vintage Clinton. It is no secret that the President sees himself as a consensus builder, and he has a widely recognized need to feel the "electro-magnetism of approval" as Time magazine (Feb. 1, 1993) put it. That makes him sensitive predominantly to the needs of the organized groups whose approval counts and it goes without saying that Arab-Americans are outside the contest.

### Clinton's Mideast position during the campaign

Early in the campaign, candidate Clinton resorted to the familiar pandering which U.S politicians engage in at least once every four years. In addition to the Jerusalem issue, which lacks originality, the confrontation between Bush and Israel seemed an absolutely ready-made issue for a Democratic candidate in pursuit of votes. He challenged Bush's linkage of loan guarantees to the territorial issue. In response to a question on the subject he said on March 28, 1992; "My position is now we have the parties at the peace table. Why is the United States only hitting on Israel and never saying publicly about what changes the Arabs have to make?" In 1992, he told the Jewish Leadership Council, "the lack of positive vision has led to miscalculations and missed opportunities, and while he praised Bush and Baker for convening the peace talks, he retorted

"But they have chosen to browbeat Israel, the region's sole democracy, while nurturing ties to Syria's despotic regime." In his position papers he declared that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and opposed the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Later in an interview with the French quarterly Politique International that was published on the eve of the elections, he accused President Assad of "territorial ambitions." In another interview published in the Nov.-Dec. 1993 issue of Middle East Insight magazine, he reaffirmed his position on Jerusalem but said he "would not move the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem during negotiations."

According to the Jerusalem Post (Nov. 6, 1992) Clinton added a religious dimension to his pro-Israel posture. After describing a 1981 visit to Israel as "Fundamentally religious rather than political," he recounted a story about his last conversation with his pastor on his deathbed in highly emotional terms: "He told his Jewish audience in June 1992, He (the pastor) said to me that he hoped some day I would have a chance to run for president but that if I ever let Israel down, God would never forgive me... I think he is looking at me, and if I am elected president, I will never let Israel down."

At the same time, after Bush made his reconciliation with Israel during Rabin's stay at Kennebunkport, Clinton reiterated his praise of Bush and Baker for having gotten the negotiations underway, and pledged to continue and support these negotiations, if elected.

**Clinton's Middle East team**

1. The Jewish Mainstream

Having established himself as the truly pro-Israel candidate, Clinton began to build a team of advisors to fashion a Middle East policy. The names on that team are very revealing both in terms of their positions across the Jewish spectrum and their broader world views. These are Stuart Eizenstat, Steven Spiegel, Michael Mendelbaum, and Martin Indyk. The latter was assigned the task of drawing up the main position paper for the transition team.

It is rather significant that Clinton's consensus building within the Jewish community seemed to assign tasks proportionately, according to his assessment of the power configurations in the Jewish community and his own conception of the United States interests. While the Jewish Peace Lobby was given access to Clinton and a hearing, in addition to positions in the transition team and in the Administration, the mainstream and AIPAC operatives as well as spin-offs were assigned both positions and policy formulation functions. For example, the four persons commissioned to set the tone of Clinton's Middle East policy come from the AIPAC mainstream axis. The key person on that panel, Martin Indyk, is an Australian Jew whose naturalization as a U.S. citizen had to be completed in time for his appointment as the top Middle East "expert" in the NSC. Prior to his establishment of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in 1985 he served as assistant research director for AIPAC. Although he does not like to be identified with AIPAC and makes it a point to describe the Washington Institute as a non-partisan scholarly think-tank, the pro-Israel character of the Institute is undeniably self-evident. Eizenstat comes from the mainstream of the Jewish community with a position close to that of AIPAC. Spiegel, a UCLA Political Scientist, is also close to AIPAC, and so is Mendelbaum, a Johns Hopkins political scientist, who is generally a foreign policy hard liner.

Thus, the people entrusted with the task of drawing up the main position paper for Clinton's transition team include none of the so-called doves from the Jewish Peace Lobby. It is also significant that Indyk's input into policy is bound to reflect the positions which the Washington Institute has been developing during the past eight years. In 1988, Indyk expressed the mission of his institute, which was established with seed money from foundations and contributions from American Jews, as consisting of the need to inject a "balanced and realistic voice" into Washington's Middle East policy debates. He said on April 30, 1988; "We thought there was a balance problem ... a feeling that the Arabs were in the heroic phase."

He thought at the time that U.S policy was "confronting Israel" causing it to suffer serious setback. He began to invite the "Arabists" from Defense and State for lunch once a month to hear speakers, and to interact with think-tank "experts." He also invited congressional staff, diplomatic correspondents and began to publish policy papers and newsletters. The Institute convened numerous study groups, seminars and symposia. Some five years ago, Indyk said: "Think tanks come to the forefront when there is a transition between administrations. There is a receptivity to ideas." Accordingly, he convened a forty member study group in 1988 to make recommendations on Middle East policy for the incoming Bush Administration. While some of the ideas emanating from Indyk's "ready talents" showed up ultimately in Baker's diplomacy four years later, the cumulative findings and recommendations of the Washington Institute's seminars, under Indyk's guidance and leadership became the centerpiece of Clinton's Middle East agenda. Of course Indyk tried to involve a broad segment of the establishment and the pro-Israel community, both inside and outside the government, in the study group and produced a publication entitled "Pursuing Peace: An American Strategy for the Arab-Israeli Peace Process." It was released on September 25, 1992 when Indyk was already serving on the panel charged with

drawing up the main paper for Clinton's transition team. It would be hard to believe that the positions in the two publications are really distinct, particularly when Indyk and Mendelbaum serve on both groups.

Moreover, the Washington Institute's input into Clinton's policy seems to include, beside the mainstream Israeli position, views from various sectors of the neo-conservative and reassertionist foreign policy traditions. For examples, among the people who worked on the Washington Institute's publication "Pursuing Peace" is Peter Rodman, a neo-conservative academic at Johns Hopkins, editor of the right wing National Review and a foreign policy advisor to the Bush/Quayle campaign. He was a special assistant to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and director of policy planning in the Reagan Administration. Another principal author of the report is Harvey Sicherman, former special assistant to Secretary of State Alexander Haig and a speech writer to Secretary James Baker. It is also worth noting that the Washington Institute published a report, "Restoring the Balance," during the Gulf War in which an analysis of what went wrong was offered and recommendations for what to do in the context of the post Gulf War were made. Another report was published after the war under the title "After the Storm," which made recommendations for reshaping the Middle East in the areas of regional security, arms controls i.e., Iraqi disarmament, and economic and political development. Indyk took credit for some of the ideas which he claimed to have influenced U.S policy under Bush in the areas of regional security and "arms control." Actually three members of the study group which authored that report went into the Bush Administration: Zalmay Khalilizad, who became director of policy planning in the Pentagon; Seth Carus; who went to the Pentagon to assist and John Hannah who joined the policy planning staff of the State Department.

Thus the Washington Institute has succeeded with a $600,000 annual budget and eight staff members, in transforming itself from a peripheral pro-Israel organization to a major resource for the media, Congress, and the Bush Administration, and finally emerging as an anchor and source of Mideast policy and personnel for the Clinton Administration. As the sole "expert" on the Middle East at the White House, the Institute's founder and director, Martin Indyk, will be a major actor in policy formulation. Anthony Lake, the titular head of the White House policy team is likely to be involved in the macro rather than the micro aspects of foreign policy.

Others from the Jewish establishment and AIPAC who played an important role in the transition include Morris Amitay, a former AIPAC director, and Richard Schifter, a Reagan democrat and extremely hawkish neo-conservative, who served, ironically, as assistant secretary of state for human rights in the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Reuters has reported (Jan. 21, 1993) that he used to personally screen the entries on Israel in the State Department annual report on human rights in an attempt to repair Israel's image, given its egregious human rights violations in the occupied territories. When Schifter left the Bush Administration in early 1992, it was apparently due to differences with Baker over policy on Israel. Israeli deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin was quoted by Reuters (Jan. 21, 1993) that Schifter told him that Israel's expulsion of 415 Palestinians to Lebanon on December 17, 1992 did not constitute a violation of international law. He incurred the wrath of the mainstream Jewish community because of his close identification with Baker's policies, and was replaced by Samuel Lewis, who was U.S Ambassador to Israel from 1977 to 1985. As the new director of Policy Planning in the State epartment, Lewis, whose tenure in Israel coincided with the development of the strategic alliance under Reagan would have a great deal of influence over U.S Mideast policy. He was described by the Israeli newspaper Hadashot as a "Long-time friend of Israel." Another newspaper Yediot Ahronot said the appointment "strengthens the hope for a continuation of the special relationship." It is interesting that his position was first offered to Michael Mendelbaum who played a major role on the Middle East during the transition but was turned down by him.

Given Clinton's eagerness to insure some continuity regarding the peace talks, he asked Dennis Ross to stay as a consultant but to work closely with Indyk.

2. The Jewish Peace Faction

As far as the peace faction in the Jewish Community is concerned, a number of people associated with Americans for Peace Now have close ties with the Clinton Administration and some were offered senior positions, but none was included in the formal bodies working on the Middle East, either during the campaign or after. And yet, the Jerusalem Post (Jan. 20, 1993) apparently referring to Samuel Berger's appointment as Deputy National Security Advisor, explained it as follows: "Clinton's appointees to foreign policy positions represent neither mainstream Jewish-American opinion nor a centrist Israeli position. On Middle East issues, his administration is composed almost exclusively of Yossi Sarid and Shulamit Aloni counterparts."

In fact these strange "counterparts" like Peter Edelman, Eli Segal, Stanley Sheinbaum, and others, have no Mideast positions in the Administration. According to the Washington Post (Dec. 13, 1992), Sheinbaum, one of the five Jewish activists who met with Yasser Arafat in Stockholm in 1988, submitted a number of memoranda to Clinton, and had to go through Steven Spiegel, Clinton's Mideast policy

consultant. Peter Edelman, on the other hand, the Georgetown professor who headed the transition team for the Justice Department and who is chairman of Americans for Peace Now, submitted to Clinton a number of memoranda advocating a more active U.S role in the "peace process." The Washington Post (Dec. 13, 1992) described his connections to Clinton as going "beyond the professional; they first met through Edelman's wife, Marian Wright Edelman, the President of the Children's Defense Fund, who was Hilary Clinton's mentor." Another member of the board of Americans for Peace Now, Eli Segal, served as financial officer in the transition and was mentioned as a possible White House chief of staff.

**The range of the controversy**

Given that the competing views on Middle East policy in the Clinton Administration are fairly limited to the American Jewish community, it seems necessary to ask whether there is really a controversy, and if so, what is it? What are the principal differences between the two camps and what are the salient points in the debate? Perhaps the single most important differences between the peace camp, represented by Edelman - Sheinbaum and others on the one hand, and the AIPAC group on the other, is the extent to which the U.S government should be involved in the negotiations. While the former groups memoranda to Clinton advocated a much stronger U.S participation to salvage the "peace process," the Indyk group called for continued U.S involvement as a high priority, but emphasized the need for the parties to advance substantially before Washington can intervene with "bridging" proposals. The latter group also expresses strong opposition to any modification of the Madrid framework.

Upon releasing a blue-ribbon study on September 25, 1992 by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Martin Indyk had this to say: "The current rules of the game should be maintained and there may be circumstances in which one or the other party may try to change the rules of the game, to test the resolve of a new Administration; if it is new, it's that the whole thing will start to come apart if you start playing with that. Other than this issue, differences between them are simply subtle and nuance. Although the Jewish peace camps in the Clinton circles had entertained divergent views on Palestinian rights, the new realities of the Peace process made the pace of the negotiations and the proper U.S role as the major issues in the controversy, a task that hardly offers a serious challenge to Clinton's consensus.

**A Jewish family affair**

For the first time in forty-five years, when Israel was established, consensus building on the Middle East in the official U.S arena has practically become a Jewish family affair. The various constituencies, which invariably included sectors of the church peace community, Afro-Americans, Arab-Americans, the oil lobby and the so-called Arabists, who have traditionally argued for a mere restraint on U.S uncritical support of Israel, are virtually absent. Meanwhile, Clinton's structure and apparatus, which lack people of real stature - say a Kissinger or a Baker - at the foreign policy helm, will enable him to decide which options will become his choices. An important issue, besides the Arab-Israeli negotiations that is bound to make his agenda, relates to domestic versus international priorities. How much involvement, how much aid will the U.S be able to give?

What is quite certain is that Bill Clinton is not a neo-Isolationist; what is less certain is whether he is a neo-realist, like Carter, or a reassertionist, like Reagan and Bush. Despite his personal warmth and conciliatory demeanor, he appeals to conservatives by preaching toughness. "International outlaws" (i.e. Saddam Hussein) were already warned that he would be vigilant but Clinton was elected almost entirely on domestic rather than international issues.

With regard to foreign aid, key congressional leaders indicated recently that reductions in foreign aid, including aid to Israel, are likely to occur in the new future. Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs, Middle East Subcommittee, criticized the "skewed distribution," whereby sixty percent of the total foreign aid goes to Israel, Egypt and Turkey. Stuart Eizenstat, a close Clinton advisor said Israel must learn to wean itself away from $1.2 billion in U.S non-military assistance, and must not take for granted indefinitely the $1.8 billion in military aid. "In the long-run, we are talking about less aid and more trade," he said.

Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee said, however, that while foreign aid will surely be reduced, Israel "will fare well" in the reallocation.

Surely, Mr. Clinton will have an easier time with his constituents reducing foreign aid than cutting social security benefits of American retirees.

This time, however, the uproar which normally accompanies hints or trial balloons regarding aid cuts to Israel, is not expected to surface. For the decision itself will be made largely by Israel's own supporters within the Administration and among the Congressional leadership. And while Israel's aid would be reduced, trade is likely to be enhanced and prepositioning of military equipment would be stepped up. ✪

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# The Anti-Defamation League: Civil rights and wrongs

For decades, the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith has run a private nationwide spy network - a systematic, long-term, professionally organized political espionage operation complete with informers, infiltrates, money laundering, code names, wiretapping, and secret meetings.

While it is not unusual for private political groups to gather information, the ADL spying is different. It is not only the scale which sets it apart - files on 950 organizations and nearly 10,000 individuals - but the focus.

The ADL spied on groups which opposed its stated goals as well as those which supported its principles. More disturbing, however, is the League's collaboration with state, federal, and foreign intelligence gathering entities.

This sharing of often confidential information and resources is not only illegal, but a violation of trust, a threat to civil liberties, and an infringement on the right to privacy.

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) has won a long-standing public reputation as an opponent of anti-Semitism, defender of minority rights, and promoter of racial justice. In January 1993, a less benign dimension of ADL surfaced. San Francisco newspapers broke the story of police officer Tom Gerard, who kept computerized files on thousands of Arab-Americans, 36 Arab organizations, 33 anti-apartheid organizations, 412 "pinko" organizations, 349 right-wing organizations, and 35 skinhead groups.

Gerard worked closely with Roy Bullock, a full-time salaried undercover investigator for ADL for the past 32 years. Bullock's records were even more extensive than Gerard's, with files on 77 Arab organizations, 647 "pinko" and anti-apartheid organizations, 612 right-wing organizations and 27 skinhead groups.

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The spy network to which Gerard and Bullock belonged has headquarters in the ADL's New York office under ADL director of "fact-finding," Irwin Suall, and his deputy, Thomas Halpern. As the League's chief West Coast undercover operative, Bullock maintained numerous contacts with law enforcement and federal officials, recruited informers, and worked with ADL operatives in other cities.

The ADL, which has a $34 million annual budget has openly acknowledged compiling files on "extremist hate groups" and supplying reports on them to law enforcement agencies. Richard Hirschhaut, executive director of the ADL Central Pacific Region, also admitted that "the ADL does keep files on Arab-American groups or individuals who espouse anti-Jewish views or take credit for anti-Jewish acts."

Bullock's and Gerard's files, however, revealed massive ADL operations directed not only against right-wing extremists and anti-Semitic groups, but also hundreds of mainstream and progressive groups. Included among the minority, anti-apartheid, ethnic, peace, religious, human rights, and other organizations and individuals - many of which ADL should have regarded as allies in the struggle against racism and bigotry - were the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), National Lawyers Guild, NAACP, Rainbow Coalition, Greenpeace, Mother Jones, Jews for Jesus, Americans for Peace Now, Irish Northern Aid, Asian Law Caucus, ACT UP, United Auto Workers, the board of directors of public television station KQED, the Department of Black Studies at San Francisco State University, Los Angeles Times South Africa correspondent Scott Kraft, Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Cal.), House Armed Services Committee Chair Rep. Ron Dellums (D-Cal.), and former Representative Pete McCloskey.

Also named in the files were thou-

sands of Arab-Americans, many who fear their names were passed on to Israeli intelligence agencies, potentially placing them in danger. ADL has frequent and close contact with Israeli officials, and despite repeated denials, has been linked to Mossad. Allready, one Arab-American, a U.S. citizen included in Bullock's computer files, has been arrested by Israeli authorities when he returned to the Occupied Territories.

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**Gerard, Bullock, and the ADL spy network**

In mid-January the *San Francisco Examiner* began a series of front-page stories revealing that SFPD officer Tom Gerard was secretly supplying confidential data on thousands of people to an agent of the ADL. On December 10, 1992, the news report disclosed, authorities had executed search warrants on Gerard's home, that of ADL operative Roy Bullock, and on the San Francisco and Los Angeles offices of ADL. The news hit the Bay area like a bombshell. In fact, Bullock and Gerard had been under FBI investigation for more than two years for selling information about anti-apartheid activists to South African government agents.

Gerard, 50, had been a member of the SFPD since 1986. He claims that from 1982—85, he took a three-year leave of absence to serve with the CIA in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala as a bomb expert.

After returning to the SFPD, where he served as liaison to the FBI, Gerard approached the Bay area chapter of the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC). He offered to liaise between the Arab-American community and the Police Department and to help with security at ADC public functions.

His collaborator Roy Bullock, a small-time San Francisco art dealer, had provided information on an unpaid basis to the FBI. Bullock's investigations for the ADL went back as far as 1954 in Indianapolis. In 1960, he moved to southern California and began working for the ADL, which forwarded copies of his written reports to its New York headquarters. Around 1979, Bullock moved to San Francisco where, in 1985, local ADL head Richard Hirschhaut introduced him to Gerard, and the two men began to investigate both right-and-left-wing groups in the Bay area.

One of Bullock's chief assignments in San Francisco was to spy on Arab-American organizations and individuals, especially the ADC, which he joined in March 1983. He was removed from the membership rolls in July 1987, after it was discovered that he was an ADL agent.

**Police search Gerard, Bullock, and ADL offices**

By October 1992, Gerard and Bullock were about to lose their covers as the FBI passed its intelligence about the two to the SFPD and the story began to leak out.

Gerard fled to a house he had been building on a remote island in the Philippines, which has no extradition treaty with the U.S.

Before leaving, however, he neglected to erase his computer files. When authorities searched his houseboat during the December 10 raids, they found 7,011 files on individuals, including extensive files on San Francisco's Arab-American community and Arab-American activists around the U.S. Some information originated with law enforcement agencies across the country and centered on fundraising for Palestinian groups. One file listed members of the Palestinian Arab Fund, a registered charity with 11 chapters in California and other states. Unidentified people alleged that they saw organization charts on U.S. Arab-American groups, transcripts of secret tape recordings of their meetings, and photos of pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Gerard's files.

While Gerard granted interviews from his safe haven in the Philippines, the ADL and Bullock stonewalled. ADL said that it had consented to the December 10 search of its San Francisco and Los Angeles offices and had been advised that it was not the target of the investigation. It declared itself merely a civil rights organization that collected information about "anti-Semites, racists and extremists from many sources." A spokesperson declined to reveal ADL's sources and information collection methods and claimed that no information went to Israel; as far as Gerard was concerned, "the relationship we [ADL] had with him," said Richard Hirschhaut, "was the same as with thousands of police

officers around the country."

Bullock also claimed he had operated within the law and that his computer files were legally obtained. In addition to those on the 950 organizations, police found files on 9,876 individuals. Bullock had been paid during his 32-year employment at the ADL indirectly through prominent Los Angeles attorney Bruce Hochman, and received approximately $170,000 over a five-year period ending in 1993. By going through Hochman, both Bullock and the ADL sought to portray Bullock as a self-employed individual only one of whose clients was the ADL. As of May 1993, ADL was continuing to pay Bullock $550 a week because he was "damn good."

When the extent of the Gerard-Bullock-ADL spy operation began to emerge, ADL launched an extensive public damage control effort. ADL attorney and executive committee member Barbara Wahl set the stage for distancing her organization from the illegal operation. Bullock, she asserted, was operating as an "independent contractor."

"He's never been instructed nor did we condone the breaking of the law. ...We don't know if he did... [and] have no knowledge of him going through the trash of target groups."

The distance closed when many of the files seized from Bullock's home turned out to be the same as those in the ADL offices. ADL's credibility vanished when, after months of ADL denials, Wahl admitted the League had gathered information and passed it on to Israel. She rejected connections with other foreign governments, presumably including South Africa. But she did not explain why the Los Angeles ADL offices had files on anti-apartheid activities and activists, dating back to the 1950s. An FBI report confirmed that Gerard and Bullock gave information to the South Africans.

"The scandal," notes Daniel Levitas, former executive director of the Atlanta-based Center for Democratic Renewal, "...has completely tainted the ADL's credibility and reputation with regard to objectivity." It may also land some people in jail. The League faces criminal prosecution on up to 48 felony counts including gaining illegal access to police computers. Journalist Robert Friedman quotes a source saying that indictment is "99 percent certain."

On May 6, Gerard suddenly and surprisingly returned to San Francisco where he was arrested and booked on eight counts of stealing government documents and one count each of computer theft, burglary, and conspiracy. He said he returned because he was afraid the CIA had put out a contract on him and though he would be safer in the U.S. He was released on $20,000 bail.

While Bullock, Gerard, and the ADL ran for cover and tried to off-load responsibility on each other, the media relegated the targets of the secret surveillance to being merely bit players. Meanwhile under an extensive ADL spin control campaign, the story is being treated as an exotic spy thriller rather than the serious erosion of personal political freedoms and invasion of privacy that it is.

**ADL's mission**

ADL's vehement support for SFPD surveillance operations was an ironic betrayal of its original principles. The League's 1913 founding charter defined its mission to oppose "the defamation of the Jewish People" and asserted that "its ultimate purpose is to secure justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike." Over the years, the League won widespread respect for its active support of civil rights and its vigorous opposition to racist segregation and white supremacy groups.

The gradual undermining of that broad mission is linked to both internal and external factors. From its very inception ADL sought acceptance by, and alliance with, those in power. It regarded "good working relationships" with the law enforcement community as pivotal. Toward this end, ADL has openly participated in seminars and informational programs and worked cooperatively with federal, regional, state, and local law enforcement officials. That close relationship facilitated Gerard's and Bullock's crimes.

External factors also precipitated ADL's violation of its original principles: The post-World War II Cold War struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; and the creation in 1948 of an independent Jewish state dependent on Western, especially U.S., support.

On the first score, the U.S. government saw radical domestic movements, particularly the Communist Party, as a major subversive threat to national security. ADL's first known involvement in the resultant repression of leftists came to light in hearings before a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives in October 1947. The hearings investigated the authority of the Civil Service Commission to compile an "investigators' leads file" containing "facts, rumor and gossip bearing upon the views, opinions, and acts of individuals who were neither federal employees nor applicants for positions coming under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission." The result, charged Subcommittee Chair Clare E. Hoffman (R-Mich.), would be "a most admirable smear list" based on "hearsay." Hoffman indicated that the source of much of the information on alleged subversives was the American Jewish Committee and the ADL.

Rep. Fred Bushby (R-Ill.) pressed Civil Service Commissioner Arthur S. Flemming:

Busby: Do you have any knowledge as to who in your organization contacts the Anti-Defamation League... and checks their files, and how often they go to their offices and check their files for leads for your files?

Flemming: I do not know, and I do not have such information.

Busby: How does this information get into your files, then?

Flemming: There may be some contacts. In some instances it may be publications.

No matter how the government obtained the files, it is clear that, as far back as 1947, ADL had been collecting names of alleged subversives which were used in anti-communist repressions.

Spying extended to leaders of the civil rights movement in the 1960s. Henry Schwartzchild, who worked in the ADL publications department between 1962 and 1964, reported that the ADL had spied on the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. on behalf of the FBI.

**Redefining anti-semitism**

The founding of the State of Israel and, even more so, the 1967 Middle East War changed ADL's view of its mission. Prior to World War II, the League focused on domestic issues and "historically distanced itself from the issues of Israel and Zionism." Until 1967, it supported Israel without making that country central to ADL policy or Jewish identity. Then, ADL philosophy became: "Anti-Zionism equals anti-Semitism," i.e., "criticism of Israel reflects insensitivity to American Jews and constitutes a form of anti-Semitism.

This change in mission sparked internal opposition. Raul E. Joftes had been an officer of B'nai B'rith, ADL's parent organization, for 25 years. After he was fired as Executive Secretary of the International Council of the B'nai B'rith in 1970, he lamented that B'nai B'rith "has become an international organization engaged in other things besides charitable, religious, and educational activities. It is no longer nonprofit. It engages in international politics and more often than not does the bidding of the Government of Israel. Its leaders make frequent trips to Israel for indoctrination and instructions. I had tried to prevent this change... [I have resisted] attempts by Israeli Zionists to dictate B'nai B'rith policy."

**The Anti-Defamation League for many years has maintained a very important, confidential investigative coverage of Arab activities and propaganda.**

Among the documents attached to the Joftes affidavit was a letter from ADL National Director Benjamin R. Epstein to Joftes:

"As you know, the Anti-Defamation League for many years has maintained a very important, confidential investigative coverage of Arab activities and propaganda. ... Our information, in addition to being essential for our own operations, has been of great value and service to both the U.S. State Department and the Israeli Government. All data have been made available to both countries with full knowledge of each that we were the source."

**Targeting critics of Israel and Arab-Americans**

As part of its goal of promoting Israeli interests, the ADL has long sought to undermine support in the U.S. for Palestinian and Arab rights. It has labeled Arab-American and pro-Arab groups as either a "mouthpiece of the PLO" or in the pay of petro-dollar governments.

Critics of Israeli policy, including Noam Chomsky, were targeted for investigation. The MIT professor's 150-page dossier included articles, letters, and statements by and about him. Chomsky concluded that his talks are regularly monitored and that ADL used its files in a "coordinated effort to discredit or counter" critics of Israeli policies.

In November 1983, the ADL circulated to many campus Jewish leaders a secret list of campus groups and of academics and other professionals involved in Middle East studies. Stamped "Confidential," the blacklist was accompanied by a letter from ADL New England Director Leonard Zakim denouncing their contribution to the "alarming increase in anti-Semitic incidents and anti-Israel propaganda." On November 30, 1984, the Middle East Studies Association passed a resolution protesting the "creation, storage or dissemination of blacklists, enemy lists or surveys that call for boycotting individuals or for intimidating scholars.

Jeffrey Ross, the League's National Director of Campus Affairs, called the list "an unfortunate incident that would not be repeated," but reaffirmed ADL's commitment to collect and disseminate information on anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist activities.

More worrisome to Arab-Americans was the revelation in the 1970s that ADL was collecting data on Arab-American political activity and pro-

viding it to the FBI on a regular basis. Moreover, according to a former high Israeli intelligence official, the U.S. and Israel regularly traded information on Arabs, including U.S. citizens living in the U.S.

This collaboration continues and has resulted in harassment of Arab-Americans. After the ADL provided information to the federal authorities on seven Palestinian men and one Kenyan woman living in California, the targets were rounded up in dragnet arrests and charged with violating the McCarran-Walter provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act or other technical violations of their immigration status. While this case generated a considerable amount of media criticism of the government's attempts to use the immigration law for political purposes, very little appeared about the ADL's role in the case.

**Israel and the ADL mission**

The disclosure of Bullock's and Gerard's secret files, dramatic as it is, simply spotlights ADL's well-established pattern of information gathering. This case provides indisputable evidence of ADL's inappropriate relations with official intelligence and police organizations.

The San Francisco revelations have galvanized public outrage. Many individuals and groups are demanding the release of all files and a full and impartial investigation of possible criminal wrongdoing. Activists attending packed meetings of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors and the Police Commission suspect that the SFPD has been consistently flouting its own guidelines by conducting or abetting illegal spying.

Ninety organizations have asked the National Lawyers Guild (also a target of the spying) to obtain their files. A group of 19 people and groups opposed to apartheid or Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories have launched a class action suit charging Gerard, Bullock, Hirschhaut, and the ADL with violating California laws by collecting and disseminating confidential information.

Arab-American groups are working particularly hard to bring the case to national attention and to challenge the SFPD to conduct a vigorous investigation. Hundreds of individuals have sent in notarized requests for their files. Many more around the country are trying to determine if their local police department exchanged information with the ADL on Arab-Americans in their communities.

**Never before has the close collaboration of a private political spy network with regular law enforcement officials been exposed to the degree that it has here. The implications are enormous.**

The targeted groups are concerned that political considerations and hardball public relations efforts by the ADL will force San Francisco law enforcement officials to downplay criminal wrongdoing by the ADL.

Never before has the close collaboration of a private political spy network with regular law enforcement officials been exposed to the degree that it has here. The implications are enormous. Many individuals and organizations have given support to ADL and what it purported to stand for: combating racism and religious hatred and sensitizing Americans to discrimination.

These same groups now find that they were targets of ADL spying and that by supporting ADL, they were, in effect, supporting secret surveillance on themselves. ADL's cooperation with federal, state, and local police agencies which spied on progressives has damaged hopes for a broad-based civil rights coalition and agenda.

Because of their past experience with ADL on Palestinian and Arab-American issues, Arab-Americans especially have reacted with fear and distrust.

ADL's response has been to defend its methods, downplay its role, and lash out against its critics. When ADL National Director Abraham Foxman went on a damage control tour of West Coast media offices and Jewish organizations, he denounced ADL critics as "anti-Semitic, undemocratic, and anti-American ... bastards."

In light of consistent stonewalling and attacks, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect ADL to acknowledge officially and forthrightly its wrongdoing, to confine future information gathering to legitimate areas, and to end its dissemination of information on Arab-Americans and others.

What is required then is a carefully thought out and organized program of informational campaigns, lawsuits, organized public pressure, and condemnation from leaders of all sectors of society to place offenders on notice. The abuses of private-public political surveillance will not be tolerated. This effort is a challenge that faces Arab-Americans, anti-apartheid activists, and progressives. It is also a challenge for those ADL members and supporters who believe that the ADL mission does not include political spying. ✪

**Attorney and Vice Chairman of Arab-American Anti-descrimination Committee (ADC)*

# Legal opinion (fatwa) of Al-Azhar on the Zionist entity

The Committee of Legal Opinion of Al-Azhar Mosque convened on Sunday, 8 Jumada I, (January 1st, 1956), presided by His Eminence Sheikh Hasanein Muhammad Makhlouf, member of The Group of Grand Scholars and former Grand Mufti of Egypt, and attended by their eminence Sheikh Isa Manoun, member of the Group of Grand Scholars and former Sheikh of the Sharia' college (Shafii school); Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltout, member of the Group of Grand Scholars (Hanafi school); Sheikh Muhammad at-Tanikhi, member of the Group of Grand Scholars and Director of Teaching and Guidance (Maliki school); and Sheikh Muhammad Abdul-Latif as-Subki, member of the Group of Grand Scholars and Director of Investigation at al-Azhar (Hanbali school). Also present was Sheikh Zakariyya al-Bari, Secretary of al-Fatwa (legal opinion).

The Committee looked into the following request for a formal legal opinion, and issued the following:

Praise be to God, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the Worlds; prayers and peace be upon the Leader of the Apostles, our Prophet Muhammad, and all his family and companions.

Now, the Committee of Legal Opinion of Honorable al-Azhar looked into the request submitted to it for giving a formal legal opinion with respect to the ruling of the Islamic Law on concluding a peace agreement with Israel; Israel which usurped Palestine from its people, expelled them from their homes, dispersed them - women, children, aged and young - all over the globe, robbed them of their properties, committed the most abominable sins against the places of prayer, the Islamic Holy relics and shrines; and with respect to the ruling on establishing friendship and co-operation with the imperialist powers which backed Israel, and still is, in this sinful aggression, supplied it with political and material support so as to establish a Jewish state in this Islamic country and amidst Islamic states; with respect to the ruling on alliances called for by the imperialist states which aim, amongst other things, at enabling Israel to survive on the land of Palestine in order to implement the imperialist policy; with respect to the duty of the Muslims toward Palestine and restoring it to its people; with respect to the plans through which Israel, backed by the imperialist states, is trying to expand its lot and bring immigrants thereto to reinforce its entity and its dominance and, eventually, tighten its grip around the throat of its neighbors and mount its threat to them in order to annihilate them.

The Committee substantiates that peace with Israel - as is sought by those who are advocating it - is lawfully forbidden because it involves confirmation of the perpetuity of the usurper's forcible confiscation, recognition of his entitlement to what they usurped and enabling the aggressor to persist with their aggression. All divine and civil laws rule that usurpation is forbidden, that the thing usurped must be returned to its rightful owners and urge the latter to defend and pursue their right. The honorable Sunna says: "Whoever is killed in the cause of the pursuance of his property is a martyr." It also says: "The possessor is accountable to what he has taken until it is returned." Hence, it is not permissible for the Muslims to make peace with those Jews who usurped the land of Palestine, assaulted its people and robbed them of their properties; it is not permissible in any way which would enable the Jews to stay as a state on this holy Islamic land. All, with their different tongues, colors and ethnic origins, should cooperate to restore this land to its people, to protect the Farthest Mosque, the cradle of Islam and the place of prayer of the prophet - whose precincts God (Glory to Him) did bless, to protect the Islamic relics and shrines from those usurpers, to supply the fighters with arms and other means of strength to fight in this cause, and to spare no effort for purifying the country of the traces of those aggressive oppressors. God (Glory to Him) says: *"Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of God and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but who God doth know."* (8:60)

And whoever neglects this, squanders it, leaves the Muslims in the lurch with respect to it, calls for whatever causes disagreement and disunity or enables the imperialist states and Zionism to implement their plans against the Arabs and Islam and against this Arab Islamic country, is according to Islam, parting with the Muslims and committing the gravest

sin. Why shouldn't it be so since all people know that Jews, ever since the Message and up till now, have inexorably conspired against Islam, its people and its homeland; and they do not intend to be satisfied with the extent of assaulting Palestine and the Farthest Mosque, but their contemplated plans aim at appropriating the Islamic countries extending from the Nile to the Euphrates. If all the Muslims, within the Islamic framework, are an indivisible unity with respect to the defense of the faith of Islam, then the religious law rules that they must unite to repulse this danger, defend the country and salvage if from the hands of the usurpers. God (Glory to Him) says: *"And hold fast, all together, by the rope which God (stretches out for you), and be not divided among yourselves."* (3:103)

**If all the Muslims, within the Islamic framework, are an indivisible unity with respect to the defense of the faith of Islam, then the religious law rules that they must unite to repulse this danger, defend the country and salvage if from the hands of the usurpers.**

And God (Glory to Him) also says: *"God hath purchased of the believers their persons and their goods; for this (in return) is the garden (of paradise); they fight in His Cause, and slay and are slain; a promise binding on Him in truth, through the Torah, the Gospel and the Qur'an. And who is more faithful to his Covenant than God. Then rejoice in the bargain which ye have concluded; that is the achievement supreme."* (9:111) Glory to Him also says: *"Those who believe fight in the cause of God, and those who reject faith fight in the cause of evil. So fight ye against the friends of Satan feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan."* (4:76)

On the other hand, cooperation with the states which support this oppressive band, supply it with money and arms and enable it to stay in Palestine is lawfully forbidden, because it involves helping it continue with this oppression and backing its aggressive stand against Islam and the countries of Islam. God (Glory to Him) says: *"God only forbids you, with regard to those who fight you for (your) faith, and drive you out of your homes, and support (others) in driving you out, from turning to them (for friendship and protection). It is such as turn to them (in these circumstances), that do wrong."* (60:8)

Glory to Him also says: *"Thou will not find any people who believe in God and the Last Day, Loving those who resist God and His Apostle, even though they were their fathers or their sons, or their brothers, or their kindred. For such He has written faith in their hearts, and strengthened them with a spirit from himself. And He will admit them to Gardens beneath which rivers flow, to dwell therein (forever). God will be well pleased with them, and they with Him. They are the party of God. Truly it is the Party of God that will achieve Felicity."* (58:22)

God (Glorious and Great) instated together in one single verse all that man imagined with respect to motives of care for relatives, acquaintances and trade which he fears lest it should decline as a result of boycotting the enemies; and He warned the believers of allowing such motives to have any effect whatsoever on them and of making them an excuse for supporting the enemies. God (Glorious and Great) says: *"Say: If it be that your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your mates, or your kindred; the wealth that ye have gained; the commerce in which ye fear a decline; or the dwellings in which ye delight - are dearer to you than God, or His Apostle, or the striving in His Cause; then wait until God brings about His Decision; and God guides not the rebellious."* (9:24)

There is no doubt that dealing with the enemies and turning to them for friendship is just like supplying them with what strengthens them and makes them gain a foothold, by word and thought, by arms and power - in secret and in public - directly and indirectly. The Muslim, regardless of the excuses and justifications he imagines, is forbidden from doing all this. Accordingly, it is understood that these alliances which the imperialist states call for and try hard to have them concluded amongst the Islamic states for creating strife and disagreement amongst them, gaining foothold in the Islamic countries and carrying on with implementing their plans against the peoples thereof, is forbidden; and no Islamic state should acquiesce to them or take part in them, because they involve grave danger to Islamic countries, especially Palestine, the martyr, which these imperialist states handed over to oppressive Zionism in defiance of Islam and its peoples along with their endeavor to establish for themselves a state amidst the Islamic countries to serve as a barracks for implementing their imperialist ambitions that are detrimental to the Muslims, themselves, their properties and their homes. Such alliances are at the same time one of the strongest manifestations of clientage, which is forbidden by Islamic Law and about which God (Glorious and Great) says: *"And he amongst you that turns to them (for friendship) is of them."* (5:51)

The Glorious Qur'an points out that befriending the enemies is nothing but the result of a disease that afflicts the hearts and drives the af-

flicted to this submissiveness which becomes apparent by befriending them. God (Glorious and Great) says: *"Those in whose hearts is a disease thou seest how eagerly they run about amongst them, saying; we do fear lest a change of fortune bring us disaster. Ah! Perhaps God will give (thee) victory, or a decision according to His Will. Then will they repent of the thoughts which they secretly harbored in their hearts."* (5:52)

The Glorious Qur'an also forbids the Muslims, as a principle of law, from enabling Israel, together with the imperialist countries which supported it and guaranteed its protection and perpetual existence, to implement these plans which only seek to flourish the Jewish state and make it prosper with a fertile land so as to defy the Arabs and Islam in its dearest home, do the worst mischief in the country and intrigue against the Muslims in their countries.

The Muslims must prevent with all their power the implementation of these plans, and line together in one row to defend the territory of Islam and foil these awful conspiracies, at the head of which stand these detrimental plans. Whoever neglects this, helps in implementing these plans or adopts a passive attitude toward them commits the most heinous sin.

The Muslim ought to pursue the plan of the Prophet (PBUH) and follow his footsteps, which is the straight path, in his stand against the people of Mecca and their oppression after they drove him and his companions (God bless them all) out of their homes; robbed them of their possessions, prevented them from practicing their religious ceremonies and disgraced the Sacred House (Kaa'bah) by worshipping idols and images. God (Glorious and Great) ordered the Prophet to prepare himself to rescue His house from the hands of the aggressors and to tighten their living circumstances by which they aback themselves. The Prophet (PBUH) set out blockading their economies upon which they depended until wars broke out between him and them. Fighting continued between the army of Guidance and the armies of Falsehood until God completed His favor upon him and made Mecca, which was a fortress for pagans, be conquered at his hands, thus salvaging the weak men, women and youngsters and purified the House of God from the abomination of the idols and disarmed paganism and tyranny.

**One of the principles of Islam is fighting all wrong that causes detriment to people and country.**

How similar the two transgressions are, with a difference that has to be considered, that Mecca was a country shared by both the Believers and the pagans, a home for them all, unlike the land of Palestine which belongs to the Muslims alone with the Jews having no rule, no state there in. Despite this, God willed that Truth shall be proclaimed in Mecca and the falsehood shall be perished, that Mecca shall return to the Believers and that paganism and pagans shall be crushed; God ordered His Prophet (PBUH) to fight the aggressors, God says: *"And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out;"* (2:191)

He briefed the Muslims about counter-transgression by saying: *"If then anyone transgresses the prohibition against you, transgress ye likewise against him."* (2:194)

One of the principles of Islam is fighting all wrong that causes detriment to people and country. If the removal thereof, is a must under all circumstances, it is more compelling and committing with respect to this particular transgression.

This is so, because the transgression of these transgressors did not terminate at driving the Muslims out of their homes, robbing them of their possessions and dispersing them all over the globe, but also assaulted holy places which are sanctified by all divine religions, namely, mosques and places of worship. God says: *"And who is more unjust than he who forbids that in places for the worship of God, God's name should be celebrated whose zeal is (in fact) to ruin them. It was not fitting that such should themselves enter them except in fear. For them there is nothing but disgrace in this world, and in the world to come, an exceeding torment."* (2:114)

Now then, this is the ruling of Islam on the Question of Palestine, on Israel and its supporters of the imperialist states and others, on the plans which they are after in order to mount up Israel's welfare and on the duty of the Muslims in this respect.

This is a ruling which the committee of legal Opinion of Honorable al-Azhar clarifies and calls on all the Muslims to hold fast together by the strong rope of God (Glorious and Great) and to assume power with respect to all that furthers their grandeur and dignity, and assess the consequences of weakness and of reposing before the oppression of the oppressors, the conspiracies of the conspirators, and to agree amongst themselves on undertaking the truth of God and the truth of the coming generations, in honor of their straight and true religion. ✪

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# Statement of North American Muslim organizations concerning "Gaza-Jericho Agreement"

*"Glory be to the One who took his servant on a journey by night from al-Masjid al-Haram to al-Masjid al-Aqsa whose precincts We have blessed."*
(Qur'an Surah Isra', Verse 1)

September 17, 1993

As Muslims of North America, we feel it is necessary to clarify some important points concerning the "Gaza-Jericho Agreement" which was recently signed in Washington. Masjid al-Aqsa is the first Qibla of the Muslim Ummah and the third holiest place on earth. For all Muslims its loss has been one of the most painful events in modern history. Palestine, the land of the prophets and divine revelations, the land of Isra' and Mi'raj, the land mentioned in the Qur'an numerous times as being especially blessed has in the past century witnessed tragedy, bloodshed, war, oppression and occupation. Striving for the implementation of freedom, equality, and justice in Palestine, we call upon all just-minded individuals and organizations to stand with us in speaking out against oppression and defending these international principles and norms.

Islam is a religion of peace and Jerusalem is the city of peace. It is for this reason that we welcome any step which leads toward a just peace. We remind all those opposed to the search for an Islamic solution that throughout the centuries of Islamic rule, Christians and Jews found in the Islamic lands refuge and peace from the arbitrariness and excessiveness of various European rulers. Historically, whatever lands have been ruled by Islam have provided refuge to those fleeing from religious persecution and intolerance elsewhere.

As Muslims, we yearn and strive for peace, freedom and justice and it is in fact for this reason that we are so concerned about the "Gaza-Jericho Agreement" which we fear will only lead to more bloodshed while institutionalizing oppression and injustice. The agreement allows for the continuation of Jewish settlement construction throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip where more than half the land has already been confiscated by the occupation authorities, does not address the refugee problem and says nothing about Jerusalem. The plan may devise the Palestinian police to serve the interests of the occupation authorities and suppress legitimate resistance to that occupation. Rather than guaranteeing the Palestinians statehood, recognizing their right to self-determination, or even recognizing the fact that Israel is in occupation of Palestinian lands, the agreement only allows for limited Palestinians self-rule provisions in the areas of education, health, taxation, and tourism.

The most tragic aspect of the agreement is that it seems to confirm the perpetuity of the usurper's forcible confiscation of land and the recognition of his entitlement to what he usurped. The establishment by force, violence and terrorism of a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948 as well as the expansion of that state in succeeding years involved the unjust and illegal usurpation of Muslim and Christian lands and rights. The fact that usurpation took place in the blessed land of Masjid al-Aqsa increased the gravity of the crime while simultaneously increasing our responsibility to work to overturn the injustice. To recognize the legitimacy of that crime is a crime in itself and any agreement which involves such recognition is unjust and untenable. The League of Ulama in Palestine declared on Sept. 14, 1993 that no one has the authority to concede the rights of the Islamic Ummah in Palestine.

With this in mind, we assert that the recognition of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands by a faction within a Palestinian group is meaningless. First of all, that same faction has for months rebuffed all attempts to hold a dialogue in which all prominent groups and personalities could come together to mutually agree on a mechanism in which a legitimate and popular Palestinian leadership could be formed and a decision making procedure could be established. For this reason and due to the secret nature in which the "Gaza-Jericho Agreement" was arrived at without any recourse to consulting, informing or even seeking the opinions of the wider Palestinian population, the agreement is limited to those who signed it and does not even represent the approval of the Palestinian people much less the wider Muslim population for whom the future of Masjid al-Aqsa

and Palestine is a primary concern.

A peaceful solution to the problem of Palestine requires a change in the racist, chauvinistic, and militaristic nature and attitude of the current regime. Until the imposition of the Zionist entity in Palestine, the Jewish people had always been welcome in Muslim lands, and the cultural and intellectual Golden Age of Jewish history and experience occurred under Muslim rule. After a true and just peace is found in the blessed land of Palestine, no one should be forced to leave or give up his rights. A lasting peace requires justice. It is this peace that we strive for. ✪

*Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP), Islamic Association for Palestine in North America (IAP), Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA), Muslim Students' Association in U.S. and Canada (MSA), International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO), Islamic Affairs Council (IPAC), Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), Islamic Center of Southern California, Imam Jamil Abdullah al-Amin.*


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

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

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# Text of the Declaration of Principle of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement

*Following is the text of the agreement on Palestinian self-rule approved by the Israeli Cabinet. The original text, in English, was provided to the Associated Press by Yediot Ahronot, an Israeli newspaper that printed a Hebrew translation. In the preamble the term "representative of Palestinian people" was later replaced by the "Palestinian Liberation Organization."*

**Preamble**

The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization representing the Palestinian people agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles.

**Article I**
**Aim of the negotiations**

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council, (the "Council") for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

**Article II**
**Framework for the interim period**

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

**Article III**
**Elections**

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will insure public order.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

**Article IV**
**Jurisdiction**

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for Issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

**Article V**
**Transitional period and permanent status negotiations**

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.

3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

**Article VI**
**Preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities**

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jeri-

cho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

**Article VII**
**Interim agreement**

1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement").

2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.

3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.

4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, and Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

**Article VIII**
**Public order and security**

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

**Article IX**
**Laws and military orders**

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.

2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

**Article X**
**Joint Israeli-Palestinian liaison committee**

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli - Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

**Article XI**
**Israeli - Palestinian cooperation in economic fields**

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli - Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

**Article XII**
**Liaison and cooperation with Jordan and Egypt**

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on one hand, and the Government of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and

disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

**Article XIII**
**Redpoyment of Israeli forces**

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a re-deployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

2. In re-deploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.

3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

**Article XIV**
**Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area**

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

**Article XV**
**Resolution of disputes**

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through reconciliation. To this end, on the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

**Article XVI**
**Israeli-Palestinian cooperation concerning regional programs**

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshal plan," the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

**Article XVII**
**Miscellaneous provisions**

1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.

2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

**Annex I**
**Protocol on the mode and conditions of elections**

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.

2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:

a. The system of election,
b. The mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition, and
c. Rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.

3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

**Annex II**
**Protocol on withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area**

1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

3. The above agreement will include, among other things:

a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.

b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in

these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.

c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.

d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.

e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian - Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.

f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.

g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:

a. Gaza - Egypt
b. Jericho - Jordan

5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Annex VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

**Annex III**
**Protocol on Israeli - Palestinian cooperation in economic and development programs**

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli - Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This program may also provide for the construction of a petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.

6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related.

7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian - Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.

8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.

9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training

centers, research institutes and data banks.

10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.

12. Any other programs of mutual interest.

**Annex IV**
**Protocol on Israeli - Palestinian cooperation concerning regional development programs**

1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a development program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:

a. An Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
b. A Regional Economic Development Program.

A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements:

1. A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.

2. A Small and Medium Business Development Plan.

3. An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.)

4. A Human Resources Plan.

5. Other programs.

B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:

1. The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.

2. The development of a joint Israeli - Palestinian - Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

3. The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza)-Dead Sea Canal.

4. Regional Desalinization and other water development projects.

5. A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification.

6. Interconnection of electricity grids.

7. Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.

8. A Regional Tourism. Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.

9. Regional cooperation in other spheres.

C. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards its success. The two parties will encourage inter-sessional activities, as well as prefeasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

**Agreed minutes to the Declaration of Principles on interim self-government arrangements**

A. General Understandings and Agreements

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these agreed minutes below.

B. Specific Understandings and Agreements

It is understood that:

1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, Settlements, military locations, and Israelis.

2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

**Article VI (2)**

It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:

1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the Names of the authorized Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: Education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism and any other authorities agreed upon.

2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be

affected.

3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.

4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

**Article VII (2)**

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

**Article VII (5)**

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

**Article VIII**

It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the interim Agreement.

**Article X**

It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee.

It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

**Annex II**

It is understood that, subsequent to its withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. ✪


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


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


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# The letters by Arafat and Rabin

*Following are letters from Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst of Norway and from Mr. Rabin to Mr. Arafat.*



**Arafat to Rabin**
September 9, 1993
Mr. Prime Minister,

The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following P.L.O commitments:

The P.L.O recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.

The P.L.O accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The P.L.O commits itself to the Middle East peace process and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.

The P.L.O considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the P.L.O renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all P.L.O elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.

In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the P.L.O affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the P.L.O undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

Sincerely,
Yasir Arafat
*Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organization*

**Rabin to Arafat**
September 10, 1993
Mr. Chairman,

In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that in light of the P.L.O commitments included in your letter the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the P.L.O as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the P.L.O within the Middle East peace process.

Yitzhak Rabin
*Prime Minister of Israel*

**Arafat to Holst**
(Apromise to end the Intifada)
September 9, 1993
Dear Minister Holst,

I would like to confirm to you that upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles I will include the following positions in my public statements:

In light of the new era marked by the signing of the Declaration of Principles the P.L.O encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation.

Sincerely,
Yasir Arafat
*Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organization*

# Minutes of Arafat-Rabin meeting in Cairo

*On October 12, 1993 the Israeli Radio broadcasted the details of the Arafat-Rabin talks on October 6, 1993 in Cairo. The following excerpts represent the true nature of the Gaza-Jericho first agreement and is a likely indicator of the future directions of the negotiations.*

**Rabin**: I have information that there is a strong opposition to the agreement inside the PLO including even Fatah. This information is very troublesome and that's why I called for this meeting.

**Arafat**: I don't deny that there is opposition, but it's ineffective. I'm personally not worried at all. I will handle the situation in my own way. I understand the opposition and I have the necessary means needed to deal with the situation.

**Rabin**: There is an important matter; it's the announcements you give continuously concerning united Jerusalem, the capital of the state of Israel. To us Jerusalem would stay united and will never be divided, it's the capital of Israel.

**Arafat**: But we agreed to postpone the discussion on Jerusalem to a later stage since it's part of the permanent status negotiations.

**Rabin**: I did not promise any concessions on Jerusalem; it's the capital of the Jewish people and it will stay as such forever.

**Arafat**: But our people also look at Jerusalem as the capital of its independent Palestinian state.

**Rabin**: You know very well that there will be no independent state. And as long as there will not be any state there will not also be any capital. We have discussed this issue extensively in the past and we have reached points of mutual understanding.

**Arafat**: But our people are aspiring to the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

**Rabin**: Your people could continue living without an independent state. I think that you in Tunisia must stop talking about these matters. Talks about an independent Palestinian State and Jerusalem cause anger and disgust in our country.

**Arafat**: I understand exactly what you say, and I know what is taking place in Israel, but I can't prevent the Palestinians from talking about the Palestinian State and Jerusalem. You know that these issues are very sensitive.

**Rabin**: It is you and your assistants in Tunisia who give these talks about the State and Jerusalem. I believe that you can stop all that and you ask your aides to stop giving any talks about these sensitive issues you've referred to.

**Arafat**: I'd like to talk about the problem of the Palestinian prisoners. This is a very important problem and people are asking me about the fate of their sons in prisons and I promised them that they will be set free.

**Rabin**: I also want this problem to be solved, and I'm personally concerned so that all prisoners will be out, but it's a very sensitive issue since many have been indicted in killing or injuring Jewish citizens or harming Jewish properties. These people will never be set free. They have been sentenced to many years since they have committed capital crimes and terrorist acts. I believe we have several thousands of those dangerous prisoners.

**Arafat**: Are there about one thousand prisoners from all Palestinian factions?

**Rabin**: There are about four thousand dangerous prisoners. And they will not leave the prisons.

**Arafat**: And when will the other prisoners be out?

**Rabin**: Very soon, a big number will be set free.

**Arafat**: Will they be able to return to their houses in the West Bank and Gaza?

**Rabin**: They will be able to return to their houses, but we want them just to promise that they will be quiet and won't return to terrorist activities.

**Arafat**: I also don't want them to return to armed action, and you should be very secure in that.

**Rabin**: I'll feel secure only when you succeed in controlling the situation in Gaza and Jericho. I think you'll face a great difficulty.

**Arafat**: I promised you before that we will succeed in controlling the situation. Don't forget that we have an army of policemen who have been trained well. This army will preserve security and order.

**Rabin**: I tell you this because if you fail, then the limited self-rule would also fail and we will not negotiate with you anything after that and we will not depend on you.

**Arafat**: Don't worry Mr. Rabin, there will be no problems. I know how to handle the situation, but I hope that you'll free Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, Hamas' Leader. The release of Sheikh Yasin from prison will help our agreement with you and we need to improve our relation with Hamas so we can guarantee stability and calmness in the self-rule areas.

**Rabin: Our position is very clear in this issue. I don't believe that any change will take place neither today nor in the next stage as you said. We will not permit the division of Jerusalem. This will not happen; I will not permit it. It's our capital and will stay as such forever.**

**Rabin**: I said that we will release prisoners but I didnot promise to release the leader of Hamas. I believe it's in our common interest that the Sheikh stays in prison.

**Arafat**: I think I will return to Gaza and Jericho in early next year and my wife Suha will return with me. I have not decided yet where I will stay permanently. I think we will stay in both towns. We will have a house in Gaza and another in Jericho.

**Rabin**: Your return and that of your aides to Gaza and Jericho will not be easy. We will have to discuss this issue in the Cabinet and I'll let you know about the results in time. Mr. Arafat I'd like to emphasize that the comments you give periodically do cause anger and disgust of everyone in the country. I hope that it's plain clear to you that these speeches contradict with the agreement we signed. Jerusalem is the capital of the Jewish people and we will not permit this united city ever to become an Arab capital.

**Arafat**: What do you want us to do? There exists a Palestinian people that look to Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state. I'm personally in a very sensitive situation and you know that.

**Rabin**: But you're talking about the capital of the Jewish people. Our position has been and still is clear concerning this issue; Jerusalem will never be an Arab capital. There will not be an Arab flag over Jerusalem. There will not be an independent state. What I wanted out of this meeting today is to shatter these myths. That is important to us.

**Arafat**: We talked a lot about Jerusalem. Let's leave that topic now, we'll have many coming meetings and we agreed to postpone this issue to the final status. Isn't that so Mr. Rabin?

**Rabin**: Our position is very clear in this issue. I don't believe that any change will take place neither today nor in the next stage as you said. We will not permit the division of Jerusalem. This will not happen; I will not permit it. It's our capital and will stay as such forever.

**Arafat**: And what do you want me to tell my people?

**Rabin**: You could tell them that this city is the capital of the State of Israel and there will not be an independent Palestinian state. Therefore, your people do not need a capital. This means that Jerusalem is united; it will not be an Arab capital and I'm not here to draw for you the borders of the independent Palestinian state.

**Arafat**: It seems to me Mr. Rabin that you're angry and you're speaking nervously which makes it difficult for us to negotiate in a deep, serious and satisfactory way.

**Rabin**: I'm neither angry nor nervous as you claim. I'm talking in a very balanced and calm way. But as I said before I'm here to shatter myths, myths which are dominating you and your aides in Tunisia. There must be someone who can clear these issues for you since your continuous comments represent violation of our agreement and I will not permit that to continue.

**Arafat**: I'll deal with these issues with my way and I could say that we are in total agreement.

**Rabin**: Everytime you claim that you would deal with it with your own way, you don't do anything. You and your assistants in Tunisia claim that Israel agreed to return around one million Palestinians who left the country dur-

ing the six day war and the following years. I don't know where you got this information. I'm the Prime Minister of Israel and I don't know about that. We did not discuss this subject in the government and I did not discuss it with you.

**Arafat**: This subject was discussed between your foreign minister Shimon Peres and Abu Mazen, and I think they agreed on points concerning the return of Palestinians to the West Bank including Jerusalem and to the Gaza Strip. Undoubtedly, you are aware of this.

**Rabin**: No one talked to me about that, and Peres is not authorized to discuss the return of Palestinians who left the country. This is a very important subject and must be discussed in the Cabinet. This is not the time to discuss it. And when we talk about the Palestinians who left the country, we will not permit the return of hundreds of thousands - not even to the self-rule areas. No Israeli government would even permit the return of these huge numbers of Palestinians to the country.

**Rabin: Mr. Arafat, we will permit the return of some to areas in the West Bank and the Strip. But we will not permit the return of any to Jerusalem. If this is a humanitarian issue and it needs a permanent solution, you have the Arab countries.**

**Arafat**: The right of return should also be extended to the Palestinians. There are millions of Palestinians who are living in the diaspora. This is a humanitarian issue in the first place.

**Rabin**: Mr. Arafat, we will permit the return of some to areas in the West Bank and the Strip. But we will not permit the return of any to Jerusalem. If this is a humanitarian issue and it needs a permanent solution, you have the Arab countries. The Palestinians could be settled in these countries or in some of them. If the Arab states are concerned about helping you I don't think they will oppose that. There are 2 million Palestinians or more living in Jordan and there could also be one million Palestinians living in Iraq for instance and I think this issue will be solved later.

**Arafat: Saddam Hussein will not agree to settle the Palestinians in his country and he will say that the Palestinians have a country and they should return to their country.**

**Arafat**: Saddam Hussein will not agree to settle the Palestinians in his country and he will say that the Palestinians have a country and they should return to their country.

**Rabin**: We will permit the return of those who have been deported from the territories, their number will not exceed a few tens of thousands only. I believe this is the best we can offer to you concerning the return of the Palestinians. And for the Palestinians who left the country after the War of Independence (1948), not all of them will be permitted to return. I think these issues have been clarified to you in our talks in Oslo.

**Arafat**: Yes, yes. These issues were discussed in Oslo but we did not reach a final agreement. And I think we must discuss the issue of refugees (1948) and those who left (after 1967) also. The Israeli-Palestinian joint Committees will discuss these issues.

**Rabin**: I don't think so. I'm trying to tell you that there are issues that we look at seriously and it will not be open for talks or discussions. Maybe financial compensations could be given to all those who will not be permitted to return to the country; you should try to help me so there will not be a serious crisis which could lead to the collapse of almost everything.

**Arafat**: I'm trying to help you, and you know Mr. Rabin my position very well. We have reached an agreement and we signed it. We will not retreat and we, in the leadership of the PLO, are looking forward to good relations with you, relations of permanent peace. We have recognized— we the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people—the state of Israel and its right to live within secure borders.

**Rabin**: I'm happy to hear these words Mr. Arafat. I believe that our relations with you will be good. Indeed it will be good and we will work together for the interest of our peoples. We should know that this agreement is an agreement that must succeed and stay, especially that there are many who are looking forward to see it fail.

**Arafat**: We are also committed to what we have signed and I'll prove that we respect our commitments and pledges and that we respect our word.

**Rabin**: I hope so sir. ✪

# Articles in the Palestine National Covenant* promised by Arafat to be invalid and inoperative in his letter to Rabin

Article 2 Palestine, within the frontiers that existed under the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 9 Armed struggle is the only way of liberating Palestine, and is thus strategic, not tactical. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm their determination to carry on the armed struggle and to press on towards popular revolution for the liberation of their homeland. They also affirm their right to a normal life in their homeland, to the exercise of their right of self-determination therein and to sovereignty over it.

Article 10 Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular war of liberation. This requires that commando action should be escalated, expanded and protected and that all the resources of the Palestinians and all scientific potentials available to them should be mobilized and organized to play their part in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires solidarity in national struggle among the different groups of Palestinians and between the people and the Arab masses, to ensure the continuity of the revolution.

Article 15 The liberation of Palestine is a national obligation for Arabs. It is their duty to repel the Zionist invasion of the greater Arab homeland and liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine. The full responsibility for this belongs to the people and governments of the Arab nations and to the Palestinian people first and foremost. The task of the Arab nation is to enlist all the military, human, moral and material resources at its command to play an effective part, along with the Palestinian people, in the liberation of Palestine. Moreover, it is the task of the Arab nations, particularly at the present stage of the Palestinian armed revolution, to offer the Palestinian people all possible aid and support, and to place at their disposal all the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to perform their role as the vanguard of their armed revolution until the liberation of their homeland is achieved.

Article 19 The partition of Palestine, which took place in 1947, and the establishment of Israel, are fundamentally invalid however long they last, for they contravene the will of the people of Palestine and their natural right to their homeland and contradict the principles of the United Nations Charter, foremost among which is the right of self-determination.

Article 20 The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate Instrument, and all their consequences, are hereby declared null and void. The claim of historical or spiritual links between the Jews and Palestine is neither in conformity with historical fact nor does it satisfy the requirements for statehood. Judaism is a revealed religion; it is not a separate nationality, nor are the Jews a single people with a separate identity; they are citizens of their respective countries.

Article 21 The Palestinian Arab people, expressing themselves through the Palestinian armed revolution, reject all alternatives to the total liberation of Palestine. They also reject all proposals for the internationalization of the Palestine problem.

Article 22 Zionism is a political movement that is linked with world imperialism and is opposed to all liberation movements in the world. The Zionist movement is essentially fanatical and racist; its objectives involve aggression, expansion and the establishment of colonial settlements, and its methods are those of the Fascists and the Nazis. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, a geographic base for world imperialism and a springboard for its thrust into the Arab homeland to frustrate the aspirations of the Arab nations to liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant threat to peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Inasmuch as the liberation of Palestine will eliminate the Zionist and imperialist presence in that country and bring peace to the Middle East, the Palestinian people look to all the World's free and to all forces of good, peace and progress in the world, and call on them for all possible aid and support in their just and legitimate struggle to liberate their homeland.

Article 23 The demands of peace and security and the exigencies of right and justice require that all nations should regard Zionism as an illegal movement and outlaw its existence and its activities, out of consideration for the ties of friendship between peoples and for the loyalty of citizens to their homelands. ✪

** The 33 article covanant was passed and adopted by the fourth Palestine National Council on July 17, 1968 in Cairo, Egypt.*

# Announcement

My name is Hobo, the son of wretched Richard of Palestine. I am a Christian and the owner of deed #9 of the Wanted District, West Jerusalem. This deed includes a home, 480 sq. meters, on 2 dunums of land. Its sub-district is #13; its jurisdiction is the municipality of Jerusalem, south of the Railroad Station. I am the legal proprietor of this deed, with the following to prove it:

1. A registration document by the proper authorities of the (British) High Commissioner #A30078.
2. The testimony of neighbors, from Chief Bakre's home, north, to the residence of Haj Abadi, south, to Abu Ali the creamer, west.
3. The acknowledgment of the contractor and constructor Mr. Sa'id Belbeasy who was paid 7,000 pounds for the project.
4. The attestations and substantiation's of all those who attended the inauguration ceremony at the residence door, 1/3/1948, including Rashid Socrate, Nayef Dollah, and Haj Sa'id , all of whom are still alive.

**Additional proof:**

1. The key to the main door, 14 cm., Queens brand, made in Britain, which I still own.
2. A residential tax notice in the amount of one Palestinian pound.
3. A ton of tears and pain for having to forcefully leave my home.

*I hereby declare that the contract signed in Washington, DC, USA has nothing to do with me. It is not enough, and as far as I am concerned it is void if it does not lead me back to my above home.*

**I entrusted and empowered Yasser Arafat to:**

1. Lead me, my brothers and neighbors, and to represent us at all legal, political and military forums so that we regain our rights.
2. This empowerment does not give Yasser Arafat the right to conduct any business in any way which will alter the legal status of my property, much less to compromise all or part of it.
3. Yasser Arafat has been paid for his efforts: the lives of Palestinian infants, youth, elders and women. These efforts raised him to the chairmanship of the PLO. He became our statesman and leader.
4. Yasser Arafat has the right to use all documents, official papers and legal papers to prove our rights to all international, legal, official and popular conventions. But he has no right to exclude any document proving ownership.
5. There is no objections to Yasser Arafat, the official designee, to politically pursue our rights or to solve our just cause in a fashion consistent with the norms of my brothers and neighbors in the West Bank and Gaza but in a way that does not violate my legitimate and legal right.
6. Our contract for which we retained Yasser Arafat to secure our public rights is for the explicit reason of obtaining such rights. None of us, nor anyone who represents some or all of us, has the authority to negotiate these rights away without everyone else's approval.

I, as an owner of an estate, as a human with rights, can not be forced by anyone to have a relationship or an interaction with the Israelis outside of the framework of human rights. No one has the power to substitute for my land lordship or my estate investment as long as we remain within the parameters of the law. I forswear to conduct my business with respect to the legal protection of all other proprietors. But if owning property is done by force and political expediency, then that does not concern me at all.

And so the above states my case clearly. All other efforts which may lead to an alternation, a change of description, form or essence, by political or legal means of the fact that I own my property is null and void. It requires my signature.

*Son of Wretched Richard of Palestine*

By: Ibrahim M. Abu Rabi'

# Israel and the Palestinians: Muslim and Jewish perspectives

**Marc H. Ellis, *Toward a Jewish Theology of Liberation* (Markynoll: Orbis Books, 1988).**

**Marc H. Ellis, *Beyond Innocence and Redemption: Confronting the Holocaust and Israeli Power* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990).**

**Isma'il Raji Al-Faruqi, *Islam and the Problem of Israel* (Islamic Council of Europe, 1990 reprint).**

**Ronald L. Nettler, *Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim fundamentalist's View of the Jews* (Published for the Vidal Sasoon International Center for the Study of anti-Semitism, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem by Pergamon Press: New York, 1987).**

Contemporary debates about the historical and theological relationship between Judaism and Islam have been marred by the tragic continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It should be noted, however, that the history of the Jewish-Islamic encounter cannot be reduced to a mere fifty years of bitter relationship, nor can it be viewed as a simple dialectical happening. History is a complex human process, and it is definitely erroneous to ascribe to it monolithic explanations and views. Muslims and Jews have lived together for many centuries, sharing both good luck and misfortunes. The present anomaly has to be understood in the context of the rise of the West since, the Industrial Revolution, and the subsequent decline of Islamic civilization. The three authors whose works are under review here, represent divergent, and sometimes contradictory, views on Anti-Semitism, Israel, Judaism, Islam, and the Palestinians.

In *Toward a Jewish Theology of Liberation*, Marc Ellis argues that the Jewish people are at crossroads and that a deep sense of crisis pervades the modern Jewish experience. What are the causes of such a crisis? The author contends that at the heart of the Jewish experience throughout history has been liberation through struggle, self-affirmation, and identification with the downtrodden and meek.

In spite of their achievements, the Jewish people have suffered tremendously. Fair enough. But the values of justice, love, and emancipation that permeate Jewish life and thought have been tainted by "evil practices" that deviate from true human and Jewish values.

"The Jewish community's struggle to be faithful to those values has been shadowed by the reality of betrayal, for in advance of your interests we have been slave merchants and masters, supported corrupt kings and governments, and even at times oppressed one another. Today, in Israel and in the Jewish community in North America, policies and alliances increasingly resemble those historically used to oppress our own people. On the Israeli side, one need mention the recently-concluded occupation of Lebanon and the continuing subjugation of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians; just as horrific are the relations Israel maintains with South Africa and Israel's military assistance to the murderous governments of El Salvador and Guatemala. In North America efforts continue to establish Israel as a U.S. outpost by building up its military. Relations between American Jewry and the oppressed of North America remain strained, and the ambivalent courtship of Israel by fundamentalist Christians continues." [Ibid.,p.2]

Ellis' central preoccupation is universal suffering. Far from claiming that suffering is a quality possessed by the Jewish people alone, he contends that Jews have to learn from their own historical suffering, and carry the heavy responsibility of being "a light upon other nations" in this regard. The Holocaust, no doubt, is a major event in the modern history of Europe and the Jewish people. "For contemporary Jews, the overwhelming experience of suffering is the Jewish Holocaust, the death of six million Jews and the attempted annihilation of our entire people. Interpretation of the event is omnipresent, though insights are diverse and often controversial." [Ibid.p.7]

Now, that the state of Israel has been created by Zionism, what are the moral and intellectual lessons that can be drawn from such a reality? Ellis argues that to be truthful to authentic Jewish values and ideals, one has to confront the meaning of the state of Israel: "An ever-growing displaced Palestinian people challenges the integrity of the State of Israel. The desire to remain a victim is evidence of disease; yet to become a conqueror after having been a victim is a recipe for moral suicide." [Ibid. p.25] It is not clear whether or not Ellis, who is very courageous in his condemnation of Israeli policies towards the Palestinians, calls for the dismantling of the

state of Israel. This call is evident in the writings of the Palestinian Muslim thinker, the late Isma'il Al-Faruqi , whose work is also reviewed here. It is clear, however, that the Jewish Holocaust and other Holocausts, perpetrated by the Nazis on other nations in the 1930's and 1940's of this century have to be understood against the background of modern Western European history; and that Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims have not been part of that historical situation.

Ellis comes to the understanding that modern Palestinian history, as part of the modern history of the Muslim world, has been subjugated to Western powers and interests in the form of colonialism and cultural Westernization. What disturbs Ellis and other conscientious Jewish thinkers is, perhaps, the great harm that has been done, mainly, to the peasant society of Palestine as a result of the creation of Israel in 1948. He, for instance, further sees a relevance of the situation prevalent in peasant societies in Latin America to that of Palestinian society because of their similar social and economic formations and conditions.

With his commitment to Judaism and the struggle of the marginalized people of the globe, who in fact constitute the majority of the world population, Ellis affirms his true identity as well as his authentic human outlook. He further calls for a Jewish theology of liberation which is humanistic, universal, loving, and truly emancipating: "A Jewish theology of liberation recognizes that the world has changed and that by simply applying pre-Holocaust and Holocaust categories to the contemporary world we close our eyes and ears to the pain and possibility of the present. By carrying our own history we bequeath insight to contemporary struggle." [p.121].

In his more recent work on the same subject, *Beyond Innocence and Redemption: Confronting the Holocaust and Israeli Power*, Ellis develops the theme of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the stand of contemporary Jewish theology. He formulates his theological political position in light of the following assumptions:

(1) What Jews have done to the Palestinians since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 is wrong.

(2) In the process of conquering and displacing the Palestinian people, Jews have done what has been done to us over two millennia.

(3) In this process Jews have become almost everything we loathe about our oppressors.

(4) It is only in this confrontation with state power in Israel that Jews can move beyond being victim or oppressor.

(5) The movement beyond victimization and oppression can only come through a solidarity with those whom we as Jews have displaced the Palestinian people."

In the first chapter, "The Birth of Holocaust Theology", Ellis examines critically the work of three leading and contemporary Holocaust theologians: Elie Wiesel, Emil Fackenheim, and Rabbi Irving Greenberg. Two events have shaped the epistemological underpinnings of the work of these theologians: the Holocaust, and the Israeli Victory over three Arab states in the 1967 war. Ellis tells us that "for Holocaust theologians the victory in the Six-Day War was a miracle, a sign that an innocent people so recently victimized might be on the verge of redemption". [p.3]

Wiesel, for instance, views the 1967 Israeli victory as a moral victory of the Jewish people. Israeli soldiers are seen to have behaved in a humane way, and, if Israelis turn out to be killers, it is the fault of the Arabs. In the words of the ex-Prime Minister of Israel, Golda Meir, as quoted by the author "Some day we will forgive the Arabs for killing our boys but we can never forgive them for turning our boys into killers."

Fackenheim, a professor of Jewish Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada, also applauds the Israeli victory of 1967 since Israelis responded to "the commanding voice of Auschwitz" [p.14] In other words, the Arabs, according to Fackenheim, missed the chance of perpetrating another Holocaust on the Jewish people, mainly because Israel was able to avert it. From his side, Rabbi Greenberg, Ellis tells us, is convinced that the Israeli reunification (better read as the occupation of Arab Jerusalem) "symbolizes the presence of God and the continuation of the [Jewish] people". [p.16] Greenberg is more keen than the former two about the political reconstituting of the state of Israel. To him, any criticism of the state of Israel is necessarily the work of anti-Semitism. Ellis tells us that Greenberg considers the Intifada a new type of

**"A Jewish theology of liberation recognizes that the world has changed and that by simply applying pre-Holocaust and Holocaust categories to the contemporary world we close our eyes and ears to the pain and possibility of the present."**

war waged by the Palestinian people against the divine state of Israel. From Greenberg's perspective, the basic fact is that the Palestinians are waging war. Though clearly Israel has superior military strength and the methods of Palestinian resistance physically endanger few Israelis, the situation is warlike insofar as the goals of the uprising are the destruction of Israel by "attacking its legitimacy, its support, its capacity to defend itself". [p.25]

Ellis contends that Jewish theology a la mode of Weisel, Fackenheim, and Greenberg is inadequate for coming to terms with the present dilemmas of Jews and Judaism, mainly because of its historical character. The solution is, therefore, to examine the whole problem of the Holocaust and the question of the emergence of Zionism and the creation of the State of Israel against their historical, social, and political background. Therefore, to Ellis' mind, Israel, Zionism, and "unethical" Jewish activities are not immune to criticism. In this context, Ellis attempts to examine the suffering of the Palestinian people after the great historical rupture of their society in 1948.

It is the contention of Ellis and other Jewish "dissenters" that the Holocaust has been "used as a powerful tool by Israeli and Jewish leadership in the United States to organize and police the Jewish community. Diaspora Jews, for example, are made to feel guilty for not having done enough to prevent the Holocaust; at the same time the message is conveyed that Israel is threatened with annihilation". [p.36] Ellis maintains that the mainstream Holocaust theology has identified Palestinians with Nazis, an assumption that leads "to hysterical responses rather than reasoned policy." [p.37]

Ellis views Zionism, a Jewish movement of national liberation, against its historical background in nineteenth-century Europe. He suggests that classical "Zionism was less a response to anti-Jewishness ...than to the challenge of [Western] liberalism and nationalism". [p.42] In the inter-war period, and as a result of the increasing power of Nazism in Germany, Jews opted for political Zionism rather than for cultural Zionism. But still, on the basis of analyzing key ideas of important Zionist thinkers of the time- Arendt, Magnes, and Ahad Ha'am — the author maintains: "The desire of a minority of the Jewish people for return to the land is bound more to culture and education and less to nationality and statehood." [p.54] Ellis questions the notion that the pro-statist (pro-Israel) view is dominant in Jewish circles: "If it is true that Jews have inherited the formative events of Holocaust and Israel, it is also true that a difficult and often painful dissent has accomplished these events and awaits a renewed hearing." [p.55]

**Ellis maintains that the mainstream Holocaust theology has identified Palestinians with Nazis, an assumption that leads "to hysterical responses rather than reasoned policy."**

But Jewish dissent has been peripheralized and "stricken from Jewish history, erased from its inheritance". Zionism has understood the enormous influence the mass media can exert in technologically advanced societies. The creation and sustenance of the state of Israel has been nourished by the great support the mainstream Western mass media has lent it. Ellis testifies to this by quoting a Russian-born American Jewish journalist, William Zukerman, who says:

"To this observer, nothing demonstrates more sharply the uncanny power of modern propaganda to control minds, sway emotions and brutalize people than the Zionist propaganda on the Arab refugees during the last decade. It literally succeeded in turning black into white, a blatant lie into a truth, a grave social injustice into an act of justice glorified by thousands. It has turned clever people with more than average intelligence into starry-eyed fools, believing everything they are told, and has converted kindly and gentle men and women with a strong sense of mercy into fanatics, insensible to the suffering of any people except their own. In no other way can this writer explain the many paradoxes which the Arab refugee problem has created in Jewish life." [p.64]

Ellis also relies on the analysis provided by Jacob Neusner, famous for his writings on Jewish theology and philosophy, who discusses the intellectual climate in the state of Israel: "Neusner exposes the 'poorly kept secret' that Israeli scholarship is dull and boring and that since Martin Buber and Gershom Scholem (both born in Germany) Israel has not produced a single scholar in theology, philosophy, or history who is important outside of Israel. Further, Israel is a client state dependent economically and militarily on the United States." Neusner concludes: "So much for being a Jew in the State of Israel. Here in the Diaspora we can be what we want, when we want—from nothing to everything, all the time or once in a while. Freedom is nice, too. And the United States really has become a free country for us Jews. For American Jews — Jewish Americans — the

American dream has come true. I wonder how many Israelis think the Zionist one has come true, too." [p.70]

Seen in a historical perspective, the Palestinian uprising is a reflection of the repressed Palestinian suffering over the years, especially since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. In other words, Ellis appreciates the inner dynamics of Palestinian society under occupation and its ability to generate movements of protest and defiance against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

**Palestinians are banished, frozen in Israeli national memory, and Jews who dare stir up that memory will be accused of being an anti-Semite, a lover of the Arabs, and a self-hater.**

Ellis admonishes contemporary mainstream Jewish theology because "there is a noticeable absence of Palestinians." Palestinians are banished, frozen in Israeli national memory, and Jews who dare stir up that memory will be accused of being an anti-Semite, a lover of the Arabs, and a self-hater.

In a chapter entitled, "Holocaust, Israel and Christian Renewal", [pp.134-155], Ellis discusses the attitude of some twentieth-century Christian theologians on the State of Israel and the Palestinians. He starts with the views expressed by the famous American theologian Rein Niebuhr, who, turning away from his socialist ideas of the 1920's and 30's, espoused the mainstream and conservative attitude vis-a-vis the indigenous population of Palestine, and for that matter Muslims as a whole. Niebuhr is quoted by Ellis as saying that: "One difficulty with the Arab problem is that the technical and dynamic civilization which the Jews might have helped to introduce and which should have the support of American capital, and which would include river-development, soil- conservation and use of native [read as slave] power, would not be acceptable to the Arab chieftains though beneficial to the Arab masses. It would have therefore to be imposed provisionally, but would have a chance of ultimate acceptance by the masses." [p.136]

It is ironic that Niebuhr, the most perceptive Christian theologian of the twentieth century, was insensitive to the plight of Palestinian Arabs—Christians and Muslims alike. In the words of Ellis, "Niebuhr saw Jewish Palestine and Christian Lebanon as islands of Western civilization confronted by the hopeless picture of an Arab-Muslim Middle East." [p.136] Ellis discusses the ideas of another leading contemporary Christian theologian, Paul Van Buren, a former professor of religion at Temple University, Philadelphia, who commented on Israel's victory in the 1967 war saying: "We are witnesses today to the opening of a new era in the continuing life of God's people." [p.142]

In the course of his illuminating analysis, Ellis dwells on the inspiring work of Rosemary Radford Ruether and Herman Ruether's The Wrath of Jonah: The Crisis of Religious Nationalism in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (1989). He says: "By analyzing Zionist and Palestinian history, Ruether concludes that the chief impediment to peace has not been historically and is not today the Palestinian people but an expansionist and violent state of Israel." [p.148]

In conclusion, Ellis is one of the few contemporary Jewish thinkers and theologians who have criticized the policies of the State of Israel for the sake of pursuing what they see as truth. It is, perhaps, surprising to see such a courageous Jewish voice in an age when powerful American Jewish institutions and personalities have lent their uncritical (and unflinching) support to Israel.

In *Islam and the Problem of Israel*, the late Professor Al-Faruqi tackles issues similar to those raised by Ellis. His point of departure is the modern historical situation of the Christian West, Israel, and Islam. Al-Faruqi presents the following presuppositions: 1) the Jewish problem, as it has been known so far, is an exclusively European, i.e., Christian problem, and it has to be understood against the religious, social, and historical background of medieval and modern Europe; 2) in the same vein, Zionism was created in Europe as a result of the unique circumstances the Jewish people faced in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century; 3) Israel is a unique and aggressive form of Western colonialism, and 4) the danger posed by the existence of the State of Israel is colossal — far from endangering Palestinian society alone, Israel poses a real threat to the security and safety of Arabs and Muslims at large. The following quotation illustrates the basic meanings that have to be drawn from Al-Faruqi's work: "The problem of Israel confronting the Muslim world today has neither precedent nor parallel in Islamic history. The Muslim world has tended to regard it as another instance of modern colonialism, or at best, as a repetition of the Crusades. The difference is not that Israel is neither one of the these; but that it is both and more, much more." [p.1]

Al-Faruqi follows a line of analysis, common to many who wrote on

the encounter between Judaism and Christianity, by arguing that two features mark the modern Jewish experience: anti-Semitism and assimilation. He confirms an idea of Ellis' that the American experiment, in particular, has welcomed Jews as an ethnic and religious culture, and that, fundamentally speaking, there is no contradiction between the American brand of modernity and Judaism.

Born in the context of nineteenth-century Europe and in reaction to Jewish assimilation, Zionism opted to create an independent homeland for the Jewish people. Al-Faruqi goes on to argue that one has to see the birth of Zionism in the context of colonialist and expansionist Europe as well. He maintains that the "interests of Zionism coincided beautifully with the imperialist interests of France and England. Both these colonial powers were embroiled in a desperate fight with the Muslim natives of their colonies everywhere." [p.72] Therefore, the state of Israel, as a political embodiment of Zionism, "would like nothing better than a role in world affairs which guarantees its occupation of the land and expands it, strengthens its state to the point of invincibility, and nurtures the Jewish hatred of all non-Jews, the Jewish persecution complex, and Jewish racism on which Zionism had rested the whole being and existence of Jews in the age of romanticism." [p.72]

Al-Faruqi contends that both Islam and Judaism are theologically compatible. Both affirm the divine principles of Din al-Fitrah' or religion naturals, are united by the principle of revelation, and share the same religious tradition of Noah, Abraham, Jacob, and Isaac, etc. He says: "Islam...is the best friend Judaism has ever had." It recognized Judaism as religion de Jure, which no other religion or political system ever did. It not only tolerated the observance of the Torah but demanded it; and it placed its executive power at the disposal of the rabbinical court." [p.90] As a Muslim Palestinian thinker, Al-Faruqi is troubled, not so much by Judaism as a religion or Jews as a nation, but by Zionism, since, to him, it committed a "long list of crimes against the individual Palestinian men and women, against the corporate existence of the Palestinian, against the individual Arabs of the surrounding countries as well as the Umma." [p.93] He goes on to argue that the Israeli state has to be dismantled — its army and public institutions. However, dismantling does not necessarily mean the destruction of Jewish lives and properties. Al-Faruqi maintains that Islam safeguards Jewish lives, and that the best solution to the Jewish problem lies in permitting Jews to settle anywhere in Muslim lands. Those who desire to do so have to de-zionize themselves.

**Al-Faruqi contends that both Islam and Judaism are theologically compatible. Both affirm the divine principles of Din al-Fitrah' or religion naturals, are united by the principle of revelation, and share the same religious tradition of Noah, Abraham, Jacob, and Isaac, etc.**

Al-Faruqi considers contemporary Zionism to have failed on several fronts: (1) failure to provide security to all Jews, and this evidenced by the fact that the majority of world Jewry still lives outside of Israel; (2) failure to stop assimilation — most Jews are secular; and (3) the failure of Zionism to enable Judaism to blossom forth. In this regard, Al-Faruqi draws on the basic assumption of the American Jewish theologian, Jacob Nuesner, quoted above, that Zionism has not inspired any major movement in philosophy, literature, the sciences, the arts.

"To this day, the world of scholarship knows of no Jewish social sciences, of no Jewish Humanities. In the realm of thought, Zionist Jews are tailing the West in all fields. Indeed, Zionist theory itself has been formulated in Hegelian terms. Even in Biblical Studies, Zionism has been led by Western Scholarship....The same is true of other domains of thought. The universities and colleges of Israel do not as yet know of a Jewish sociology, a Jewish anthropology, philosophy, political sciences or economics. All that is being taught and written by Jewish intellectuals stands within the Western tradition." [P.103]

In the context of Ellis' and Al-Faruqi's major theses, I would like to examine a very short and, to my mind, controversial piece, written by the Canadian author Ronald Nettler.

In *Past Trials and Present Tribulations*, Nettler's objective is to portray the Islamic doctrinal dimension of Muslim-Jewish relations. His explicit assumption is that Muslims have developed a sophisticated and rich doctrine of hatred towards Jews since the foundation of the Islamic state during the Prophet's time in 622. Undoubtedly, Nettler's assumptions are bounded by a context of interest and

subjectivity. It is my contention, drawing on Ellis' and Al-Faruqi's arguments, that his main interest is to justify the hegemonies and colonialist nature of the state of Israel. Since his context is that of the Israeli scholarship, which is antagonistic to Arabism and Islam, his personal interest would be to show that the real problem is not between Christendom/Europe and Judaism, but between Islam and Judaism.

Nettler does not make any analytical distinction between Judaism, Zionism, and Israel. He considers Zionism to be the product of Judaism and Israel the culmination of both. Understood in this light, if Muslims oppose the Israeli occupation of Palestine, they oppose both Zionism and Judaism.

**Nettler considers Zionism to be the product of Judaism and Israel the culmination of both. Understood in this light, if Muslims oppose the Israeli occupation of Palestine, they oppose both Zionism and Judaism.**

As stated by Ellis and Al-Faruqi earlier, Zionism and the Jewish Holocaust have to be understood against the socio-economic, political, and nationalist-chauvinistic European background of the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries. The European persecution of Jews did not only culminate in the Holocaust, but in the creation of Israel as well. The writer is oblivious to this significant historical phenomenon, and, instead, he considers the West to be the true liberator of the Jews for supporting the creation of the state of Israel.

Unlike Ellis and Al-Faruqi, Nettler cannot see the anomalous consequences that the creation of Israel has brought upon Palestinian society — its total disintegration and the dispersal of its people. What he discusses, instead, is the alleged "darker side of Jewish life under Islam, which redefined the erstwhile conception of Islamic 'toleration' as having been more problematic than could before have been imagined." (p.ix) With no historical evidence in hand, the writer rushes to prove the "evil Muslim treatment of the Jews."

Nettler aims at proving his thesis of "Muslim animosity to Jews" by treating some of the works of the leading Egyptian Muslim thinker, Sayyid Qutb (1966). He uncritically accepts Wilfred Cantwell Smith's argument that "the modern period of Islamic history begins with decadence within, intrusion and menace without; and the worldly glory that reputedly went with obedience to God's law only a distant memory of happier days". He argues, in an absolute manner, that the West has nothing to do, directly or indirectly, with the "decline" of Islam in the modern world. Yet, Modern Islam, in the writer's view, suffers from a fundamental malaise. The only justifiable explanation, then, has to be sought within the Islamic religion.

Nettler proposes that the leaders of modern Islamic resurgence, and in particular Sayyid Qutb, propagated an "emotional hatred which [is] unequally modern as part of Muslim thinking on the Jews". (p.51) To him, this supposed Muslim hatred is a metaphysical a priori — it is fixed, absolute, and unchanging, and beyond the rules of history.

Nettler does not treat Qutb's ideas in their totality — as a comprehensive dynamic. Instead, he singles out one dimension of his thought — his stand on Zionism and the State of Israel. To better understand Qutb's ideas, one has to relate them to the influence of foreign powers on the leading Egyptian intelligentsia of the thirties, forties and fifties. Early in his professional career in the late thirties, Qutb wrote a number of articles on colonialism and Westernization. He linked these two phenomena to the British attempt to create a state for the Jews in Palestine. Nettler does not refer to these significant phases in the history of the Middle East — colonialism and the creation of Israel. He treats the Qutbian "doctrine of hatred towards the Jews" in an absolute political and historical vacuum.

Qutb's philosophy, which is succinctly summarized in his main works Islam and Social Justice (1948) and the Battle Between Islam and Capitalism (1951), placed him at the center of Egyptian intellectual life during that period. He was never a neutral interpreter of events, but an engaged theologian, philosopher, and social thinker. His social commitments equaled his political and theological concerns. It was quite natural for him to respond, analytically at least, to one of the main dangers that the Muslim world was facing — Western colonization and its culmination in the creation of the state of Israel. Qutb's theoretical formulations were very much shaped by those practical concerns.

A critical perspective on the debates raging between Palestinians/Arabs/Muslims, on the one hand, and Jews/Israelis on the other over the existence of the state of Israel is urgently needed. These debates have not taken the form of dialogue yet. The available literature could allow us to convert our confrontational stands to those of dialogue and understanding.✪

*By: Nancy El Bassiouny*

## True story from the West Bank

# Separate and unequal

My eyes burned from the remains of the tear gas that was thrown a while ago. Actually, my eyes burned because I was trying so hard not to cry. I was fighting the tears because I was a man and I wasn't supposed to cry.

The soldiers had orders to do anything they found necessary to any woman, man, or even child holding stones in their hands. So I hid mine well. Could you imagine that? I was already fifteen years old and paranoid at anything.

The last thing I was going to do was to drop these dangerous weapons, these stones. They were the only piece of land I could really call my own. The stones were small and smooth like the skin on my little brother.

**The last thing I was going to do was to drop these dangerous weapons, these stones. They were the only piece of land I could really call my own. The stones were small and smooth like the skin on my little brother.**

That is of course before he and the proud man I called my father were brutally killed while going to the solider-infested town market. The soldiers said that my father had resisted arrest after insulting a soldier.

That was something you didn't dare to do. So gun shots went off. One screamed its way through my brother's chest and the other three in my father's head. My mother let us stay home from school the next several days out of respect.

As I got older, my hatred for the soldiers grew as my mind and body did. I was the man of the house now, so the last thing I was going to do was to get myself killed. At fifteen I had a mother and two sisters to care for.

I never hated the enemy's babies, though, because I knew that they had nothing to do with the actions of their evil government. Oh how much I envied them. At least they had a country to call their own. I had nothing.

My country was in all my dreams. It was as if it existed on another planet, and I was far away. I dreamed of a country, so nice, where the grass was always green. I could be a doctor, or even a politician, but not a corrupt one.

I knew that this place that I dreamed of was out of reach, at least for now, but I never stopped dreaming. My dreams were all I had. That is of course, except for my determination, my pride, my anger, as well as my family. ✪

*By: Nancy El-Bassiouny*

# To dream of a homeland

It was a typical dreary day, on a typical camp that I, and many others call home. My mother went to pick-up our food from the UN relief center. My father was reading Qur'an. I was getting ready to meet my friends. I like to call them the dreamers. You see, that's about all we do when we're together. We were tired of walking around the camp. We had been doing that all of our lives, because we were all poor on this camp. Anyway, I got ready and went to meet Mahmoud, Tarek, Rafiq and the others.

**Owny told us that he was listening to his Uncle Nidal's radio when he heard something about Peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO that led to a signed peace agreement. Mahmoud looked stunned and said: "What does it mean?"**

We met by Tarek's tent and started to plan what games we were going to play. Suddenly before we could decide, Owny, who is in a wheelchair, suffering from a muscular disease, came over shouting, "Abu-Ammar, Abu-Ammar," that's what we call Yassir Arafat. We all gathered around him to see what all the commotion was about.

After catching his breath, he told us that he was listening to his Uncle Nidal's radio when he heard something about Peace negotiations between Israel and the PLO that led to a signed peace agreement. Mahmoud looked stunned and said: "What does it mean?" Owny smiled and said. "A homeland, we are finally going to have a homeland, where all our dreams will come true." Tarek's eyes opened wide and he said "A homeland? Where we can have a big yard, trees to climb and hills to roll down and ...." Before he could finish, Rafiq cut him off and said "and fruit, we can eat all kinds of fruits, and meat and ..." and again before he could finish, I interrupted and said "Food is that all you can think about! It means we won't have to sleep in leaking tents anymore and we could play all the games that other boys our age play."

So we all ran home to give the good news to our families and agreed to meet again in one hour to plan a celebration. An hour later we met again, but the smiles that were on our faces were gone. We realized the horrible truth about the agreement. The truth that shattered all our dreams that for a minute in time had become a reality. As usual, Owny was the last one in the group. He, as well as the rest of us, had very little to say. We were all so confused and full of anger.

Rafiq broke the silence and said "Why aren't we included? Aren't we Palestinians? Don't we have a right to a homeland?" Tarek stomped his foot and said "We have to do something. We have to say something." I looked at him and said "How? Who would we tell? It was too good to be true." Owny smiled a half smile and said "They might negotiate it one day, and we might..." "Forget it. It's a lost cause." We all sighed and said good-bye as we left for our tents that had suddenly become a reality.

Determination can only be embarked on by a people with democratic aspirations and tools. Otherwise it is not worth the effort.

After all the hoopla celebrating the first step towards a Palestinian state, we should remember that more important than having a state is the kind of state it is. The history of the post colonial world is disfigured by one party tyrannies and imperious oligarchies caused by Western investments, and large scale pauperization brought about by famine, civil war or outright robbery. ✪

By: Nancy Elbassiouny

## *The forgotten tears*

*Oh! Great land of Palestine*
*Full of blood and bitter wine*
*Cand of the Prophets*
*preaching love*
*See that white blood stained dove*
*Oh! Great father why do they say*
*That the name we've crowned*
*has gone away*
*A few lost homes ago we were as one*
*A land destroyed by the Devil's gun*
*We plowed our fields.*
*we built our homes*
*Sat under the stars and wrote our poems*
*The taste of time grew cruelly sour*
*As we fraught for our land*
*until the last hour*
*My eyes still see the white and blue*
*Waving so freely as our flag they threw*
*Tell me father who stole my name*
*Many photos of the dead to frame*
*Our flag was soiled.*
*our flag was torn*
*As many a child*
*with no father is born*

## In the name of salvation

**You passed me the torch**
**and a nation was born**
**and you took away that**
**same torch, gave it**
**A new flame and a**
**revolution was born**
**You brought hope to a society**
**and then with**
**your flame burned that**
**same society until it**
**turned to ashes, you stole**
**the bread from the hungry**
**defeated the weak**
**stood on the corpses and said:**
**This is all in the name of salva-**
**tion. A term you used quite often**
**but never knew the meaning**
**you fought your people**
**with their own fears and**
**ambitions, until they cried**
**tears of blood and**
**All in the name of salvation**

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

"وما تقدموا لانفسكم من خير تجدوه عند الله، ان الله بما تعملون بصير"

*In the Name of Allah,the Beneficent, the Merciful. "..Whatever good deed you send ahead for your own selves, you shall find it with Allah: Behold, Allah sees all that you do"*

# الصندوق الإسلامي لفلسطين

# Islamic Fund for Palestine

**The Muslims in Palestine are facing great hardships from the brutal Zionist Occupation. Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa is calling upon all Muslims to pay their dues to defend their sacred places. Let's give a helping hand to the families of the Martyrs, the Wounded, the Detained, the Orphans, the Needy and the Refugees. Let's support our Steadfast Muslim Brothers and Sisters.**

*Please, direct your inquiries and/or contributions to this address:*


## Islamic Fund for Palestine (IFP)

P.O. Box 82009 • Tampa, FL 33682-2009

Tel: (813) 980-2572 • Fax: (813) 985-6022

## PICTORIAL HISTORY OF PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE

**(Source: Encyclopedia of The Palestine Problem)**

# SO WE WON'T FORGET



**85. The Islamic Conference held in Jerusalem in 1929. Delegates invited by His Eminence Haj Amin Al-Husseini, Grand Mufti of Palestine, attended from 22 Islamic Countries. The Grand Mufti is in the center, to his right is Musa Kazim Pasha El-Husseini, a great Palestinian leader.**

**86. Haj Amin Al-Husseini, Grand Mufti of Palestine, flanked to his right by the Greek Patriarch and the Coptic Bishop and to his left by the Armenian Patriarch and the Abyssinian Abbot. Second from left is Musa Kazim Pasha El Husseini, former Mayor of Jerusalem and President of the Palestinian National Congress 1920-1934.**




Map Showing th[illegible]istribution of Religions in Europe in the [illegible]enth Century, C.E.,
[illegible]cating Extent of the Kingdom of the Chazars.
([illegible]or Schrader, "Atlas de Géographie Historique[illegible]

**140. 90% of Jews are Ashkenazis, descendants of Khazar Jews who adopted Judaism in the 9th Century, A.D. In particular, the Russian, Central and Eastern European, and German Jews, who originated in the Kingdom of Khazaristan, southern part of Russia, have no ethnic or historical connection with Palestine. The above map is taken from the Encyclopedia Judaica.**



33. The Main Portal of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, the third holiest place for Islam. Jews have plans to destroy these Muslim holy places and build the Jewish Temple on their site.

34. Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron. Zionists have constantly desecrated this Muslim Mosque, usurped two-thirds of it for a Jewish Temple and constantly harass Muslim worshippers.



35. The Mosque at Beersheba has been desecrated and usurped by Jews and converted to secular use.

**36. Basilica of the Church of the Nativity, Bethlehem, West Bank. It was built 330 A.D. on the site where Christ was born.**

**37. Entrance of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem. The Holy Sepulchre includes the Place of Crucifixion, the Grotto of the Finding, or Invention, of the Cross and many other lesser sites.**



**38. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem, the central shrine of Christianity, was built by Emperor Constantine in 330 A.D. on the place of burial of Jesus Christ.**

39. The "Wailing Wall" in Jerusalem, which Jews wrongly believe was part of King Solomon's Temple. In fact, a League of Nations Commission determined that it is a part of a secular wall built by Muslims and has nothing to do with either King Solomon's Temple of the Temple built by King Herod.

40. Arab houses destroyed by the Israelis in 1967 to give more Jewish access to the "Wailing Wall."



41. Arab houses in old Jerusalem were demolished by the Israeli bulldozer (right foreground).

**42. Zionists place the Israeli flag and Jewish emblems over the Dome of the Rock and other Muslim Holy Places, documenting their plans for the destruction and usurpation of these sites to build a Jewish Temple.**



**43. Zionists place the Torah and the Menorah over the Dome of the Rock and other Muslim Holy Places for the purposes stated under photograph 42.**

**44. Theodor Herzl calling upon the Jewish masses to take over the Dome of the Rock to build a Jewish temple. The Zionist flag is placed above the Muslim Holy Place.**




**45. The plan for establishing the Jewish Temple on the site of Muslim Holy Places prepared by the Jerusalem Temple Foundation.**

54. The King David Hotel in Jerusalem before the explosives planted by Irgun terrorists destroyed one wing.

55. The King David Hotel after the Irgun terrorists destroyed one wing, killing 92 Britons, Arabs and Jews and wounding 58.

56. Workers digging out bodies from the rubble after the King David Hotel explosion.

57. Body of one of the secretaries killed in the King David Hotel explosion.

63. Deir Yassin suburb of Jerusalem where the Irgun and Stern Gangs massacred 255 men, women and children, April 9-10, 1948.



64. Corpses of victims of the Deir Yassin massacre.

65. Deir Yassin under Israeli occupation was erased from the map. The photo shows the site of the mass grave of victims of the massacre.

66. Ruins of the Manshiyeh quarter of Jaffa, wantonly shelled by Irgun forces in 1948.

67. Tens of thousands of the citizens of Jaffa were forced to flee the Zionist bombardment of their city. Scores were drowned during their escape by boats in April, 1948.

68. Modern office building in Jaffa. The Zionists usurped all homes, apartments, commercial buildings, lands and possessions of the Palestinians of Jaffa.



73. Houses demolished in Sharafat village in an Israeli raid at 3 o'clock on the morning of February 7, 1951. Among the houses dynamited was the home of the Mukhtar of the village.



74. Woman murdered by Israelis in their raid on Sharafat village on February 7, 1951. It was a standard practice in Israeli raids to blow up the houses of Palestinians over the heads of their occupants.

75. On July 11, 1951, an Israeli patrol crossed the demarcation lines and entered a house in the village of Khirbat-an-Najjar. They threw a hand grenade in a Palestinian house, killing an eight-year-old girl and wounding her mother. The hand grenade tore open the abdomen of the child, as seen above.

**76. Home of a teacher in Qibya who was murdered with his family in the massacre prepetrated by Ariel Sharon and Israeli Commando Unit 101 in October 1953.**

**77. Victims of Qibya massacre, October 1953, in raid by Israeli Commando Unit led by Ariel Sharon.**

**78. Bodies of three Palestinian children and a woman massacred in Qibya.**

79. Israeli explosive charge found by U.N. Observers in Nahalin, March 29, 1954, after Israeli paratroop raid.

80. Victims of Israeli perpetrated massacre at Nahalin, March 29, 1954.

81. Palestinian victims who had their houses blown up over their heads in a raid by Israeli paratroopers, Hebron, February 1956.

**The Zionists in 1948-49 erased from the map of Palestine 492 small towns and villages after expelling their inhabitants and usurping their homes, commercial buildings, lands and possessions. Some of the villages were completely destroyed as shown below and on the facing page in pictures supplied from the collection of Dr. Walid Khalidi of the Institute for Palestine Studies.**

**94. Daliyat er Ruha and Dalia, Haifa Sub-District, was completely destroyed and erased from the map of Palestine after the expulsion of its 273 inhabitants. Its entire 10,008 dunums of land were usurped by Jews.**

**95. Kidna, Hebron Sub-District, was completely destroyed and erased from the map of Palestine in 1948 after the expulsion of its 590 inhabitants. The Jewish settlement of Gal'on was built on its 15,725 dunums of land usurped by Jews.**



98. Wreckage of the Khan Yunis, Gaza Sub-District, police station destroyed by Ariel Sharon's paratroopers during a raid and massacre they committed on September 3, 1955.

99. A house dynamited by the Israeli paratroops during one of their many raids in Syria. The above house of the Youssef family in Al-Bitalha village was blown up on December 11, 1955.

100. A child mutilated in the Israeli paratroop raid led by Ariel Sharon on Gaza, April 5, 1956. The child lost one arm and one leg.

**104. Egyptian prisoners of war ordered by the Israeli Army to strip off their clothing and lie face down in order to humiliate them, during the 1967 Israeli war of aggression.**

**107. A Jordanian soldier being treated for phosporous burns caused by Israeli Air Force phosporous bombs in the 1967 war of aggression.**

108. Allenby Bridge across the Jordan River in 1967, after its destruction caused by Israeli bombs. Palestinian refugees crossing into Jordan across the remains of the bridge.

109. Palestinian refugee children attending school at Sabra Refugee Camp in Beirut, Lebanon. The child standing, Khadija, is from a Palestinian family from Jaffa which lost its home and possessions when they were usurped by Jews in 1948. There are hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugee children in UNRWA schools. Palestinians are among the better educated people in the Arab world.

**110. Christian graves desecrated by the Israelis. Photograph is of the Greek Orthodox and Armenian cemetery on Mt. Zion, in Jerusalem, 1967.**



**111. The beautiful home of Hamza Tokan in Nablus, the West Bank, after it was blown up by the Israeli occupation authorities in 1967.**

**112. Destruction of Palestinian home in Rafah Camp in the Gaza Strip. These three children and their disabled grandmother were homeless after Israeli authorities detained their UNRWA school teacher father and pregnant mother and demolished their house.**

**113. The brutality of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza has lasted from 1967 until today. The above photograph is of an Israeli soldier beating a Palestinian schoolgirl and pulling her by the hair in Jerusalem in 1976.**

**114. Bassam Shaka'a, the Mayor of Nablus, who lost his legs in a car bomb explosion perpetrated by Jewish terrorists on June 3, 1980. Jewish terrorism against the Palestinians continues in the West Bank and Gaza and there is convincing evidence of the complicity of the Israeli Government in these terrorist acts directed against Palestinians.**

**The two photos below are evidence of the destruction of Beirut by the Israeli armed forces.**

**115. In 1982 the Israeli Air Force subjected the city of Beirut, Lebanon, to constant wanton bombing and bombardment of apartment buildings, homes, commercial buildings, schools, and hospitals. Thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians were killed, maimed or made homeless by this War Crime.**



**116. Apartment house in Beirut, Lebanon, destroyed in 1982 by wanton bombing by the Israelis in which thousands of people were buried in the rubble of their homes.**

**117. A Palestinian mother grieving at the sight of the bodies of her young children massacred in the Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camps in Beirut in 1982.**



**118. Men and women victims of the Sabra and Shatila massacre. The Israeli cabinet and the high command of the Israeli Army were implicated in the massacre. They were condemned by the United Nations as accessories to this crime of Genocide.**

**119. Ein el Hilweh Refugee Camp in Lebanon was bull-dozed by the Israeli Army in 1982. Above is a Palestinian lady in front of the ruins of her home in the camp. In 1948 the Israelis had usurped her home in Palestine. In 1982 they destroyed anything she had managed to build up in exile.**

**120. Example of wanton bombing by the Israeli Air Force of civilian homes in Palestinian Refugee Camps. This woman's home was destroyed by an Israeli air raid in May, 1987, on Ein el Hilweh Refugee Camp near Saida, Lebanon.**

**The Israeli Army blows up the houses of Palestinian families if one of their children is caught throwing stones at Israeli soldiers, thereby making ten to fifteen members of a Palestinian family homeless. The following are three photos of evidence of this War Crime in 1987, 1989 and 1990.**

**121. 1987**



**122. 1989**

**123. 1990**

**124. Israeli soldiers kicking a Palestinian youth, a typical example of brutality used by the Israelis in attempting to suppress the Intifada.**

**125. Fatmeh Abu Mayaleh, a 65-year-old Palestinian lady who was brutally beaten by fanatic Jewish Yeshiva students in East Jerusalem. The photograph was taken in Makassad Hospital after she had undergone a six-hour operation.**

**126. Israeli soldiers bashing a woman's head against a wall during a women's protest in Al-Amari refugee camp during the Intifada.**

127. One of fourteen Palestinian houses demolished by the Israeli Army on April 6, 1988, in Beita village, Nablus Sub-District, the West Bank, as a collective punishment of the people of the village. This constitutes a War Crime. In the background is a modern school built by the village.

128. A Palestinian fruit and vegetable market after being raided by Israeli troops. The Israelis try to destroy the economy of the Palestinians in many ways, including harassment and the willful destruction of Palestinian crops in the fields and produce in the marketplace.

**During the first three years of the Intifada, 93,589 verified tree uprootings have been performed by the Israeli Army as illegal collective punishment against Palestinians. These trees were either olive or fruit trees which constitute an important means for the subsistance of Palestinian families. Olive trees take fifteen years to reach maturity. This collective punishment constitutes a War Crime.**

**129. A man standing next to one of his olive trees uprooted by the Israeli Army.**

**130. A woman standing next to one of her olive trees uprooted by the Israeli Army.**



**131. A Palestinian victim of former Israeli Defense Minister Yitshak Rabin's "breaking bones" policy. The Israeli soldiers crush the bones of Palestinian demonstrators' hands and limbs in attempting to suppress the Intifada. These acts constitute War Crimes.**

**132. A Palestinian prisoner who was tortured in an Israeli prison. Note the scars on his back and arm from the Israelis applying a lighted cigarette to his bare skin and the welt marks on his arms and back from their beating him with straps. Torture constitutes a War Crime.**

Defiant Palestinian children giving the "V" for victory sign. The Israelis have been unable to crush the spirit of resistance of the Palestinians nor their hope for the future of Palestine.



133. Young Palestinian girl giving "V" for victory sign.

134. Two Palestinian girls and one Palestinian boy giving "V" for victory sign near posters calling for the release of prisoners and stopping the expulsion of Palestinians.

## PALESTINE

### I. The first Zionist colony in Palestine, 1878.

Coastline ———

Frontier ———

- Zionist colony
- Palestinian village
- Palestinian town
- Mixed town

The frontiers shown are those of the territory (excluding the Negev) that became Mandatory Palestine in 1922.

The size of the circles is not proportional to the number of inhabitants in the places represented except that the larger circles indicate towns and the smaller circles indicate villages.




PALESTINE
II. Zionist colonies in Palestine at the beginning of the British Mandate, 1920.
Coastline
Frontier
Railroad
Zionist colony
Zionist town
Palestinian village
Palestinian town
Mixed town
The frontiers shown are those of the territory (excluding the Negev) that became Mandatory Palestine in 1922.
The size of the circles is not proportional to the number of inhabitants in the places represented except that the larger circles indicate towns and the smaller circles indicate villages.
N
LEBANON
SYRIA
ACRE
SAFED
HAIFA
TIBERIAS
NAZARETH
JENIN
BEISAN
TULKARM
NABLUS
QALQILYAH
TEL AVIV
JAFFA
LYDDA
RAMLEH
RAMALLAH
JERICHO
JERUSALEM
BETHLEHEM
MAJDAL
HEBRON
GAZA
DEAD SEA
BEERSHEBA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA

# PALESTINE

## III. Zionist and Palestinian landownership in percentages by subdistrict, 1945.




The source for this map is *Village Statistics* (Jerusalem: Palestine Government, 1945). It was subsequently published as United Nations map no. 94(b) in August 1950.

The category of "public ownership" under the British Mandate derived from that known as *miri* under the Ottoman system of land tenure. Subsumed under the latter category, however, in addition to state domain, were many other subcategories that admitted a whole range of private and communal usufruct and leasehold.



## PALESTINE

**IV. Distribution of population by subdistrict, with percentages of Jews and Palestinians, 1946.**







The source for this map is the *Supplement to a Survey of Palestine* (Jerusalem: Government Printer, June 1947). It was subsequently published as United Nations map no. 93(b) in August 1950.

According to British sources, the semisedentary Bedouin population of the Negev was ca. 100,000 in 1946.



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


























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